We are beginning the ninth chapter, starting with the first Mishnah. Rabbi Eliezer says: What are we discussing here? We know that one way to annul a vow is to go to a Torah scholar, who finds a petach, an opening. Literally, petach means a door or opening. The scholar asks the person, “If you had known about this or that circumstance, would you have made the vow?” The person can then say, “If those circumstances had existed, I would not have made the vow.” That is the opening—a way out of the vow.
The question here is whether one may use honoring one’s father and mother as an opening. One could say to the person, “You made a vow, and as a result you caused your parents embarrassment and gave them a bad reputation.” The Gemara consistently views making vows as a negative thing. Sometimes a person who makes vows is even referred to as a wicked person, and they might say, “A wicked person, the son of a righteous person,” or even, “A wicked person, the son of a wicked person.” If the person’s parents are being disparaged because of his vow-making, perhaps one can say to him, “If you had known that making this vow would embarrass your parents, would you have made it?”
Rabbi Eliezer says that one may open the vow for a person through the honor of his father and mother. The scholar says to him: “If you had known that people would say about your parents, ‘Where did they learn to make vows? Their son learned this behavior from them, and they too treat vows lightly,’ would you have made the vow?” If he answers that he would not have made it, this is a valid opening, and the vow may be annulled.
We still have to wait for the Sages’ response in order to understand precisely why they disagree. The Mishnah continues: Rabbi Tzadok offered another suggestion. Instead of opening the vow through the honor of one’s father and mother, why not open every vow through the honor of God? Every vow could be addressed by telling the person, “If you had known that making a vow would anger God, and that God does not approve of vows, would you have made it?” In that way, we would have found an opening for every vow, using the honor of God.
The response was: “If so, there would be no vows.” In other words, you would have undermined the entire institution of vows. When a person makes a vow, it is as though he is making an oath in the name of the King Himself. That is therefore not an appropriate thing to do; it is as though he is diminishing the honor of the King. A person says, “I make a vow that I will not drink wine,” using God’s name for a mundane matter. That is a diminution of the King’s honor.
The response is repeated: “If so, there would be no vows.” You would have destroyed the entire concept of vows. The Mishnah therefore says that the Sages agree with Rabbi Eliezer in a particular case: when the vow directly affects one’s father and mother. In that case, one may go to a Torah scholar, and the scholar may say, “If you had known that this would disrespect your parents, would you have made the vow?”
The Sages do not allow an opening based on honoring one’s father and mother in an ordinary case. That is the position of the Sages. However, when the vow is between the person and his father or mother—when the vow itself directly affects them—the Sages agree that the person may go to a Torah scholar and have the vow annulled through that opening.
For example, a person made a vow that he would not give his parents any benefit. Now suppose his parents are destitute and need charity. It is not generally the obligation of a child to support his parents, but if they are impoverished, he does have an obligation to give them charity. The scholar can say to the son, “If you had known that what you were doing was wrong, would you have made the vow?” If he answers, “No, I would not have made it,” that can serve as an opening.
Although one normally cannot use honoring one’s parents as an opening, which is the position of the Sages, the Sages agree with Rabbi Eliezer when the vow is directly between the person and his parents. The Mishnah concludes that in such a case the vow may be annulled through the honor of one’s father and mother, but one may not annul a vow through the honor of God.
The reason one may not use the honor of God as an opening is that, if that were allowed, vows would never be annulled properly. The Rambam explains that a person who made a vow would be asked, “If you had known that this would diminish the honor of God, would you have made the vow?” No reasonable person will answer, “Yes, I would have made it anyway.” The person will lie because he is embarrassed to admit that he would disregard the honor of God. He will say, “If I had known that it would be such a degradation, I would not have made the vow.” But what may he really be thinking? “I would have made the vow anyway.” He is simply embarrassed to admit it.
Therefore, we cannot use the honor of God as an opening because we do not trust the person to tell the truth. He will not have the audacity to say to the scholar, “Even if I had known that this would diminish the Divine Presence, I would have made the vow anyway.” He will not say that. He knows that he is expected to say, “I did not realize it; I am sorry.” But he may not genuinely mean it. Since he may not mean it, there is a problem with the annulment. That is why the honor of God cannot serve as an opening.
There is, however, an important principle here. In the case of one particular commandment, a person may use it as an opening. For example, the scholar can say, “If you had known, when you made this vow, that you were violating this commandment, would you have made the vow?” A person is not necessarily embarrassed to tell the truth and say that he does not care about one particular commandment. He might lie when the matter concerns the Divine Presence, because he does not want to expose himself as someone who does not care about God’s honor. But when it concerns one commandment, he may honestly say, “I do not care about that commandment.” Since he can be trusted in that case, it can serve as an opening.
The scholar is therefore giving us an important rule. With the honor of God, one cannot use an opening because we are concerned that the vow will not be properly annulled. The person says, “If I had known that it would affect the honor of the Divine Presence, I would not have done it,” but we do not believe him. Perhaps he is a wicked person who would have done it even while knowing that the Divine Presence was being dishonored; he is merely too embarrassed to admit it. When it comes to one commandment, however, we can trust that the person is telling the truth.
For example, the observance of Shabbat can also serve as an opening for a vow. The person does not necessarily regard one commandment as something so serious that he will be embarrassed to admit that he would have made the vow anyway. If he says, “If I had known that this vow would cause me to violate the commandment, I would not have made it,” we can trust that this is his genuine response.
Let us return to the Mishnah. It continues: “And Rabbi Eliezer further said.” As a side point, normally the word “further” would not be used if another opinion appears in between. Rabbi Eliezer began the Mishnah, then we have the opinion of the Sages, and now we return to Rabbi Eliezer. Normally, the Mishnah should simply say, “Rabbi Eliezer said,” rather than, “Rabbi Eliezer further said.”
The Ran points out this question. The end of this Mishnah appears on the second side of the page, in the first broad line of the Ran’s commentary: “Our Mishnah: And Rabbi Eliezer further said, one may open a vow through a subsequent development.” The Ran explains that we cannot ask our usual question about the word “further,” because the Sages’ statement appears between Rabbi Eliezer’s two statements. Rabbi Eliezer’s second statement introduces an additional leniency, and whenever someone gives a lenient ruling, the force of the leniency is significant. Thus, when a rabbi gives a second statement that is more lenient, we may use the word “further” even though another rabbi’s opinion appears between the two statements.
What is the second case? Rabbi Eliezer further says that one may open a vow through a subsequent development, while the Sages prohibit it. Let us explain what this means. A subsequent development is a circumstance that could not have been anticipated when the person made the vow. It is something far-fetched, something that never entered the mind of the person who made the vow.
The question is: when the person later comes for the annulment of the vow, what do we do? One possible argument is that when something is so unlikely and so far-fetched, even if the person had thought about it, he would have dismissed it because he assumed it could never happen. He therefore made the vow even on the assumption that this unlikely circumstance might somehow occur.
That is the ordinary logic regarding a far-fetched circumstance: one cannot annul a vow on that basis. Since the person never expected it to happen, even if he thought about it, he would have said, “That will never happen, so I am making the vow regardless.” But when the circumstance is common, possible, or plausible, the person may have considered it. He may have thought, “Perhaps this will happen,” and therefore may not have made the vow had he known it would occur.
Rabbi Eliezer nevertheless rules leniently even in the case of a subsequent development that was not plausible and was far-fetched. One may later say to the person, “If you had known that this would happen, would you have made the vow?” If he answers that he would not have made it, that is an opening, even though the subsequent development was improbable.
What is the case? The Mishnah says: A person declared, “This person shall be forbidden to me for benefit,” meaning that he would not receive any benefit from a particular individual, or that he would not provide benefit to that individual. Subsequently, that person became a scholar. The one who made the vow had regarded him as an ignorant and unworthy person, but the man unexpectedly became a Torah scholar. The person now wants to benefit from him, but the vow prevents him from doing so.
He can say, “If I had known that this person would become a Torah scholar, I would not have made the vow.” Rabbi Eliezer allows that to serve as an opening, even though the person could not have anticipated that this individual would become a scholar. Once he became a scholar, everyone needed him—to ask him questions, seek his advice, and benefit from his Torah knowledge.
The Mishnah gives another case: the person about whom the vow was made married off his son. The one who made the vow now wants to attend the wedding and benefit from the celebration. He says, “If I had known that this person would marry off his son, I would not have made the vow.” The circumstance was not anticipated, and the Mishnah treats it as a subsequent development.
One might ask: becoming a scholar is perhaps a far-fetched development that would never enter a person’s mind. But a person marrying off his son seems more ordinary. Why is that considered a subsequent development? The early commentators ask this question. The Rosh answers that the vow was made for a specific period of time—a limited window. During that period, the person did not expect this man’s son to get married. Because the wedding occurred within that particular time frame, it is treated as a subsequent development.
The Ran explains the distinction between a circumstance that is likely to occur and one that is not likely to occur. When something is common, the person can say that he made the vow on a mistaken premise: had he known that this normal and foreseeable event would occur, he would not have made the vow. Since it was plausible, it is possible that he had considered it.
But when the circumstance is far-fetched, the person does not anticipate it. He says, “I am so certain that this will never happen that even if it does happen, I am making the vow anyway.” That is why the Sages say that one cannot annul a vow on the basis of a subsequent development. Rabbi Eliezer, however, rules that even such an unlikely development can serve as an opening.
There is another case in the Mishnah: “I will not enter this person’s house,” or “I will not enter this house.” Later, a new circumstance develops, and the person says, “If I had known this would happen, I would not have made the vow.” That too is a case of a subsequent development, and we will see it discussed in the Gemara.
Before beginning the Gemara, let us read one point from the Jerusalem Talmud, which the Ran quotes. We have established that, according to everyone, one may not use the honor of God as an opening. Everyone would say, “If I had known that this would diminish the honor of God, I would not have made the vow,” because the person would be embarrassed to say otherwise. The same should apply to the honor of one’s teacher. A person will not say to his teacher, “Even if I had known that I was dishonoring you, I would have made the vow anyway.” Just as one cannot use the honor of God, one cannot use the honor of one’s teacher.
Now we begin the Gemara. The language of the Mishnah was that Rabbi Tzadok said to Rabbi Eliezer: According to what you are saying—that one may open a vow through honoring one’s father and mother—why not open every vow through the honor of God? Whenever a person comes to a scholar and says, “I need the vow removed,” the scholar could give the same answer: “If you had known that this would embarrass God or diminish the honor of the Divine Presence, would you have made the vow?” Why, then, do you limit the opening to honoring one’s father and mother? Why not use the honor of God as an opening for every vow?
Rabbi Eliezer responds: “If so, there would be no vows.” The Ran explains that this means that no vow would ever be annulled correctly. Even if a person had the courage to say that he did not care about the honor of God, he would not express himself that way in front of the scholar. The person would say, “If I had known, I would not have made the vow,” even if he actually would have made it. He would be too embarrassed to tell the scholar that he did not care about the honor of the Divine Presence.
This is why the Sages agree regarding the honor of God but disagree regarding the honor of one’s parents. When a person makes a vow affecting his parents, he may have enough audacity to say, “Even if I had known that my parents would be embarrassed, I would have made the vow anyway.” A person may not regard honoring his parents as equivalent to honoring the Divine Presence. Therefore, when he says that he would not have made the vow because it would embarrass his parents, we can trust that he is making an honest determination.
This is the position of Abaye. The Gemara then presents another approach. It says: If so, there would be no vows to be annulled by a scholar. If one were allowed to open every vow through the honor of God, every person could create this opening for himself. He would say, “If I had known that the vow diminished the honor of God, I would not have made it.” He would then annul the vow himself rather than go to a scholar.
There is a rule that a person cannot annul his own vow; he must go to a scholar. The concern is that if the scholars always use the honor of God as an opening, every person will make a vow and then say to himself, “If I had known about the honor of God, I would not have made it.” He would regard the vow as already annulled and would no longer go to a scholar. In this way, the entire institution of vows would be undermined.
But is honoring one’s father and mother not also a universal matter? Whenever a person makes a vow, people may call him a wicked person and say that he has embarrassed his parents. Why, then, should the rabbis be permitted to use the honor of one’s parents as an opening? Why does the same concern not apply?
The answer, according to the explanation of the Ran, is that not every vow involves the parents in a way that causes them disgrace. There are certain vows that are not so serious and do not cause the parents significant embarrassment. Those vows cannot be annulled through the honor of one’s parents. Only some vows fall into that category. Therefore, when a vow does directly affect the parents, the person must still go to a scholar, because he cannot assume that every vow can be annulled through that opening.
The difference is that every vow is connected in some way to the honor of God, since the person uses God’s name in making the vow. Thus, the honor of God is a universal factor affecting every vow. If that could serve as an opening, the person could use it for every vow and would annul the vow himself. The honor of one’s parents, however, affects only certain vows. Since it is not universal, the person will still need to go to a scholar in those cases.
The Gemara continues with the statement in the Mishnah that the Sages agree with Rabbi Eliezer in one case: when the vow is between the person and his father or mother. For example, a person made a vow that he would not provide benefit to his parents. The Sages agree that he may go to a scholar, who can tell him, “If you had known that what you did was disrespectful to your parents, would you have made the vow?” That can serve as an opening.
The Gemara says that this is understandable according to Abaye’s reasoning. Abaye explained that the problem with using the honor of God is that the person will not give a truthful answer. He will lie because he is embarrassed to admit that he would have made the vow despite the dishonor to God. But in the case of a vow against one’s parents, we can trust the person. Someone who had the audacity to make such a vow against his parents may also have the audacity to tell the scholar, “Even if I had known that my parents would be embarrassed, I would have made the vow anyway.” Since he is not embarrassed to express that attitude, his answer can be trusted.
The Gemara then asks how this works according to Rava. Rava’s reason was that if one could use the honor of one’s parents as an opening in every case, the person would never go to a scholar. He would simply say to himself, “If I had known that my parents would be embarrassed, I would not have made the vow,” and annul it himself. If so, why do the Sages allow this one case, in which the vow is directly between the person and his parents?
The Gemara answers that this is the one exception. In all other cases involving the honor of one’s parents, the scholar cannot annul the vow through that opening. Therefore, the person will still be forced to go to a scholar for all the other vows. Since he is accustomed to going to a scholar in almost every case, we are not concerned that he will annul this one type of vow by himself.
In other words, if the scholars used the honor of one’s parents as an opening in every case, the person would say, “I do not need to go to a scholar. I know what the scholar will tell me: if I had known that my parents would be upset, I would not have made the vow.” That would undermine the requirement to go to a scholar. But since the scholars do not use that opening in the other cases, the person knows that he must go to a scholar for almost every vow. Therefore, allowing this one exception does not create the same concern.
The Ran explains that since most vows cannot be annulled through the honor of one’s parents, the person will continue going to a scholar. Even though he could technically use that opening in the one case where the vow is directly between him and his parents, he is accustomed to going to a scholar for all his other vows. We are therefore not concerned that he will annul this vow himself.
The Gemara returns to the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages regarding a subsequent development. Rabbi Eliezer permits a person to use an unpredictable and far-fetched circumstance as an opening. The Sages prohibit it. The reasoning of the Sages is that when a person makes a vow, he takes all possibilities into account. Regarding an unlikely circumstance, he thinks, “I do not believe this will happen, but even if it does happen, I am making the vow.” Therefore, the later occurrence of that circumstance cannot serve as an opening.
Rabbi Eliezer brings a proof from Moshe Rabbeinu. Moshe was in Midian, and he had made a vow to Yitro that he would remain there. God then appeared to Moshe and told him to return to Egypt, because the people who had been pursuing him had died. The Gemara uses this as a basis for saying that if Moshe had known that those people would die, he would not have made the vow to remain with Yitro. Their death was an unlikely circumstance, yet it served as an opening to release Moshe from the vow.
Rabbi Eliezer therefore argues that one may annul a vow through a subsequent development. The death of those people was considered a subsequent development, and nevertheless Moshe’s vow was released on that basis. From here, he seeks to prove that even an unpredictable circumstance can serve as an opening.
The Ran asks what the Sages will do with this proof. The Sages answer that those people did not actually die. Whenever the Torah says that the people who were troubling Moshe had died, it is referring to Datan and Aviram. We know that Datan and Aviram were still alive later, since they were involved in the dispute of Korach. Therefore, the verse cannot mean that they had physically died.
Rather, they had lost their property. Losing one’s wealth is considered a form of death. Once they lost their money, they lost their influence and their ability to cause trouble. They no longer had the standing to go to Pharaoh and malign Moshe Rabbeinu. They lost their wealth, their influence, their words, and their audience. Thus, when God told Moshe that the people who had been pursuing him had died, it meant that they had lost their power.
According to the Ran, losing one’s property is not considered a subsequent development. Poverty is a common occurrence. Rabbi Zeira says that poverty is prevalent, and therefore it is not an unpredictable event. The Sages can therefore explain that Moshe’s vow was released on the basis of something foreseeable, not on the basis of an actual subsequent development.
The commentators ask how we know that Datan and Aviram were poor rather than suffering from one of the other conditions that are described as being equivalent to death. The Rosh answers that even if they had become afflicted with leprosy, they would still have retained the ability to influence Pharaoh against Moshe, and they would not necessarily have been expelled from the community. We also know that they were not blind, because later, during the dispute of Korach, they said to Moshe, “Even if you gouge out the eyes of those men, we will not go up.” That shows that they could see.
Nor could they have been childless, because their children later participated in the dispute of Korach. We therefore know that the death referred to in the verse was the loss of their property. Their wealth and influence disappeared, and that is what was considered their death. Since poverty is a common and foreseeable occurrence, the verse does not provide a proof that one may annul a vow on the basis of a true subsequent development.