The Eri B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, Gittin, has been sponsored by our good friend and loyal student of Daf Yomi, Mr. Haim Idana, and his dear wife. May the Almighty protect them and keep them in life. They have dedicated this tractate according to the principle taught by our rabbis: when a person studies a particular subject, the study can avert that matter from occurring. We therefore wish to study Tractate Gittin so that it will remain in the realm of learning and never come to fruition in actuality. May Mr. Idana, his dear wife, and all of the Jewish people be blessed with peace in the home, success, prosperity, and blessing in all their endeavors. Amen.
What is an apoteki? The word is an acronym, or a combination of three words, meaning, “From here you may take.” When a person borrows money, he designates a particular asset and tells the lender, “If I do not repay you, you may collect from this asset.” This is not necessarily collateral in the ordinary sense. Rather, he designates a particular property from which the lender may collect if the loan is not repaid.
There are two types of apoteki. In one case, the borrower says specifically, “Only from this item.” If something happens to that item, the lender loses the opportunity to collect from it. In the other case, the borrower designates an item without making it exclusive. If something happens to that asset, the lender may still collect from other property.
In the case before us, a person borrowed money and made his slave an apoteki. He said, in effect, “If I do not repay the loan, you may take this slave.” He then freed the slave. The Mishnah states that, according to the strict law, the slave is not obligated to do anything. However, because of a rabbinic enactment, the slave’s master is forced to free him, and the slave must write a document of freedom for his own value. The document is not written by the one who originally owned him; it is written by the person who freed him.
This Mishnah is extremely vague and difficult to understand. The Gemara will explain every word and detail of the case, and afterward we will return to the Mishnah and see precisely how everything fits together. As Rashi indicates, we must wait for the Gemara to clarify the entire situation.
Let us first establish the terminology. The borrower made the slave an apoteki for the loan, and then the slave was freed. The first question is: who freed him?
Rav answers that it was the first master, meaning the borrower. After the borrower designated the slave as an apoteki and borrowed the money, he freed the slave. When the Mishnah says that, according to the strict law, the slave is not obligated to do anything, what does that mean? It means that he is not obligated to do anything for the second master, namely, the lender.
This follows the opinion of Rava, who teaches the principle that consecration, chametz, and manumission can remove an asset from a lien. A lien means that a person has a legal claim on an asset because money is owed to him. Here, the lender has a lien on the slave. Nevertheless, there are certain acts that are stronger than the lien and can override it.
The first example is consecration. Suppose a person borrows money and makes his animal an apoteki, telling the lender, “If I do not pay, you may take this animal.” A lien now exists on the animal. The borrower then consecrates the animal, declaring it holy for the altar. Is the consecration effective? The answer is yes. The animal becomes consecrated, and the lender’s lien is removed. The lender may no longer take the animal.
Why? There is a principle that certain matters are stronger than a lien. In this case, the animal was merely an apoteki. It was not actually in the lender’s possession; it remained in the borrower’s possession. Therefore, the borrower still had the ability to consecrate it.
The second example concerns chametz. Suppose a Jew borrowed money from a non-Jew and told him, “If I do not repay you, you may take this chametz.” Passover arrives, and the chametz becomes prohibited. The prohibition of chametz removes the non-Jew’s lien, because the chametz is still considered to be in the Jew’s possession. Since it is considered the Jew’s chametz, it becomes prohibited on Passover and may not be derived from. The fact that the non-Jew has a lien does not transform the chametz into the property of the non-Jew.
The third example is the slave in our case. Once the borrower frees the slave, the act of manumission has the power to override the lien. Therefore, the manumission is legally effective. If one were to argue that the borrower had no right to free the slave because the slave had already been designated for repayment of the loan, the answer would be that the lender’s claim is only a lien. The slave remains in the borrower’s possession, and manumission overrides that lien.
We can now return to the Mishnah according to Rav. The borrower made the slave an apoteki for the lender and then freed him. The manumission is effective because the freeing of a slave overrides a lien. According to the strict law, the slave is no longer obligated to do anything for the lender. Once he is free, the lender may not collect the loan from him. In practical terms, the asset that had been designated for the lender has now been lost to the lender, and the lender may not take the slave as payment because he is already a free man.
However, there is a concern. The lender may encounter this former slave and say, “You are mine. You were designated to me for this loan, and therefore you are still my slave.” Why is that a serious concern? The former slave may have married a Jewish woman. His children are completely valid; they are not illegitimate. But if people regard him as a slave who married an Israelite woman, they may claim that his children are disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. A slave who marries an Israelite woman does not produce illegitimate children, but the children are considered disqualified from the priesthood.
To prevent people from making this claim, the law requires the second master—the lender—to free him as well. The lender is forced to declare him a free man and write him a document of freedom. The first master, the borrower, already freed him, but the concern is that the lender will go around claiming that the man is still his slave because he had been pledged to him. Therefore, the lender must write the document so that no one can challenge the status of the former slave or question the status of his children.
This is not a law of the Torah. It is a rabbinic enactment made for the sake of the social consequences involved. Once the lender writes the document, the former slave can produce it if challenged and say, “You yourself gave me this document, and the court has established that I am free.” This protects him from anyone who might attempt to claim that he is still a slave and, consequently, that his children are disqualified.
The Mishnah then says that the slave must write a document for his own value. In other words, although he is free, he must compensate the lender for the fact that the lender allowed him to be freed. This is not payment of the original loan. The slave is not paying the loan, because the manumission by the first master was effective, and technically the slave no longer owes the lender anything. Rather, as part of the rabbinic enactment, the slave must provide compensation to the lender for the benefit he received when the lender’s claim was removed.
The Gemara explains that the person who must provide the compensation is the one who freed him—the borrower. The borrower caused the entire problem by freeing the slave after designating him as an apoteki. Since his action placed the lender in the position of having to free the slave and suffer a loss, the borrower must compensate him.
As Rashi explains, the borrower affected the lender by placing him in a position where he had to free his slave. The borrower must therefore pay compensation. The slave himself is not paying the value of the loan, but there is a benefit in the fact that the lender permitted the manumission, and that benefit must be compensated.
At this point, we must clarify an important limitation. The borrower is not automatically exempt from the loan. We are discussing an apoteki that was not designated exclusively for this loan. If the borrower has other assets, the lender can certainly collect from those other assets. The discussion concerns a case in which the designated slave was the borrower’s only asset. The early commentators point out that, if the borrower has other property, the lender may collect from it. The question is what happens when the slave was the only asset available.
The Gemara presents a dispute between the Sages and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. The underlying question is: what is the law when a person damages another person’s lien? Here, the borrower damaged the lender’s lien by freeing the slave.
According to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, one who damages another person’s lien is liable. The borrower must pay the lender the value of the slave, which corresponds to the amount of the loan for which the slave had been designated. If the loan was one thousand dollars and the slave was worth one thousand dollars, the borrower pays the lender one thousand dollars, and the loan has effectively been covered. If the slave was worth only eight hundred dollars, the borrower pays eight hundred dollars through this obligation, and the lender may collect the remaining two hundred dollars from other assets if the borrower has them. If the borrower has no other assets, the lender receives only the eight hundred dollars represented by the slave.
This is an interesting form of damage. The borrower did not directly damage the lender. He damaged the apoteki that had been designated for repayment. Nevertheless, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel considers this damage to the lender’s lien and requires compensation.
The Sages disagree and say that the borrower is exempt. The borrower did not directly damage the lender; he damaged only the lender’s lien, and damaging a lien is considered an indirect form of damage. Therefore, the borrower is not required to pay for the value of the slave. The slave himself must provide compensation to the lender, but that compensation is not payment of the debt. It is remuneration for the benefit he received from the lender’s agreement to free him.
According to this first interpretation, the Mishnah reads as follows: the borrower made the slave an apoteki for the lender, and then the borrower freed him. The manumission is effective because freeing a slave overrides a lien. The lender may not collect from the slave because the lien has been overridden. Nevertheless, because we are concerned that the lender will claim that the man is still his slave and thereby cause people to question the status of the man’s children, the lender is forced to write him a document of freedom.
The slave must provide compensation for the document, while the borrower is responsible for compensation according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel because he damaged the lender’s lien. If the slave was worth the full amount of the loan, the borrower must pay that value. If the slave was worth less, the borrower pays the value of the slave, and the lender collects any balance from other assets if they exist. The Sages maintain that the borrower is exempt because damage to a lien is not considered direct damage, while the slave must pay only a separate compensation for the benefit he received.
The Gemara then brings a proof to this interpretation. The discussion concerns a person who damages another person’s lien, and the dispute is whether he is liable. This supports the explanation that the borrower was the one who freed the slave and that the question is whether his action damaged the lender’s lien.
There is, however, a second way to understand the Mishnah, offered by Ulla. According to Ulla, who freed the slave was the second master, namely, the lender. The lender went ahead and freed the slave, even though the slave was not actually in the lender’s possession. The slave was merely an apoteki for the lender; the lender did not have the authority to free him as though he were his own slave.
According to the strict law, the slave is not yet obligated in commandments like a full-fledged Israelite. Normally, when a slave is freed, he becomes obligated in the commandments. In this case, however, the lender’s act is not a fully valid act of manumission, because the lender does not have the legal authority to free the slave. The slave was only designated as an apoteki. Therefore, according to the strict law, the slave remains obligated only in the limited commandments applicable to a woman, including commandments that are not time-bound.
Nevertheless, there is a public concern. Once word spreads that the slave has been freed, people will see him as a free man. They may not know the technical details of the case. If they observe him failing to perform commandments, they will ask, “This man is free. Why is he not putting on phylacteries in the morning? Why is he not fulfilling the commandments expected of a free Jew?”
To prevent this confusion, the first master—the borrower, who is the slave’s actual master—is forced to make him a free man. The lender placed the borrower in this position by improperly freeing the slave and creating the public impression that he was free. The borrower must therefore write a document of freedom. The Mishnah then says that the slave must write a document for his own value.
According to the Sages, the one who must provide compensation is the person who actually freed him, namely, the lender. The lender caused the borrower to lose his slave. The borrower owed the lender one thousand dollars, but the slave may have been worth one thousand five hundred dollars. Since the lender’s action forced the borrower to free a slave worth more than the debt, someone must compensate the borrower for the additional five hundred dollars.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the lender is liable for this additional value. The lender damaged the borrower by forcing him to free the slave. The borrower owed one thousand dollars, but he was compelled to give up an asset worth one thousand five hundred dollars. The lender must therefore pay the difference of five hundred dollars.
The Sages disagree. They maintain that the lender’s action is a form of damage that is not recognizable. There are damages that are visible, and there are damages that are not visible. A classic example is a person who renders another person’s terumah impure. One looks at the terumah and sees no physical change, but the terumah has become unusable. Similarly, if someone pours a libation into another person’s wine, the wine looks exactly the same, but it may no longer be used. This is called damage that is not recognizable.
The case before us is also damage that is not recognizable. The lender’s act caused the borrower a loss, but nothing appears physically damaged in the slave himself. The slave is healthy and looks exactly as he did before. Nevertheless, the lender’s action forced the borrower to relinquish an asset worth more than the debt.
Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel considers such damage to be legally recognized damage and therefore requires the lender to compensate the borrower. The Sages say that damage that is not recognizable is not considered damage in this context, so the lender is not liable. The slave is freed, and the one thousand dollars represented by the loan is effectively relinquished. But the additional five hundred dollars—the amount by which the slave’s value exceeded the loan—must be paid by the slave as the price of his freedom.
Let us now review the Mishnah according to Ulla. The borrower, the actual master, made the slave an apoteki. The lender then freed him, even though the lender had no real authority to free him. According to the strict law, the slave is not yet obligated in the commandments applicable to a free Jew. However, because people will hear that he has been freed and will wonder why he is not performing those commandments, the borrower is forced to make him fully free and write him a document of freedom.
The Sages say that the slave must compensate his master for any amount by which the slave’s value exceeds the loan. The loan itself is relinquished through the manumission, but the excess value must be paid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that the lender must pay that additional amount because the lender’s action caused the borrower to lose the excess value of the slave.
The Gemara then explains why Rav did not interpret the Mishnah like Ulla, and why Ulla did not interpret it like Rav. According to Rav, the difficulty with Ulla’s interpretation is the language of the Mishnah. If the lender was the one who freed the slave, why does the Mishnah refer to him as the master? He is not really the slave’s master; he merely has a lien on him. The Mishnah should have said that the lender is forced to free him, not that his master is forced to free him.
Ulla can respond that the second person is indeed called the master because he is the one who performed the act of freeing. The Mishnah says that the master designated the slave as an apoteki and then freed him, and the language fits the lender because he was the one who issued the document of freedom.
Rav, however, raises another difficulty with Ulla’s interpretation. According to the Mishnah, the one who frees the slave must write the document for the slave’s value. But according to Ulla, the lender is called the one who freed him even though the lender’s act was not a valid act of freedom. The actual manumission is performed by the borrower. Therefore, Rav says that the language of the Mishnah does not fit Ulla’s interpretation either. Each interpretation has a difficulty in the wording of the Mishnah.
The Gemara then presents a similar case. A person makes his field an apoteki for a lender, and afterward a river floods the field and renders it unusable. There are two types of apoteki, as we explained earlier. Sometimes a person says, “You may collect from this property,” without making it exclusive. If something happens to that property, the lender may collect from other assets. Sometimes he says, “You may collect only from this property.” In that case, if the property is destroyed, the lender loses his claim.
The Gemara records a statement that, when the field is flooded, the lender cannot collect from other assets. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak explains that this was said about a particular scholar known as the handsome one, who nevertheless made statements that were not attractive. The point is that it would seem unreasonable to say that the lender loses everything merely because the field was flooded. If the borrower did not say that the lender must collect specifically from this field, why should the lender not be able to collect from other property?
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak therefore explains that there is no dispute between the two authorities. The statement that the lender loses the loan concerns a case in which the borrower specifically said, “You may collect from this property.” Once the borrower made that condition, the lender accepted that if the field were destroyed, he would lose his claim. The other authority was discussing a case in which the borrower merely designated the field without saying that it was exclusive. In that case, the lender may collect from other property.
A baraita supports this distinction. If a person makes his field an apoteki for a lender and the field is then flooded, the lender may collect from other assets if the borrower did not say, “This field alone.” The same applies if a person designates a field for a debt owed to his wife under her marriage contract. If he does not say specifically that she may collect only from that field, she may collect from other assets.
There is, however, a distinction between an ordinary lender and a wife collecting her marriage settlement. With an ordinary lender, if the borrower designated a field without saying that it was exclusive, the borrower may sell that field, and the lender can collect from another property. The lender must conduct his own search and determine from which property he can collect.
A wife is treated differently. Even when the husband did not say explicitly, “Only from this field,” her mind is focused on the field that was designated for her. She is not interested in having every property pledged to her in a way that forces her to determine which property was sold last and which one remains subject to her claim. Therefore, she may collect from the original field that was designated for her, even though the husband did not use the word “only.” This is a special provision in her favor.
We now come to the next Mishnah, which discusses a slave who is half slave and half free. This can occur when two partners own one slave and one partner frees his half while the other partner retains his half.
The Mishnah states that the slave works for one master one day and for himself the next day. This was a rabbinic enactment. Since he is half slave and half free, without this enactment he could simply remain idle. He could say that he is free and therefore does not have to work, while the other side would say that he is still a slave and must work. The Sages therefore established that he works one day and rests the next day. One day belongs to the remaining master, and the following day belongs to the slave himself.
Beit Hillel initially said that this arrangement repaired the situation for the master, because the master at least receives the slave’s labor every other day, but it did not repair the situation for the slave. The slave cannot marry a female slave because he is half free, and he cannot marry a free Jewish woman because he is still half a slave. Yet the world was created to be inhabited, and the purpose of human existence includes bringing children into the world. The slave is being prevented from marrying and establishing a family.
Therefore, the master who retained ownership is forced to write a document freeing the slave completely. The slave must compensate that master for half of his value, because the master paid money to acquire his half of the slave. If the slave was worth one thousand dollars, the master paid for the ownership interest and is now being forced to relinquish it. The slave must therefore compensate the master for the portion being freed.
Initially, Beit Shammai made the enactment that the slave should work one day and rest one day. Beit Hillel objected that this arrangement helped the master but did not help the slave. Later, Beit Hillel retracted its position and accepted the view of Beit Shammai that the second master must be forced to free the slave completely.
The Gemara then brings a baraita concerning a person who frees half of his slave. The question is whether one may free a slave partially. Everyone agrees that a person who wishes to free his slave completely may do so. The question is whether he may free only half of the slave.
Rabbi Meir says that the partial manumission is effective to some degree. The Sages say that it is not effective. Rashi explains that, according to Rabbi Meir, the person acquires the slave’s half-free status, so that the slave becomes a free man with respect to that portion. The Sages say that the act accomplishes nothing.
Rabbah explains that the dispute concerns a document of manumission. The Torah says regarding a female slave that she was not freed, using language that juxtaposes redemption with the granting of a document. From this juxtaposition, Rabbi Meir derives that just as money can free a slave partially, a document can also free a slave partially.
The Sages reject this derivation. They compare the document of a slave to the document of divorce given to a woman. Just as a document of divorce completely severs the relationship and does not operate partially, so too a document of manumission must completely free the slave. According to the Sages, a document cannot partially free a slave. According to Rabbi Meir, it can.
Everyone agrees, however, that money can free a slave partially. The verse says, in effect, that she was redeemed but was not redeemed. This teaches that she can be redeemed partially. If her value is one thousand dollars, she can redeem half of herself with five hundred dollars. The dispute concerns only a document.
Rabbah explains that Rabbi Meir makes a juxtaposition between money and a document: just as money can free a slave partially, a document can also free a slave partially. The Sages instead use a verbal analogy based on the repeated word “for her.” They say that the analogy to a woman’s document is stronger, and a document of manumission must therefore be complete.
Usually, when there is a choice between a juxtaposition and a verbal analogy, the verbal analogy is stronger. In many cases, the words used for the verbal analogy are extra, which gives them greater force. A juxtaposition, by contrast, is derived from the fact that two subjects appear next to each other. Furthermore, a verbal analogy is a received tradition from Sinai, whereas a juxtaposition can be derived independently.
Why, then, does Rabbi Meir prefer the juxtaposition in this case? He can argue that the comparison to a woman is not exact. A woman cannot be freed with money, while a slave can be freed with money. The slave therefore has greater flexibility in the laws of manumission than a woman has in the laws of divorce. Since the two cases are not fully parallel, the verbal analogy is flawed, and Rabbi Meir relies on the juxtaposition.
Thus, according to Rabbah, everyone agrees that money can free a slave partially. The dispute concerns a document. Rabbi Meir uses the juxtaposition between redemption and a document to say that the document can also work partially. The Sages use the verbal analogy to the document of a woman and say that a document must free the slave completely.
Rav Yosef offers a different explanation. According to Rav Yosef, the dispute concerns money itself. Rabbi Meir understands the verse to mean that the slave is redeemed but not redeemed, which indicates that money can free him partially. The Sages understand the verse as ordinary, flowery language and do not derive a partial redemption from it. According to them, manumission must be complete.
According to Rav Yosef, everyone agrees that a document cannot free a slave partially. The dispute is only about money. A baraita appears to challenge Rav Yosef because it presents the dispute as one concerning a document. The baraita says that Rabbi Meir considers a partial document effective, while the Sages say that it is not.
The Gemara answers that Rav Yosef must revise his position. The dispute is indeed about a document, as the baraita states. However, it is also a dispute about money. The baraita emphasizes the dispute concerning the document in order to show how lenient Rabbi Meir is. Rabbi Meir says that even a document, despite the verbal analogy to a woman’s document, can work partially.
The baraita does not need to state the dispute about money because the verse itself indicates that Rabbi Meir permits partial redemption. Its purpose is to teach the additional novelty that Rabbi Meir also permits a partial document. The Sages, meanwhile, reject the partial document and maintain that it must be complete.
The Gemara then returns to the verse. It says that the female slave was freed with money. Could one conclude that she is completely free? The verse says that she was not freed. Could one conclude that she is not free at all? The verse says that she was freed. How can both statements be reconciled? The answer is that she is free and not free: money can free her partially.
The Gemara then asks how we know that a document can free a female slave. The verse says that she was not freed and uses language indicating that she was not given a document. We know from the laws of divorce that a woman is freed through a document, and the same expression is used. Just as a woman is freed through a document, a slave can also be freed through a document.
From these verses, one might initially conclude that money can free a slave partially, while a document can free a slave only completely. The Gemara then derives from the juxtaposition between the two forms of freedom that just as money can operate partially, a document can also operate partially. This is the basis of the baraita that presents Rabbi Meir as allowing partial manumission through a document.
According to Rav Yosef, the author of the baraita can therefore be Rabbi Meir, since Rav Yosef understands Rabbi Meir to say that both money and a document can free a slave partially. According to Rabbah, however, money is accepted by everyone as a means of partial manumission, while the dispute concerning the document is between Rabbi Meir and the Sages.
Rabbah can explain that the first part of the baraita follows the view accepted by everyone, namely, that money can free a slave partially, while the later part follows Rabbi Meir, who extends that principle to a document. Although it is generally preferable not to say that different parts of a baraita follow different opinions, Rabbah can alternatively say that the entire baraita follows Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir accepts partial freedom through money and also accepts partial freedom through a document.
We now return to our Mishnah. The Mishnah discusses a slave who is half slave and half free. If one person owned the entire slave, how could he become half free? The answer is that there were two masters. One master freed his half completely, while the other master retained his half.
According to the universal view that money can free a slave partially, the Mishnah can be understood as dealing with a case in which the slave redeemed himself partially with money. According to Rav Yosef, however, partial redemption through money is itself a dispute. He would therefore have to say that the Mishnah follows the opinion of Rabbi Meir.
The Gemara prefers not to limit the Mishnah to Rabbi Meir. It answers that the Mishnah is not speaking about one master who freed only half of his slave. It is speaking about two masters, one of whom freed his entire ownership interest. Since that master owned only half of the slave, his act completely freed the half that belonged to him. The other master retained the other half, leaving the slave half free and half enslaved.
Accordingly, the Mishnah can follow all opinions. The first master did not partially free the slave; he freed his entire portion. The slave remained half free only because another master still owned the other half. That is why the Mishnah’s case does not depend on the dispute over whether a single master can free one slave partially with money.
May our study of these laws remain in the realm of learning and bring blessing, protection, and peace. Amen.