Our discussion today begins by revisiting a halachic dispute from our Mishna concerning an individual bitten by a rabid dog. The Mishna presents a disagreement between the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Matya ben Charash. The question is whether one may feed the patient liver from the infected dog, which was considered a remedy in ancient times. The Tanna Kamma prohibits this, arguing that since the dog's liver is non-kosher, it cannot be given for a treatment that is not definitively curative. Rabbi Matya ben Charash, however, permits it, asserting that the diseased liver will indeed cure the patient, thereby justifying its use to save a life. It is worth noting a historical anecdote: Dr. Louis Pasteur, renowned for his work on immunization, reportedly found inspiration for his research in this very Gemara, after reading its French translation by Dr. Rabinovitch. Pasteur's work, which involves introducing a weakened form of a disease to induce recovery, mirrors the Gemara's concept of using a part of the diseased dog for a cure, illustrating the profound wisdom contained within the Talmud.
The Gemara then presents a Baraita detailing five signs to identify a rabid or sickly dog. These include: its mouth remaining open, saliva dripping, ears drooping, tail sagging between its legs, and walking along the sides of the road rather than the middle. Some add a sixth sign: it barks, but its sound is inaudible. The Gemara then explores the origin of this condition. Rav suggests that sorceresses use their witchcraft on these dogs, causing their affliction. Rashi clarifies that they "try out their magic" on the dogs. Shmuel, however, attributes it to an evil spirit that possesses the dog. The practical difference between these two opinions, a nafka mina, concerns how such a dog should be killed. According to Shmuel, who believes in an evil spirit, one must kill the dog from a distance, using a thrown object, to avoid direct contact that could transfer the spirit to the killer. Conversely, if the affliction is due to witchcraft, Rashi implies direct contact is permissible. However, Rabbeinu Elyakim offers an alternative interpretation, stating that a dog possessed by an evil spirit can be killed from a distance, but one afflicted by witchcraft cannot be killed at all, as any involvement would lead to contamination by the black magic itself.
A Baraita is brought to support Shmuel's view, stating that when such a dog is killed, it must be done with a thrown object, not directly. Brushing against a rabid dog is dangerous, and a bite can be fatal. The Gemara asks for the remedy for someone who has brushed against such a dog. The answer is to immediately remove one's clothes, throw them forward, and run. This is illustrated by the story of Rav Huna the son of Rabbi Yehoshua, who, after brushing against a rabid dog in the marketplace, removed his clothes and ran, quoting the verse, "Wisdom brings life to its owner," as his knowledge of this remedy saved him from danger. For someone bitten by a rabid dog, which is a fatal condition, the Gemara asks for the remedy. Abaye suggests taking the skin of a male monkey (as interpreted by Rabbeinu Elyakim) and writing a specific incantation upon it. The clothes worn during the bite should be buried at a crossroads for twelve months, then exhumed, burned in an oven, and their ashes scattered at the crossroads. During these twelve months, the patient must drink water only through a copper straw. This is to prevent them from seeing their reflection or, more critically, the reflection of the evil spirit in the water, which could be dangerous. The story of Abba bar Marta (also known as Abba bar Minyume), whose mother made him a golden straw for this purpose, is cited. The Ramban further explains that those bitten by venomous animals, including rabid dogs, are endangered by seeing the animal or its image, even its reflection in water, as this can reawaken the poison or the evil spirit. He also notes that physicians warn against even mentioning the animal's name in front of the victim, as the mind's focus on it can be fatal.
The Mishna then discusses another case where Rabbi Matya ben Charash permits taking medicine on Shabbat for a throat ailment, which the Gemara identifies as a dangerous gum disease that spreads to the intestines. Rabbi Yochanan himself suffered from this disease, called safidna (identified by Rashi as an ailment of the teeth and gums). He sought treatment from a non-Jewish woman who administered the remedy on Thursday and Friday. When Rabbi Yochanan asked what to do on Shabbat, she assured him he would be cured and not need it. However, he pressed her, asking what if he did need it, implying a danger to his life. She agreed to reveal the secret recipe only if he swore not to reveal it. He swore "to the God of Israel" that he would not reveal it, but then proceeded to teach it publicly in his Shabbat lecture to his students. The Gemara questions how he could break his oath. The answer is that his oath was phrased as "I will not reveal it to the God of Israel," implying that God already knows it, but he would reveal it to the people of Israel. The Gemara then raises the concern of chilul Hashem (desecration of God's name), as the non-Jewish woman would perceive him as having broken his oath. The response is that Rabbi Yochanan clarified his intention to her immediately after making the oath, so she understood he was not truly swearing to keep it secret from his people, thus avoiding chilul Hashem.
The Gemara then details the remedies for safidna. Rav Acha son of Rav Ami suggests water from yeast, olive oil, and salt. Rav Yeimar recommends yeast itself, olive oil, and salt. Rav Ashi advises applying marrow from the tip of a duck's wing to the temples. Abaye recounts trying all these remedies without success until an Arab told him to take an olive pit that had not reached one-third of its growth, burn it on a new shovel, and then smear the resulting ointment on his teeth. Abaye followed this, and it cured him. The Gemara asks about the cause of safidna. It attributes it to eating very hot wheat bread or leftover fried fish that have sat overnight. A different text in Masechet Avoda Zara suggests very cold bread. The sign of the disease is bleeding gums when food touches the teeth. The Gemara reiterates that Rabbi Yochanan performed his remedy on Shabbat because the disease, starting in the mouth and potentially spreading to the intestines, was a matter of danger. Rav Chiya bar Abba asks Rabbi Yochanan if he follows Rabbi Matya ben Charash, who permits medicine on Shabbat for mouth ailments due to potential danger. Rabbi Yochanan replies that he believes that in this specific case, the Sages agree with Rabbi Matya ben Charash, even though they disagreed with him regarding the rabid dog's liver. Rashi clarifies that the Sages agreed that the mouth ailment was a genuine medical necessity, unlike the dog's liver, which they deemed an inconclusive remedy.
The Gemara attempts to prove this point from a Baraita, which lists three cases where Rabbi Matya ben Charash permits action on Shabbat: feeding donkey meat to someone with jaundice, feeding a rabid dog's liver, and giving medicine for a mouth ailment. The Baraita then states that the Sages say, "In these, there is no remedy." The Gemara questions what "in these" excludes. Initially, it is suggested that it excludes the mouth ailment, meaning the Sages agree with Rabbi Matya ben Charash on that case. However, the Gemara rejects this, proposing instead that "in these" refers to all three cases mentioned by Rabbi Matya ben Charash, while the Sages agree on a different case: bloodletting for srunki (a type of asthma). This interpretation is supported by another Baraita, where Rabbi Yishmael son of Rabbi Yose, quoting Rabbi Matya ben Charash, lists bloodletting for srunki, the rabid dog's liver, and the mouth ailment. The Sages again say, "In these, there is no remedy." The Gemara argues that this "in these" must exclude the first case (srunki), implying the Sages agree on that, but not the other two. However, the Gemara then states that it could also mean the Sages disagree on the first two, but agree on the last one (the mouth ailment), thus leaving the matter inconclusive.
A more definitive proof is brought from a Baraita taught by Rabba bar Shmuel. It lists three cases where Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Yose, quoting Rabbi Matya ben Charash, permits action: feeding a pregnant woman who smells food on Yom Kippur, feeding a rabid dog's liver, and giving medicine for a mouth ailment on Shabbat. The Sages then say, "In this case, but not in another." The Gemara reasons that "in this case" cannot refer to the pregnant woman, as everyone agrees she should be fed on Yom Kippur if necessary. It also cannot refer to the rabid dog's liver, as the Sages explicitly disagreed with Rabbi Matya ben Charash on that in our Mishna. Therefore, "in this case" must refer to the mouth ailment, proving that the Sages agree with Rabbi Matya ben Charash that medicine can be taken for it on Shabbat. Thus, Rabbi Yochanan was acting in accordance with all opinions. Rav Ashi adds that our Mishna itself implies this. The Mishna first presents the dispute over the rabid dog, then states, "And furthermore, Rabbi Matya ben Charash said: one who has a mouth ailment, medicine may be given to him on Shabbat." The Sages' disagreement is only stated after the dog case, not after the mouth ailment. If they disagreed on both, they should have presented both cases and then stated their comprehensive disagreement. The fact that they did not indicates their agreement on the mouth ailment.
The Mishna's concluding phrase, "because it is a matter of potential danger, and any potential danger overrides Shabbat," is then analyzed. The Gemara asks why the Mishna adds the seemingly superfluous statement that "any potential danger overrides Shabbat." Rav Yehuda, quoting Rav, explains that the novelty is that we are not only concerned with the danger on the current Shabbat, but even a potential danger on a future Shabbat. For example, if doctors determine a patient needs eight days of treatment, and the first day falls on Shabbat, one might think to delay treatment until after Shabbat to avoid desecrating two Shabbatot. However, the Mishna teaches that treatment must begin immediately on Shabbat, even if it means treating over two Shabbatot, because any delay could exacerbate the danger. A Baraita supports this: it is permissible to warm water for a sick person on Shabbat, whether for drinking or bathing, even if the bathing is primarily to strengthen limbs rather than for immediate healing. The novelty is that this can be done on Shabbat itself, and even for a potential danger on a future Shabbat; one does not wait, hoping the patient will recover on their own. Instead, treatment begins immediately due to the principle that potential danger overrides Shabbat, and this applies even if the danger is not imminent but anticipated for the next week.
The Baraita further states that these actions (saving a life on Shabbat) should not be done by non-Jews or quasi-converts (or minors, according to the Gaon of Vilna's version), but specifically by the greatest scholars of Israel. This is a crucial halacha. The commentators debate the rationale. Some, like Tosafot HaRosh, explain that if we were to rely on minors or non-Jews, there might be a delay in a critical situation while searching for them, leading to danger. Therefore, the greatest scholars should act immediately, setting an example. Other opinions, such as Tosafot Rid, argue that if minors or non-Jews are readily available, they should be used first to minimize Shabbat desecration by adults. However, Tosafot offers a different reason: we do not trust non-Jews to perform the task diligently, and their potential laziness or negligence could endanger the patient. Therefore, it is a mitzvah for a Jew to perform it. The Baraita also states that these actions should not be taken based solely on the assessment of women or quasi-converts, but their opinion can be combined with others. Rashi explains that if two men say treatment is needed, and three say it is not, a woman's or quasi-convert's opinion that it is needed can be added to the two, making it three against three, thus creating a doubt that leans towards leniency (safek nefashot lehakel). However, the Bach challenges Rashi, pointing out that in matters of life and death, we do not follow the majority opinion; if even two say it is needed, that is sufficient to act. The Bach therefore amends Rashi's interpretation to a case where one man says it is needed and two say it is not; in such a scenario, a woman's testimony can be added to the single man's to create a tie, allowing for leniency. Other opinions, like the Riva, suggest that a woman's assessment is as reliable as a man's, and her opinion, combined with one man's, can be relied upon even against multiple men.
The Baraita continues: "One attends to matters of life and death on Shabbat." This is not merely permission but an obligation. "And the zealous one is praised," meaning the quicker one acts, the more praiseworthy they are. "And one does not need to take permission from the rabbinic court." The Gemara provides three examples to illustrate this. First, if a child falls into the sea, one immediately casts a net to retrieve them. The zealous person is praised, and no permission is needed from the rabbinic court, even if casting the net also catches fish, which is normally forbidden on Shabbat. Rashi explains that this applies even if one intends to catch fish, as the primary intent is to save the child. However, other Rishonim dispute this, arguing that direct intent to perform a forbidden labor (like catching fish) would make it prohibited, even if done in conjunction with saving a life. They suggest that the text implies the fish are caught unintentionally. Second, if a child falls into a pit, one immediately digs out steps to reach them. Again, the zealous person is praised, and no permission is needed, even though digging is normally forbidden. Third, if a child is locked behind a door, one breaks the door to free them. The zealous person is praised, and no permission is needed, even if one intends to use the broken wood for other purposes. Here too, the word "intends" (mechaven) is debated among Rishonim, with some versions of the Gemara omitting it to avoid the implication that direct intent for a forbidden act is permissible.
The Gemara then discusses extinguishing a fire on Shabbat. One may directly extinguish a fire or create a firebreak (e.g., by lining up jugs of water to explode) to prevent it from spreading. The zealous person is praised, and no permission is needed, even if extinguishing the fire also flattens coals for future use. Tosafot notes that the inclusion of both direct extinguishing and creating a firebreak is significant. Direct extinguishing is clearly permissible, but creating a firebreak might involve carrying vessels through a public domain, which entails two prohibitions (carrying and indirectly extinguishing). The Baraita teaches that this is also permitted. Furthermore, one might think direct extinguishing is preferred due to its certainty, whereas bringing vessels might be unnecessary if the fire goes out on its own. The Baraita teaches that we do not wait; one acts immediately. The Gemara asks why all these cases are necessary. If only the case of a drowning child were given, one might think that only in such an immediate danger, where there is no time to consult a rabbinic court, is immediate action without permission allowed. But for a child in a pit, who is merely sitting there, one might think permission is needed. Therefore, the pit case is taught. If only the pit case were given, one might think that only where the child is terrified is immediate action allowed. But for a child locked behind a door, who might be distracted with games until after Shabbat, one might think to wait. Therefore, the locked door case is taught. Finally, the fire case is taught to include a situation where the fire is in one courtyard but endangers sick people or minors in another courtyard, emphasizing that one may extinguish the fire in one domain to prevent harm in another.
Rav Yosef, quoting Rav Yehuda, quoting Shmuel, states a fundamental principle: "In matters of life and death, we do not follow the majority." The Gemara seeks to clarify this. If it means that if there are nine Jews and one non-Jew, we don't follow the majority (Jews) to save them, that's incorrect, as the majority is in favor of saving. If it means a 50/50 split, that's not a majority issue but a case of doubt, where leniency applies. The Gemara concludes it refers to a situation with nine non-Jews and one Jew. However, the Gemara then challenges this: if they are all in one fixed location (kavua), then the rule is "any fixed group is treated as 50/50," meaning we treat it as if there's a 50% chance the Jew is there, and thus save. So this is also not a case of disregarding the majority. The Gemara clarifies: the rule applies when they have left their initial fixed location and moved to another courtyard. In such a scenario, the general rule is "whoever separates from a group separates from the majority." So if nine non-Jews and one Jew were in one courtyard, and they all moved to another, and a building collapsed, one might think to follow the majority (non-Jews) and not save. The principle "we do not follow the majority in matters of life and death" teaches that even in this case, we disregard the majority and save, because we know for sure a Jew is among them. The Gemara then cites Rav Assi, quoting Rabbi Yochanan, who states that if nine non-Jews and one Jew are in the same courtyard and a building collapses, one saves (due to the kavua rule). But if they are in a different courtyard, one does not save. This seems to contradict the principle that we disregard the majority. The Gemara resolves this by distinguishing between two scenarios: if all ten (nine non-Jews and one Jew) moved to the second courtyard, then we know for sure a Jew is there, and we disregard the majority to save. However, if only some of them moved, and we are unsure if the Jew is among them, then we follow the rule "whoever separates from a group separates from the majority," and since the majority are non-Jews, we do not save, as there is no certainty of a Jewish life being at stake.