The Eddie D Sit edition of the audio series on the Talmud Bavli, specifically Masechet Zevachim, has been dedicated by our esteemed friend and student of the Shiur Daf Yomi, Binyamin HaCohen, affectionately known as Benny C. He has dedicated this Masechet with the hope, Bezrat Hashem, that he will experience success and prosperity. As a Cohen, it is hoped that when the Mashiach comes, he will serve in the Beit Hamikdash alongside the other Kohanim, in merit of this dedication, which specifically discusses the Avoda of the Kohanim in the Beit Hamikdash concerning the Korbanot.
Today’s study on Daf Mem Zayin is dedicated to the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Esther, may his soul be bound in the bond of life, and for the complete recovery of Mickey ben Jamie, as well as for the success of Binyamin Mordechai ben Esther. We begin today’s Daf on Mem Zayin, starting with the fifth line down: “She'ein machshava holechet ela achar ha'oved.”
We learned in the Mishna that the thought of pigul applies only to the one performing the service. If someone else, such as the owner who is not performing the service, has a thought, it cannot disqualify the korban. This is the opinion of the Mishna: as long as the person is not performing the service, any thought they have cannot affect the act being done at the time of the korban; only the person actually performing the Avoda has that capacity.
The Gemara states, “She'ein hamachshava holechet ela achar ha'oved.” Our Mishna does not align with the following Tanna, as the Beraita states: “Amar Rabbi Elazar Berabbi Yose: shamati she'bealim mefagelin.” Rabbi Elazar Berabbi Yose heard that the owners can indeed cause pigul even though they are not the ones bringing the korban.
Rava asks, “What is the reason of Rabbi Elazar Berabbi Yose?” He cites the verse, “V'hikriv hamakriv,” indicating that the one bringing the korban is akin to the one who is the makriv itself. Thus, their thought can affect the korban even if they are not physically bringing it. This connection is made through the term “v'hikriv,” which implies that their thought can influence the korban.
Abaye states that Rabbi Elazar Berabbi Yose, Rabbi Eliezer, and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar all agree on the principle that one can have a thought while another performs the Avoda, and this will render the korban liable. The three rabbis share this opinion. Rabbi Elazar Berabbi Yose, as stated, heard that the owners can indeed cause pigul.
Rabbi Eliezer discusses a matter related to avoda zara. He explains that if a non-Jew slaughters a non-Jew’s animal, the Gemara will say that the non-Jew’s thought during the slaughter is for avoda zara. Even if a Jew is slaughtering it for themselves, since the non-Jew is thinking of avoda zara, the Gemara concludes that the non-Jew’s intention renders the Jewish slaughter pasul.
The Mishna states, “Detnan hashochet le'oved kochavim shechitato keshera.” This is the opinion of the first Tanna because fundamentally, the act of slaughtering is valid even if it is for a non-Jew’s animal. Rabbi Eliezer, however, disqualifies it due to the non-Jew’s intention. This indicates that the non-Jew’s thought can indeed influence the outcome.
Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar presents a ruling concerning Shabbat. In Masechet Shabbat, we learn that to be liable for carrying on Shabbat, two conditions must be met: first, it must be a significant item that people normally store, and second, it must have a certain measure that is significant enough for a person to hide it. The Gemara states, “Detnan klal amar Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar: kol she'ein kasher le'hatznia.” If it is not worth anything, it cannot be stored, as Rashi explains that it must be significant enough to be stored, but if its measure is too small, it does not meet the criteria.
If someone carried it on Shabbat, they would be liable for a chatat simply for carrying it. If a person carried dam nida, for example, it could be argued that they might not be liable for carrying it if it is not considered significant. The Gemara asserts that if a person carried dam nida in their hands in a public domain, it does not matter how much they carried; it is not a significant item that warrants liability.
The Gemara continues discussing the implications of carrying items that might not be considered significant. If a person carries something that is significant to them, even if it is not significant to another, they could still be liable. This reflects the principle that one person’s thought can impact another’s action.
In summary, we see three distinct opinions where thought impacts action: first, regarding pigul, as per Rabbi Elazar Berabbi Yose; second, in the case of shechitat avodat kochavim, as per Rabbi Eliezer; and third, concerning Shabbat, as per Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar. The Gemara notes that both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar will adhere to the law of pigul. The reasoning follows that if we recognize this principle outside of the Beit HaMikdash, surely it applies within it, where the entire law of thought pertains to korbanot.
However, Rabbi Elazar Berabbi Yose’s ruling is specific to avoda zara, indicating that he only applies his ruling there. The Gemara concludes that although his ruling pertains to korbanot, it may not extend to other areas like Shabbat without further evidence.
We now transition into the next chapter of Masechet Zevachim, discussing dam chatas. This chapter is recited every morning in prayer, and the Poskim indicate that it is taught daily because it contains no disputes, thus serving as a good sign. The Mishna begins with the question: “What is the place of the slaughtering and receiving of the blood of zevachim?”
The Mishna states that Kodshei Kodashim must be slaughtered on the northern side of the mizbeach. This is a well-established rule. The Gemara explains that the slaughtering of Kodshei Kodashim is universally accepted to occur in this area. The Mishna continues to specify that the blood must also be received there, although there may be exceptions depending on the type of korban.
As we delve into the details of Masechet Zevachim, we will explore various types of korbanot, including the par and sa'ir of Yom Kippur. These sacrifices are brought by the Kohen Gadol for atonement, and the par serves to atone for the Kohen Gadol and his household, while the sa'ir atones for the people of Israel.
In conclusion, the study of these intricate details within Masechet Zevachim not only enriches our understanding of the Avoda but also deepens our connection to the sacred practices of the Beit Hamikdash. Each ruling and distinction holds significance in our observance and understanding of the korbanot and their implications for the Jewish people.