The Talmud is discussing a statement attributed to Ulla—not Rabbi Hanina. The statement appears above on the page: wherever Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri is mentioned, the law follows his opinion. However, we do not yet know which statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri is being discussed.
The Gemara has already listed several different cases in which Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri expressed an opinion, but it cannot be referring to those cases, because those laws had already been codified. If Ulla had been referring to one of those cases, his statement would have been recorded together with the other rabbis who discussed that case. We are therefore still trying to determine which case Ulla was referring to when he said that the law follows Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri.
One possibility is the case of a bean that was planted for its seed. Ulla says that when something is planted for use as a vegetable, the years of its growth are counted from the year after it is harvested. When it is planted for its seed, however, the years are counted from the time it takes root. In this case, the bean was planted for its seed, so the years are counted from the time it took root.
Some of the beans took root during one year, after the New Year, while others took root before the New Year. The law is that one may not take the ritual offering from the produce of one year on behalf of the produce of the other year, because one may not separate the offering from new produce on behalf of old produce, or from old produce on behalf of new produce.
What, then, should one do? One should mix everything together: the produce from this year with the produce from the previous year. Once everything has been mixed, whatever is taken from the new produce can cover the new produce, and whatever is taken from the old produce can cover the old produce. Rabbi Yosei is the one who is discussing this case.
Perhaps this is what Ulla meant: that the two groups should be mixed together and the offerings should then be separated from the mixture. But this ruling had already been codified. Ulla should have stated it together with the other opinions that were mentioned there. Since it was not stated there, this cannot be the case to which Ulla was referring. We therefore have to go back to the beginning and look for another possibility.
Rav Papa says that Ulla was referring to the case of a carriage. Whose opinion is being discussed in connection with the carriage? Rav Nahman bar Yitzchak says that it refers to a statement concerning wine. Rav Papa, however, says that it refers to the carriage itself.
The question is this: If a carriage is so large that, when placed in water, it displaces forty seahs of water, it is considered a very large vessel. Which part of the carriage is measured in order to determine whether it has that size?
One possibility is that we measure the interior space of the carriage. The other possibility is that we measure the exterior as well, including the thickness of the walls. There are different types of vessels used on a boat that can hold forty seahs, and the question is whether the thickness of the outer walls is included in the measurement. If the wood itself were hollow, and that hollow space could hold two kor, would that space be counted as well?
Everyone agrees that the thickness of the legs is not counted. Apparently, the legs of the carriage are thicker than the side planks, but they are not included in the measurement. The rims around it are also not counted as part of the required measurement.
Rabbi Yosei has a different opinion. He says that the area occupied by the legs is included, as is the area occupied by the rims. There is apparently empty space between the legs and the bottom of the carriage. That empty space is not automatically counted as part of the measurement. If the rims are more than a handbreadth wide, the space between them is not measured. If they are less than a handbreadth wide, however, the legs and the space between them are included.
One might have argued that when the legs are located at the bottom, we should view the base of the carriage as though it extends all the way down. The ruling is that if the gap is a handbreadth, we regard it as a separate space. If it is less than a handbreadth, then, because the base extends downward, that space can be included in the measurement of the two kor. This is Rabbi Yosei’s opinion.
Ulla said that this was the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri: when the space is less than a handbreadth, the empty area is counted as part of the carriage’s measurement. Thus, Ulla may have been referring to the case of the carriage.
Another possibility concerns Rabbi Meir’s statement that oil is considered a liquid. We have a rule that when impurity touches a liquid, the liquid always becomes a first-degree source of impurity. Whether an impure object of the highest degree touches it, or an object of the first or second degree touches it, once something touches the liquid, the liquid becomes a first-degree source of impurity.
The novelty of Rabbi Meir’s statement is that oil is considered a liquid. Not only oil, but honey and wine as well are considered liquids. The Gemara asks: What is the novelty regarding wine? Surely everyone agrees that wine is a liquid.
The answer is that Rabbi Meir is saying that even wine is included. Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri disagrees with the broader statement concerning honey and oil. In his view, only wine is considered a liquid for this purpose.
Rashi explains that wine becomes a first-degree source of impurity whether it was touched by an object of the highest degree of impurity, by a first-degree source, or by a second-degree source. We have a general principle that anything that invalidates a ritual offering renders liquids impure as a first-degree source. The novelty, therefore, is that oil is also treated as a liquid for this purpose. Rabbi Meir says that honey is a liquid as well, whereas Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri says that only wine has this status.
The Gemara brings a story concerning Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri. Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri once had ordinary produce mixed with produce whose tithes had already been separated. The produce that had already been tithed was exempt, while the other produce was doubtful produce, meaning that there was uncertainty whether its tithes had been separated.
Produce of doubtful status is not subject to the tithe by Torah law; the obligation is rabbinic. Nevertheless, the produce whose tithes had already been separated was certainly exempt, whereas the doubtful produce was subject to a rabbinic obligation. The two types of produce became mixed together. What should be done?
One may not simply separate the tithe from the mixture, because that would involve taking from exempt produce on behalf of produce that is subject to an obligation. Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri therefore said that one should go to the marketplace and purchase doubtful produce whose tithe obligation is rabbinic, and use that produce to cover the mixture.
At most, the obligation involved would then be rabbinic, because on the level of Torah law the ordinary produce is considered nullified within the mixture. The produce purchased in the marketplace is subject only to a doubtful rabbinic obligation, since one does not know whether its tithes were already separated. Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri therefore says that this produce can be used to resolve the problem.
Rashi asks why this explanation is necessary. If the story began by saying that doubtful produce became mixed with the ordinary produce, why do we need to reach a conclusion based on nullification? Rashi therefore retracts the initial explanation and says that the case must have involved completely untithed produce, not merely doubtful produce.
Completely untithed produce is subject to the tithe by Torah law. How, then, can the problem be resolved through a rabbinic solution? The answer is that, by Torah law, the untithed produce is nullified within the ordinary produce. Nevertheless, the rabbis still required a tithe to be separated. One can therefore go to the marketplace and purchase doubtful produce, whose obligation is only rabbinic, and use it to address the rabbinic requirement.
The Gemara then presents another way of handling the matter. According to one version, a non-Jew’s acquisition of land in the Land of Israel does not remove the Torah-level obligation of tithes. According to this view, produce grown on land owned by a non-Jew remains subject to the Torah obligation, so buying from a non-Jew would not solve the problem.
According to another version, however, a non-Jew’s acquisition does remove the Torah-level obligation. The land is considered his, and the produce is subject only to a rabbinic obligation. One could therefore buy produce from a non-Jew and use it for the mixture, because the rabbinic obligation would be sufficient for the rabbinic requirement in this case.
Why, according to the first version, was Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri told to return to the marketplace? Because produce sold in the marketplace is doubtful. The seller may or may not have separated the tithes. If he did not, the produce is subject to a rabbinic obligation; if he did, it is exempt. Since the status is uncertain, it can be used to address the problem on the rabbinic level.
According to the second version, the issue is not that the seller may or may not have separated the tithes. Rather, it is a fifty-fifty uncertainty. The tithes may not have been separated, in which case the produce is subject to a rabbinic obligation, but that rabbinic obligation cannot cover a Torah-level obligation. For that reason, the produce must be purchased from a non-Jew, whose produce is considered exempt from the rabbinic obligation according to that version.
Rashi reverses the explanation and says clearly that the case involved completely untithed produce, not doubtful produce. When the rabbis said that even doubtful produce can be treated in this way, they meant that one should go to the marketplace, obtain produce that was definitely untithed, and use it to resolve the mixture. Rashi then returns to the other details of the discussion.
We can now return to the statement concerning Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri. Rabbi Mar, who was from the Land of Israel, sent a message to Rav Papa: Ravin bar Hanina said in the name of Ulla that the law follows Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri. Not only that, but wherever Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri stated an opinion, the law follows him—even in the case of the untithed produce that became mixed with ordinary produce.
In that case, Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri said that one should either purchase produce from the marketplace or purchase it from a non-Jew. The question is whether the law follows him in this case as well. We were told that the law follows Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri wherever he stated an opinion, and this is another such case.
Rav Ashi, in the name of Rav Mesharsheya, asks why this is even a question. We already said that the law follows Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri wherever his statement appears. The earlier statement did not say “wherever Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri stated an opinion in the Mishnah.” It said “wherever he stated an opinion,” which includes a baraita as well. Since the case of the mixed produce appears in a baraita, it is obvious that the law follows Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri there too.
If the wording had been, “wherever Rabbi Shimon ben Shezuri stated an opinion in the Mishnah,” then the question would have been understandable. One could have asked whether his ruling in the baraita should also be followed. But the wording includes every place where he stated an opinion, including the baraita, so the law certainly follows him in the case of the mixed produce.
Rashi explains the practical question in the story. One of the options was to purchase produce from a non-Jew. If the produce that became mixed was doubtful produce, how would buying from a non-Jew help? The produce from the marketplace is subject to a fifty-fifty doubt: perhaps its tithes were separated and perhaps they were not. If they were not separated, it would be subject to a rabbinic obligation. That rabbinic obligation could not resolve a Torah-level obligation.
Rashi therefore reverses the explanation. The case must have involved completely untithed produce. By Torah law, that produce was nullified within the ordinary produce, but the rabbis still required a corrective measure. Buying from a non-Jew provided produce that was subject only to the rabbinic framework being discussed, and that was sufficient for the rabbinic requirement.
The Gemara then turns to another matter involving a Torah scroll. Rav Hananel said in the name of Rav Habbah that a Torah scroll had been torn. What should be done? It is not sufficient simply to sew the torn letters themselves, because the letters have been damaged. If the tear passes between the letters, the scroll is invalid until it is repaired.
As long as the tear has not been sewn, the Torah scroll is invalid. One may not use it. If the tear extends into the writing, it must be repaired in a way that restores the writing properly. If the damage cannot be repaired correctly, the scroll must be set aside. The discussion is referring to old parchment, which is not suitable to be sewn in that manner.
When the rabbis referred to old parchment, they did not necessarily mean parchment that had been used for many years. When they referred to new parchment, they did not necessarily mean newly made parchment. The distinction concerns whether the parchment had been treated with gallnuts. Parchment treated with gallnuts becomes dark and looks old, even if it was made recently. Parchment that had not been treated in that way could still be suitable even if it had been in existence for some time.
When the ruling says that the parchment may be sewn, the question is what kind of thread should be used. Ordinary thread may not be used. It must be sewn with sinews, like the veins. Rashi explains that the required material is an appropriate type of string, not ordinary thread.
Another question is raised concerning the direction of the tear. The earlier case involved a tear between the columns or between the lines that extended downward, along the seam. What is the law if the tear runs horizontally between the lines? Perhaps that is also repairable, although sewing in that direction is not the normal way of repairing the parchment. The Gemara leaves this question unresolved.
The Gemara then discusses a tear between one page and another. If the tear reaches the writing, it must be determined how far it extends. If it extends more than three lines, it is ordinarily considered a serious defect. The question is whether that rule applies only when the writing itself is damaged, or whether the empty space may also be repaired when the tear extends that far.
The same uncertainty applies to a tear between two lines: if the parchment remains blank, may it be sewn, or may it not be sewn? Since the question is unresolved, the ruling is left undecided.
Rav Hananel said in the name of Rav that a mezuzah written with two words on each line is valid. The writing is arranged in short lines, with two words on one line, two on the next, and so on. The question is whether the words must be arranged in a particular pattern.
For example, one arrangement might have two words on one line, three on the next, and one on the following line. The result would be that one line is longer, one line is shorter, and the writing would not have a uniform shape. Is that arrangement valid? One could argue that it should be valid because there is a precedent for writing in a varied pattern.
The Gemara says that when the Torah describes writing in the form of a song, it is referring to writing arranged like a song. That does not mean that a mezuzah may be written in that form. If a mezuzah is written in the form of a song, it is invalid. The discussion is not referring to a mezuzah written in the ordinary form of a song.
The Gemara then discusses another shape that is not permitted. One may not arrange the writing so that it is wide at the bottom and narrow at the top, like a tent. Nor may one write it in the opposite form, wide at the top and progressively narrower toward the bottom, like a tail. The writing may not take the shape of a tent or of a tail.
Rashi provides illustrations of these two forms. In the first, the upper lines are narrow and the lower lines are wide, so that the writing resembles a tent. In the second, the upper line is wide and the writing becomes increasingly narrow, so that it resembles a tail. Neither arrangement is acceptable.
Rav Hisda discusses the final words of the mezuzah, “as the days of the heavens upon the earth.” He says that the words “upon the earth” must appear on the final line. This is why, in mezuzot, those words are generally found on the last line.
There is another version of Rav Hisda’s statement. According to that version, the words “upon the earth” must be written at the beginning of the final line rather than at the end of it. The two versions do not disagree about whether those words belong on the final line. Everyone agrees that they belong there. The question is whether they should appear at the end of that line or at its beginning.
According to the first version, the words “upon the earth” are at the end of the final line. The words “the heavens” are therefore written immediately before them, and the heavens appear directly above the earth. The distance between the heavens and the earth is represented by the length of the final line, corresponding to the verse’s description of the distance between them.
According to the second version, the words “the heavens” are at the end of one line, while “upon the earth” begins the next line. The heavens and the earth are therefore separated by the entire space between the two lines. Everyone agrees that the arrangement is intended to express the idea of long life. The question is whether the words should be placed close together, with “the heavens” directly above “the earth,” or far apart, with “the heavens” at the end of one line and “upon the earth” at the beginning of the next.
The second arrangement is the one being followed here: “upon the earth” appears at the beginning of the final line. That concludes the discussion.
May the Lord be blessed forever. Amen.