The Eddie B. Sitt edition and audio series of the Talmud Bavli, Zevachim, has been dedicated by our good friend and student of the Daf Yomi class, Binyamina Kohen—Benny Kohen, whom they call Benny C. He dedicated this tractate. With God’s help, he will have success and prosperity. Since he is a priest, when God and the Messiah come, may he serve in the Temple together with the other priests. May it be in the merit of having dedicated this tractate, which specifically discusses the service of the priests in the Temple and the sacrificial offerings.
On the first page, first column, we are at the Mishnah concerning offerings brought by gentiles. Offerings brought by gentiles are not treated as offerings in every respect. Therefore, the Mishnah says that there is no liability for sacrificial disqualification through an improper intention, for leaving the offering beyond its permitted time, for eating it while ritually impure, or for slaughtering it outside the designated area. In all these cases, there is no liability when the offering belongs to a gentile.
The meaning is that the Sages said that we do not want a person to benefit from such an offering. However, if he does benefit from it—for example, if he eats it after its permitted time—there is no liability under the law of sacrificial leftovers. Nor is the law of misuse of consecrated property applicable.
Similarly, if a gentile has an offering and says, “I want to transfer its sanctity to another offering,” the sanctity is not transferred. Normally, such a transfer would cause both animals to become sacred, but there is no transfer of sanctity with an offering belonging to a gentile.
A gentile may not bring the accompanying libations by themselves. In other words, one may not bring only wine onto the altar without an offering. However, when a gentile brings his offering, he does bring the accompanying libations.
Rabbi Yosei says that all these laws should apply stringently to an offering brought by a gentile, because regarding such an offering the verse says, “to God.” Since it is brought to God, it should be treated like ordinary offerings. The first opinion, however, says that when do we apply the stringency? When the gentile brings an offering. When did the Sages say that these laws do not apply? That is referring to a monetary donation to the Temple. In that case, the item that the gentile donated to the Temple does indeed have the relevant sanctity. We will see the difference between sanctity intrinsic to the object and sanctity that applies only to its monetary value.
The Gemara now brings the sources. The Sages established a restriction, but how do we know that the law of misuse of consecrated property does not apply? The Gemara derives it through a verbal analogy between the words “misuse” and “misuse” from the laws of terumah. Regarding terumah, we know clearly that the law applies only to Israelites and not to gentiles. Therefore, just as the law of misuse does not apply to gentiles in the case of terumah, it does not apply to a gentile’s offering.
Rashi explains that the verse uses the word “misuse” regarding offerings and also regarding terumah. Since the law of terumah applies only to Israelites, the law of misuse applies only to offerings belonging to Israelites as well.
The laws of improper intention likewise do not apply, nor does the law of impurity. If a person eats the offering while impure, the law of impurity normally applies to an Israelite, but not to a gentile. How, then, do we derive the law of impurity? We proceed through several stages.
First, how do we derive the law of improper intention? The word “iniquity” appears regarding improper intention, and the same word appears regarding sacrificial leftovers. Therefore, the two are compared through a verbal analogy. Improper intention is then compared with sacrificial leftovers, and sacrificial leftovers are compared with impurity through the repeated word “desecration.” Finally, the law of impurity is connected to the verse that says “the children of Israel,” excluding gentiles. Through this chain of comparisons, the laws are connected to one another.
Regarding the transfer of sanctity, the Torah discusses it in connection with the tithe of animals. The tithe of animals is compared with the agricultural tithe, and the agricultural tithe applies only to Israelites. We therefore learn that the transfer of sanctity also applies only to Israelites and not to gentiles.
There is a discussion, however, about whether one may make a double comparison. In the laws of consecrated offerings, we have a principle that a matter learned through a comparison cannot itself be used to teach another comparison. Since the transfer of sanctity was compared with the tithe of animals, and the tithe of animals was compared with the agricultural tithe, perhaps we may not make this second comparison.
The Gemara answers that agricultural tithe is not considered sacred in the same way as an offering. It is treated as ordinary property in this respect, and therefore the comparison can be made. Another opinion disagrees and says that one follows the subject that teaches the law. The teacher here is the agricultural tithe, which applies only to Israelites, so the transfer of sanctity should apply only to Israelites as well.
According to the first approach, one follows the subject being taught. Since the transfer of sanctity is itself a matter of sanctity, a double comparison cannot be made. According to the other approach, one follows the source teaching the law, and since that source is ordinary property, the double comparison is possible.
The Gemara offers another way to establish the matter. The tithe of animals is an obligation that is not bound to a fixed time. Whenever a person has animals subject to this tithe, he gives the tithe. We have a principle that an obligation not bound to a fixed time applies to Israelites but not to gentiles. Therefore, we do not need a comparison to establish that the tithe of animals applies only to Israelites.
Our starting point is therefore the agricultural tithe. We already know independently that the tithe of animals applies only to Israelites, because it is an obligation not bound to a fixed time. We can then compare the tithe of animals with the agricultural tithe. Just as the agricultural tithe applies to Israelites, so too the tithe of animals applies to Israelites. The verse concerning the tithe of animals mentions the transfer of sanctity immediately afterward. Thus, just as the tithe of animals applies only to Israelites, so too the transfer of sanctity applies only to Israelites and not to gentiles. We do not require a double comparison, because the first point is known independently.
A gentile does not bring the accompanying libations by themselves. How do we know this? The Sages taught that when Ezra came, he brought the accompanying libations, and Nehemiah also brought the accompanying libations. Perhaps this means that a person brings libations only when he brings an offering, but not independently. The verse says, “So shall he do for one bull.” Whenever one brings a bull, whoever he may be, he must bring the accompanying libations with it.
Rabbi Yosei says, in effect, “I am stringent regarding all these matters for a gentile.” When is the first opinion lenient and say that these laws do not apply? It is when the gentile makes a donation to the Temple. But when he brings an offering, all the laws apply.
The reason is that the verbal analogy concerning misuse was derived from terumah. Terumah has intrinsic sanctity, whereas a monetary donation has sanctity only in its monetary value. Therefore, the laws derived from terumah apply to an item with intrinsic sanctity, but not necessarily to an item whose sanctity is only monetary. At least the law of misuse will apply in the case of such a monetary donation.
The Mishnah then discusses what happens if the blood of an offering becomes impure. Whether this occurred accidentally or intentionally, the offering is accepted, and the meat may be eaten. In the case of an offering brought by an Israelite, however, whether the blood became impure accidentally or intentionally, the offering is not accepted. The same question arises concerning an offering of a gentile: whether the blood became impure accidentally or intentionally, is it accepted?
Rav Pappa said that this follows the view of Rabbi Yosei. Why? Rabbi Yosei says that with regard to all offerings of gentiles, he is stringent. He treats the offerings of gentiles like the offerings of Israelites. Therefore, just as in the case of an Israelite’s offering we distinguish between accidental and intentional impurity, we should also distinguish between accidental and intentional impurity in the case of a gentile’s offering. Since the Mishnah makes no distinction, it would appear not to follow Rabbi Yosei.
The Gemara answers that one can still say that the Mishnah follows Rabbi Yosei. In the case of blood, the verse says that the headplate worn by the High Priest atones when the blood is sprinkled. Regarding the headplate, the verse says that it is “for them,” meaning that it atones for the Jewish people. Another verse teaches that the laws of impurity apply to offerings belonging to one of the Jewish people.
One might have thought that the law of impurity applies to gentiles as well, but this is not so. The verse concerning the headplate says, “for them,” and the Sages expound this to mean “for them,” but not for gentiles. The key word is “acceptance.” The offerings of the Jewish people are brought with divine acceptance, but the offerings of gentiles are not considered to have that same degree of acceptance. Therefore, the headplate cannot atone for the impurity of their offerings, and the offering is not rendered acceptable in that way.
The Mishnah next discusses various sacrificial components. Certain items are not subject to the laws of improper intention. For example, the handful taken from a meal offering is not subject to improper intention, because it permits the remainder of the meal offering to be eaten. The improper intention applies to the remainder, but not to the handful itself. The frankincense is also a permitting component, whether for the remainder of the meal offering or for the incense offering.
Although the handful, the frankincense, and the incense are not subject to the law of improper intention, one is nevertheless liable for eating them after the permitted time or while impure. The exception is blood. The Mishnah then records the view of Rabbi Shimon, who says that one is liable only for something whose normal manner is to be eaten. Wood, frankincense, and incense are not normally eaten, and therefore one is not liable for eating them while impure.
Let us read Rashi’s explanation of the Mishnah. The discussion concerns a sin offering, with the exception of blood. Rabbi Shimon says that one is liable only for something whose normal manner is to be eaten. I heard this explanation in the study hall of Rabbi Yaakov. At the time, I did not see that this was the explanation of the Mishnah in the name of Rabbi Shimon, as it was explained by Rabbi Shimon bar Kalonymus Gaon.
The Gemara now asks: You have told me that the laws of sacrificial leftovers and impurity apply even to items that are not subject to improper intention. I would have thought that the law of impurity applies only to something that has a permitting component—either something permitted for human consumption or something permitted to be placed on the altar.
Improper intention applies to something whose permitted use is determined by a permitting component. For example, the remainder of a meal offering has the handful as its permitting component, and the sacrificial portions have the blood as their permitting component. Since the handful itself is the permitting component, it is not subject to improper intention. One might therefore have thought that the law of impurity also applies only to items that have such a permitting component.
The Gemara rejects this. We know that if a person eats an impure offering, he may be liable for a sacrifice even when he did not realize until afterward that the offering had become disqualified or that its permitted time had passed. The laws of impurity therefore apply even in a case where improper intention does not apply.
Impurity is also more lenient in certain respects. In the case of impurity, the liability connected with the sacrifice can fluctuate according to the person’s economic status: a wealthy person brings one type of sacrifice, while a poor person brings birds. The sacrifice varies according to his financial situation. There are also two forms of awareness. The Sages say that a person brings a sacrifice even if he had known that he was impure before eating the offering but forgot that fact when he ate it. It is not necessary that he discover only afterward that he was impure.
There is another way to see the distinction. The Torah states a general rule regarding impurity: anything that they consecrate to God can become subject to the laws of impurity. Since the verse says that any item of an offering that they consecrate is subject to impurity, the law applies even to items that do not have a permitting component. Nothing permits the handful itself, and nothing permits the incense itself, yet the laws of impurity still apply.
The Gemara asks whether the law of impurity begins immediately upon consecration. The verse says, “Anyone who approaches.” Rabbi Elazar says that this cannot mean that a person becomes liable merely by touching the consecrated item. The verse is therefore referring to the level of sanctity at the time when the item is ready to be placed on the altar. At that point, if he eats it while impure, he is liable for excision.
If the item has a permitting component, the law takes effect when the permitting component is brought. The sacrificial portions have a permitting component: the blood that is sprinkled permits them to be placed on the altar and permits the meat to be eaten by the priests. The remainder of a meal offering also has a permitting component: the handful permits the remainder. Once the blood has been sprinkled, the sacrificial portions may be placed on the altar and the meat becomes permitted. Once the handful has been offered, the remainder of the meal offering becomes permitted. At that point, the law of impurity takes effect.
If there is no permitting component, the law takes effect when the item is consecrated in a vessel. For example, in the meal offering of a priest, the entire offering is placed on the altar, so there is no separate permitting component. The same is true of the accompanying libations. In those cases, once the item is consecrated in the vessel, the person is liable for eating it while impure.
Thus, when the Gemara distinguishes between these cases, it is explaining that the time at which the law of impurity takes effect depends on the type of item. If the item has a permitting component, such as the remainder of a meal offering, the law takes effect once the handful has been brought. If the blood has been sprinkled, the sacrificial portions may be placed on the altar and the meat is permitted. Only when the permitting component has been brought does liability for impurity begin. If there is no permitting component, such as in the meal offering of a priest, liability begins once the item is consecrated in the vessel.
We therefore have a verse teaching that the prohibition against eating consecrated food while impure applies even to items that do not have a permitting component. We have established the law of impurity. The question now is how we know that the law of sacrificial leftovers applies as well.
We derive it through a verbal analogy between “desecration” and “desecration,” since the same word appears in the laws of sacrificial leftovers and in the laws of impurity. Just as the law of impurity applies to these items, so too the law of sacrificial leftovers applies to them.
One might object that we should instead derive sacrificial leftovers from improper intention through the repeated word “iniquity.” Just as improper intention applies only to items that have a permitting component, perhaps sacrificial leftovers should apply only to such items as well. Why derive it from impurity? Perhaps we should derive it from improper intention and say that, like improper intention, sacrificial leftovers apply only to items with a permitting component.
The Gemara explains that sacrificial leftovers are more similar to impurity than to improper intention in three respects: the nature of the disqualification, the role of the sprinkling, and the use of the word “desecration.” First, both sacrificial leftovers and impurity are disqualifications in the substance itself. Sacrificial leftovers are a disqualification in the meat, and impurity is a disqualification in the object itself. Improper intention, by contrast, is a disqualification connected with the person’s intention.
Second, in both sacrificial leftovers and impurity, it is not the sprinkling itself that creates the disqualification. The sprinkling establishes the relevant sacrificial status, but it is not the sprinkling that causes the item to become impure or to become sacrificial leftovers. This is unlike improper intention, where the intention associated with the sacrificial service is what creates the disqualification.
Third, the term “desecration” is used in connection with both sacrificial leftovers and impurity. Thus, there are three similarities between sacrificial leftovers and impurity, which is why the law of sacrificial leftovers is derived from impurity rather than from improper intention.
The Gemara nevertheless says that there are more similarities in the other direction, between sacrificial leftovers and improper intention. There are five such similarities, compared with the three similarities between sacrificial leftovers and impurity.
First, there is no communal offering that overrides either sacrificial leftovers or improper intention, whereas impurity can be overridden in the case of a communal offering. Second, neither sacrificial leftovers nor improper intention has the power of the headplate to effect atonement, whereas the headplate can effect atonement for impurity. Third, both sacrificial leftovers and improper intention apply to an item that is ritually pure, while impurity applies to an impure person or object.
Fourth, both sacrificial leftovers and improper intention are connected with a fixed period of time. Improper intention involves intending to eat or offer the sacrifice beyond its permitted time, and sacrificial leftovers involve leaving it beyond that time. Impurity is not defined in the same way by a fixed sacrificial time. Fifth, in sacrificial leftovers and improper intention, the disqualification affects the offering itself, whereas in impurity the disqualification is associated with the person who is impure.
Since there are five similarities between sacrificial leftovers and improper intention, one might argue that sacrificial leftovers should be derived from improper intention. If so, just as improper intention applies only to something with a permitting component, sacrificial leftovers should apply only to something with a permitting component.
The Gemara answers that there is a teaching of Levi. The verse says that one may not desecrate the sacred things that the Israelites consecrate to God. The verse uses a plural expression, and the Sages understand this as referring to two prohibitions: one concerning sacrificial leftovers and one concerning impurity. The wording joins sacrificial leftovers and impurity together.
Let us review the argument. We were trying to establish that improper intention applies only to items with a permitting component. The sacrificial portions have the blood as their permitting component, and the remainder of a meal offering has the handful as its permitting component. The handful itself, however, is not subject to improper intention because it is the permitting component.
The Mishnah says that the laws of impurity and sacrificial leftovers apply even to items that are not subject to improper intention. The Gemara asks why we should not compare sacrificial leftovers with improper intention, since there are five similarities between them. The Gemara answers that, despite those five similarities, the verse explicitly connects sacrificial leftovers and impurity through the repeated wording. Therefore, even though improper intention does not apply to these items, the laws of impurity and sacrificial leftovers do apply to them.