He brings it from second-tithe money. Since he did not make an explicit vow upon himself, it is not considered an obligation. Therefore, he may bring it using second-tithe money. But I ask: “Is it enough if he does not bring it?” This implies that the only way he can bring it is through second-tithe money—that he cannot bring it in any other way. The Gemara answers that he may bring it if he wishes, and if he does not wish to bring it, he need not do so. In other words, it is optional. The novelty is that he may even use second-tithe money. Certainly, if he wants to bring it from ordinary money, there is no question that he may. The Mishnah is specifically teaching us about second-tithe money.
You might ask: Why specifically second-tithe money? Why not ordinary money? The answer is that even second-tithe money may be used, because it is comparable to ordinary money in this respect. The discussion continues: You cannot bring the thanksgiving offering from the actual produce of the second tithe, but you may bring it from the money of the second tithe.
What does that mean? Second-tithe produce is wheat. You cannot sell the actual wheat of the second tithe in order to purchase a thanksgiving offering. However, you may redeem the wheat, transfer its sanctity onto money, take that money to Jerusalem, and spend it on food. That money may be used to purchase a thanksgiving offering, but the actual second-tithe produce may not be used for that purpose.
Rav Nachman and Rav Chisda explain that when we say one may not use second-tithe property, this refers only to the actual wheat. If one sold the wheat, transferred its sanctity to money, and then used that money to purchase wheat or another product, that product may be sold and used to purchase a thanksgiving offering. The second-tithe produce itself, which grew in the field, may not be used for the offering; the money, or an item purchased with that money, may be used.
Rabbi Yirmeya was sitting before Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira said: “You are saying that even wheat obtained through the money of the second tithe may not be used. According to your view, one may use only the money itself. Neither the original second-tithe wheat nor wheat purchased with second-tithe money may be used to purchase a thanksgiving offering.”
The other view maintains that the original wheat itself may not be used, but the money, or an item purchased with that money, may be used. The Mishnah asks: What is the basis of this disagreement? Each side explains both his own reasoning and the reasoning of the other.
The first view reasons as follows. A thanksgiving offering is included within the category of peace offerings. The Torah teaches that a peace offering may be purchased with second-tithe money. Since a thanksgiving offering is a type of peace offering, it follows that a thanksgiving offering may also be purchased with second-tithe money.
The other view responds that the peace offering itself is not second-tithe produce. A peace offering is an animal, and second-tithe produce comes from wheat. Since the animal itself is not of the species of second-tithe produce, the permission applies only to the money of the second tithe, and not to wheat or any other item that is itself of the species of second-tithe produce.
The first view, however, says that the wheat purchased with second-tithe money is no longer considered second-tithe produce in this respect. The wheat that grew in the field is second-tithe produce, but the money is separate from it, and an item purchased with that money is also removed from the original second-tithe status. Therefore, just as the peace offering itself is not second-tithe produce because it is meat, a thanksgiving offering may be purchased with money or with an item purchased using that money.
The second view argues that the comparison to a peace offering teaches something more restrictive. A peace offering does not come from the species of second-tithe produce at all, whereas a thanksgiving offering is itself wheat in this discussion. Therefore, even wheat purchased with second-tithe money remains within the species of second-tithe produce, and it may not be used to purchase a thanksgiving offering. Only the money itself may be used.
Thus, the disagreement is this: When one is permitted to use second-tithe property, does that permission include only the money itself, or does it also include a product purchased with that money? The first rabbi says that the money and the product purchased with it may be used. The second rabbi says that only the money itself may be used. This discussion applies only in a case where one is permitted to use second-tithe money for this purpose.
Consider the simple case in which a person takes second-tithe money and says, “I want to use this money to purchase a peace offering.” At that point, he has not yet purchased the animal. He has merely designated the money for that purpose. Does the money now acquire the sanctity of a peace offering?
Rabbi Yochanan says that it does not. The money already has the sanctity of the second tithe. One cannot simply say, “I now want to use this money to purchase a peace offering,” and thereby transfer a new sanctity onto it. Until the animal is actually purchased, the money does not acquire the sanctity of a peace offering. The reason is that the preexisting sanctity of the second tithe is not displaced by the sanctity of a peace offering until the purchase is actually made.
The Gemara raises a question, and this is the most difficult part of the discussion. Suppose a person takes second-tithe money and purchases a wild animal with the intention of bringing it as a peace offering. A wild animal cannot actually be brought as an offering. Alternatively, he may have purchased an animal merely to eat as ordinary meat. What is the status of the hide? The teaching appears to say that the hide does not become ordinary property.
To understand this, we need an introduction that is not stated explicitly in the Gemara. First, one may bring second-tithe money to Jerusalem and use it to purchase an animal that is fit to be offered. Not only may one use the money for an offering; one may use it for any appropriate purpose. Since the animal is fit to be offered, there is no problem.
However, this applies only to something that is fit to be offered. An animal that is fit to be offered must be brought as a peace offering. An animal that is not fit to be offered may be purchased and eaten as ordinary meat. This was a decree of the Sages: If the animal is suitable for a peace offering, it must be brought as a peace offering. If it is not suitable for a peace offering—for example, a chicken or a wild animal—it may be purchased with second-tithe money and eaten.
There is a second principle taught by the Sages: When one purchases an animal with second-tithe money, the hide becomes ordinary property. The hide does not retain the sanctity of the second tithe. One might think that the hide must be sold and that the money must then be used to purchase other food, but that is not necessary. The hide becomes ordinary property because the primary item—the animal—is being eaten with the sanctity of the second tithe. The same applies to wool: Since the main item is being consumed with second-tithe sanctity, the secondary material is treated as ordinary property.
Now we can return to the case in the Gemara. If a person uses second-tithe money to purchase a domesticated animal that is suitable for a peace offering, the animal acquires the relevant sanctity and the hide becomes ordinary property. If he purchases a wild animal, which cannot be brought on the altar, he may eat the animal and the hide becomes ordinary property as well.
But the case before us is different. He took second-tithe money and purchased a wild animal with the intention of bringing it as a peace offering. The wild animal cannot be brought as a peace offering. Nevertheless, the teaching says that the hide does not become ordinary property. What does that mean? It appears to mean that the wild animal now has the sanctity of the second tithe, specifically the sanctity of its monetary value. It cannot be a peace offering, because it is a wild animal, but the fact that the Mishnah says the hide does not become ordinary property suggests that the value of the peace offering has somehow been transferred to the wild animal. This is called sanctity of value.
We therefore seem to have a difficulty. Earlier, we said that when a person designates second-tithe money for a peace offering, the money does not acquire the sanctity of a peace offering. Since the money already has second-tithe sanctity, the sanctity of a peace offering cannot take effect merely through designation. Yet here, when the person designates second-tithe money for a wild animal as a peace offering, the animal appears to acquire the sanctity of the value of a peace offering.
The Gemara initially understands the case in that manner. It asks: If one designates second-tithe money for a wild animal as a peace offering, does the sanctity of a peace offering take effect on the money? The fact that the hide does not become ordinary property appears to indicate that the animal has acquired the sanctity of the value of a peace offering. The animal cannot itself be brought as an offering, because it is not a domesticated animal, but its value has become associated with the sanctity of a peace offering. One would then have to sell the animal and use its value to purchase an actual peace offering.
This seems to contradict the earlier statement that designating second-tithe money for a peace offering does not work. There, the designation did not take effect at all. Here, however, the wild animal appears to have acquired the sanctity of the value of a peace offering. The Gemara answers that this understanding is incorrect.
When the teaching says that the hide does not become ordinary property, it does not mean that the animal became a peace offering or that the sanctity of a peace offering took effect. Rather, the designation did not work at all. The money remains second-tithe money, and the wild animal remains ordinary property. Nothing happened to the animal, and the sanctity of the peace offering did not take effect.
Why, then, does the teaching say that the hide does not become ordinary property? The answer is that this is not a case in which the animal became a peace offering and the hide was then released from its sanctity. The entire comparison to the hide is inapplicable, because the designation never took effect in the first place. The animal remains ordinary property, and there is no separate hide that must be released from the sanctity of a peace offering.
Rav says that this is comparable to a person who takes second-tithe money and purchases an ox for plowing. Does the ox acquire second-tithe sanctity? No. Second-tithe money may be used for food, but it cannot be used to purchase an ox for plowing. Since the ox is not being purchased for an edible purpose, the sanctity of the second tithe does not take effect on it.
Purchasing a wild animal with the intention of using it as a peace offering is comparable to purchasing an ox for plowing. A wild animal is not suitable for a peace offering. Therefore, the second-tithe sanctity does not transfer to it, and the designation of the animal as a peace offering accomplishes nothing. The money remains second-tithe money, and the animal remains ordinary property.
We had initially thought that the animal acquired the sanctity of a peace offering because the designation had been made incorrectly, and that the hide therefore retained sanctity. But that is not the correct interpretation. The sanctity of the peace offering does not take effect at all. The animal is ordinary property, and its hide is ordinary property. It may be used for any ordinary purpose; one need not sell it in order to purchase food in Jerusalem.
Thus, if one takes second-tithe money and purchases a wild animal while saying, “This is for a peace offering,” nothing happens. It is like taking second-tithe money and purchasing an ox for plowing. The ox remains an ordinary ox, and the money remains second-tithe money. Similarly, the wild animal remains ordinary property and the second-tithe money retains its original sanctity.
This resolves the earlier difficulty. We have no proof from this case that second-tithe money can acquire the sanctity of a peace offering merely through designation. The case is not one of transfer at all, because a wild animal is not suitable for a peace offering. The money remains second-tithe money, and the animal remains ordinary property.
Rabbi Yochanan’s statement therefore remains intact: When one takes second-tithe money and designates it for a peace offering, the designation does not take effect merely through speech. The discussion then considers Rabbi Yochanan’s position in light of another opinion. Rabbi Yochanan maintains that second-tithe money is considered the person’s own property. If so, it should certainly be possible to designate it for a peace offering, because there is a place for the new sanctity to take effect. According to this view, the money is not already considered property of the Temple in a way that prevents a further designation.
The novelty would therefore be according to the opinion that second-tithe property belongs to a higher authority. One might say that since the money already has sanctity, a second sanctity cannot take effect upon it. Another opinion, however, says that since second-tithe money may be used to purchase a peace offering, one may designate it for that purpose, and the sanctity of the peace offering takes effect when the money is designated.
The Gemara then raises another question. Suppose a person took second-tithe money and said, “I want this money to be used for a peace offering.” He now wants to redeem the money. The teaching says that when he redeems it, he must add two fifths. Normally, whenever one redeems second-tithe property, he must add a fifth to its value. For example, if he has wheat worth one dollar and wants to transfer its sanctity to money, he may not redeem it with exactly one dollar; he must use money worth one dollar and twenty cents.
In this case, the person has second-tithe money that he designated for a peace offering. If he now redeems it, the teaching says that he must add two fifths: one fifth for the second-tithe redemption and another fifth for the peace-offering redemption. This appears to indicate that the money has both the sanctity of the second tithe and the sanctity of a peace offering. If the sanctity of a peace offering did not take effect, why would he be required to add a second fifth?
This would seem to prove the opinion that designation does take effect. The money has the original second-tithe sanctity and also the sanctity of a peace offering, so two fifths must be added upon redemption.
The Gemara answers that this teaching follows the opinion that second-tithe money is considered ordinary personal property. According to that view, when the person designates the money for a peace offering, the sanctity of the peace offering takes effect. The teaching about adding two fifths is therefore understandable.
Rashi explains that when a person redeems second-tithe money and transfers it into a different denomination or into other money, he must add a fifth. In the case before us, the money carries two sanctities: the sanctity of the second tithe, which it had from the beginning, and the sanctity of the peace offering, which took effect when he designated it. Therefore, two fifths must be added—one for each sanctity.
This does not necessarily establish that every opinion agrees that the sanctity of the peace offering takes effect. It may follow specifically the view that the money is considered ordinary property. According to that view, the money is available for the new designation, and the sanctity of the peace offering can take effect.
Now the Mishnah asks: How do we know that an offering may be brought only from ordinary property and not from second-tithe property? The verse states: “You shall slaughter the Passover offering to the Lord your God, from the flock and from the cattle.” The Passover offering itself can come only from sheep or goats. What, then, is the purpose of mentioning cattle?
The verse is teaching that other offerings, which may be brought from cattle just as the verse mentions the flock and cattle, are comparable to the Passover offering with respect to their source of funding. Just as the Passover offering is brought from ordinary property, so too every offering that can be brought from cattle must be brought from ordinary property.
We still need to establish that the Passover offering itself must come from ordinary property. Rabbi Eliezer teaches this through a comparison between the Passover offering in Egypt and the Passover offering for later generations. The Passover offering in Egypt was brought from ordinary property, and the Passover offering for later generations was also brought from ordinary property.
One might object that the comparison is impossible. At the time of the Passover offering in Egypt, there was no second tithe. If there was no second-tithe money available, how can we use that case to prove that the Passover offering must be brought from ordinary property?
Rabbi Eliezer responds that one cannot generally derive a rule from a situation in which a possibility did not exist to a situation in which that possibility does exist. Nevertheless, the first Passover offering is the paradigm example of a Passover offering. Even though second-tithe money did not exist at that time, the Torah is teaching that the original Passover offering was brought from ordinary property, and later Passover offerings follow that model.
Rabbi Akiva challenges Rabbi Eliezer from another direction. The Passover offering in Egypt was different because it did not involve the usual altar service. There was no altar at which its blood was sprinkled. Instead, the blood was placed on the doorposts. Perhaps that is why it had to come from ordinary property. A Passover offering for later generations, however, involves the blood and sacrificial portions being brought upon the altar. Perhaps such an offering is comparable to a peace offering and may therefore be purchased with second-tithe money.
Rabbi Eliezer answers with the verse: “You shall observe this service in this month.” The services performed in the month of Nissan are to be considered comparable. The Passover offering in Egypt was performed in that month, and the Passover offering for later generations is also performed in that month. Just as the Passover offering in Egypt came from ordinary property, so too the Passover offering for later generations must come from ordinary property.
These are the two exchanges between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer. The Gemara then clarifies Rabbi Akiva’s reasoning. If Rabbi Akiva believes that one may not derive a rule from a case in which something was impossible to a case in which it is possible, why did he raise his second question? His first argument had already challenged Rabbi Eliezer’s comparison between the Passover offering in Egypt and the Passover offering for later generations.
The answer is that Rabbi Akiva later withdrew from the first argument. He no longer maintained that one cannot derive a rule from an impossible case to a possible case. That is why he raised the second challenge: Even if the comparison is valid, perhaps the absence of an altar in Egypt explains why the offering had to come from ordinary property. Where there is an altar, perhaps second-tithe money may be used.
Rabbi Akiva then brings the Passover offering in the wilderness as a challenge to Rabbi Eliezer. The Passover offering in the wilderness was brought when there was an altar, yet it was still brought from ordinary property. Therefore, the presence of an altar does not establish that the offering may be purchased with second-tithe money.
The Gemara explains the conversation more precisely. Rabbi Akiva says: According to my own position, I do not derive a rule from an impossible case to a possible case, so I do not need any further proof. The Passover offering in Egypt cannot establish the rule for later generations because second-tithe money was not available at that time.
However, according to Rabbi Eliezer, who does make such a comparison, Rabbi Akiva asks: How can you derive the rule from the Passover offering in Egypt? Perhaps the offering in Egypt had to come from ordinary property because there was no altar. In the later case, where there is an altar, perhaps it is comparable to a peace offering and may be purchased with second-tithe money.
Rabbi Eliezer answers that the verse “You shall observe this service in this month” establishes that all the services of that month are comparable. The altar-related distinction does not change the rule. The Passover offering in Egypt and the Passover offering for later generations are both included in the same comparison, and both must come from ordinary property.
The Gemara then asks why Rabbi Eliezer did not answer Rabbi Akiva’s second challenge in the simplest way: The Passover offering in the wilderness was brought upon an altar and was nevertheless brought from ordinary property. Why did Rabbi Eliezer not simply cite that case?
The answer is that Rabbi Akiva’s second challenge concerns the altar factor. Rabbi Akiva says that perhaps the Passover offering for later generations is different from the Passover offering in Egypt because it is brought upon an altar. Rabbi Eliezer could respond that the Passover offering in the wilderness was also brought upon an altar and still came from ordinary property.
However, Rabbi Akiva does not accept that proof because, according to his position, the wilderness case itself is subject to the same question of whether one may derive a rule from an impossible case to a possible case. Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer answers with the verse concerning the service of the month of Nissan: All these services are included within one comparison.
The Gemara then presents another question from Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Eliezer has brought a verse stating that the services performed in the month of Nissan are comparable. But perhaps the comparison teaches only that the Passover offerings themselves are comparable, and not that every other offering must also come from ordinary property.
Rabbi Eliezer answers that once a comparison is transmitted as a received teaching, one may not raise ordinary questions against it. A comparison in the laws of offerings is not an inference that one independently constructs. It is a tradition received from one’s teachers and ultimately from Sinai. The Torah is teaching that the Passover offering for later generations is brought from ordinary property.
Rabbi Akiva could still ask: The verse does not state explicitly that all the services are identical in every respect. You are making an inference that the services are comparable. Perhaps they are comparable in another respect, but not with regard to the source of the funds. Why may you derive a rule that is possible from a case in which it was impossible?
The answer is that once the comparison has been established, one does not create another comparison on top of it. In the laws of offerings, one cannot make successive comparisons, one after another, in order to derive new rules.
Let us proceed slowly. If someone asks how we know that ordinary offerings must be brought from ordinary property, the answer appears to involve a double comparison. First, we learn that the Passover offering for later generations must come from ordinary property because it is compared with the Passover offering in Egypt. Then, based on the verse that mentions both the flock and cattle, we extend the rule from the Passover offering to other offerings that may be brought from cattle.
But how do we know that the Passover offering itself must come from ordinary property? We learn that from the comparison between the Passover offering in Egypt and the Passover offering for later generations. Thus, it appears that we have one comparison from the Passover offering in Egypt to the later Passover offering, and then another comparison from the Passover offering to the other offerings.
The objection is that one may not construct a double comparison in the laws of offerings. Rabbi Eliezer answers that the entire matter is one comparison concerning the Passover offering. We should not divide it technically into separate stages. The comparison from the Passover offering in Egypt to the Passover offering for later generations, and from there to the other offerings, is all under one general framework. The Passover offering is the paradigm, and the other offerings are included within that same teaching.
Therefore, even though one could describe the process as a comparison from the Passover offering in Egypt to the Passover offering for later generations, followed by a comparison from the later Passover offering to the other offerings, Rabbi Eliezer maintains that it is not properly viewed as two independent comparisons. It is one unified teaching: The Passover offering is brought from ordinary property, and offerings that share the relevant characteristics of the Passover offering are brought from ordinary property as well.