We previously learned that a minor boy is not permitted to sell his father's inherited assets. According to the Gemara, there is a dispute regarding the specific age at which this prohibition ceases: either 18 or 20. This is an enactment by the sages, designed to prevent unscrupulous individuals from taking advantage of young people who may not be adept in business matters. Thus, a minor cannot sell real estate inherited from his father until he reaches the designated age of either 18 or 20.
However, when it comes to testimony, the rules differ. Once a boy reaches 13 years old and has visible puberty hairs, his testimony is considered valid. This holds true even if he is not yet proficient in business law. The validity of his testimony is linked to his ability to sell the specific type of item in question. For movable property, since a 13-year-old is permitted to sell it, he can also testify about it. Conversely, regarding real estate, since he cannot sell it at 13, he also cannot testify concerning it.
A question arises from the fact that very young children, referred to as pa'otot (e.g., five or six years old), are permitted to sell movable property. If the ability to sell dictates the ability to testify, then their testimony should also be valid. However, this is not the case. The Torah explicitly states that a witness must be an "adult man." Therefore, very young children, despite their ability to sell movable property, cannot serve as witnesses. Once a boy reaches the status of an adult man at 13, the rule changes: if he can sell an item, he can testify about it; if he cannot sell it, he cannot testify.
A further distinction is drawn between selling and gifting. While a 13-year-old cannot sell inherited real estate, he is permitted to gift it. The sages prohibited selling inherited real estate for a minor because they were concerned he might be swayed by money and sell valuable property for a cheap price, or even for a profit, but still unwisely. The concern is that a young person, often strongly attached to money, might sell off his entire inheritance if given the power to do so. However, gifting is different. A gift is typically given as a reciprocal act for a favor received, or to foster kindness. By allowing minors to make gifts, the sages encouraged others to perform favors for orphans, thereby creating a system of mutual benefit and support. Thus, a minor's gift is considered valid, unlike his sale of inherited real estate.
The discussion then turns to various situations where a physical check for puberty hairs is required to establish the legal status of a boy or girl who has reached the age of adulthood (13 for boys, 12 for girls). This physical check, known as a bid'ika, is necessary for several mitzvot:
1. **Kiddushin (Betrothal):** The betrothal of a minor girl is not valid. If a girl who was a minor subsequently accepts betrothal from another man, her status for the first betrothal must be clarified. The Rashbam explains that we do not rely solely on age. Even if she is 12 years and one day old, a physical check is needed to confirm she has brought puberty hairs. If she has, her betrothal is considered valid; otherwise, it is not. This check is crucial, especially in cases where a second betrothal might occur, to determine the validity of the first and subsequent betrothals.
2. **Girushin (Divorce):** For a husband to issue a divorce, he must be an adult male. This rule becomes particularly relevant in a levirate marriage situation. If a minor brother takes his deceased brother's widow in a levirate marriage (even at nine years and one day old), he can enter the marriage as a minor. However, to issue a divorce from this levirate marriage, he must be an adult. Therefore, when he reaches 13, a physical check is required to confirm his adult status before he can issue a valid divorce.
3. **Halitza (Levirate Release):** The Torah states that the woman performing levirate release must be an adult. Therefore, a physical check is required for a girl who reaches 12 years old to ensure she has brought puberty hairs and is a full adult (Gadola) before performing levirate release. This clarifies the law against the opinion of Rabbi Yosef, who held that only the man needed to be an adult, but the woman could be a minor. The Gemara concludes that both the man and the woman must be adults for levirate release.
4. **Mi'un (Refusal):** A girl who was married by her mother or brother (but not her father) before the age of 12 has the right to refuse the marriage. However, once she reaches 12 years old, she loses this right. A physical check is needed at 12 to confirm whether she has brought puberty hairs. If she has not, she is still considered a minor (ketanah) and can still refuse the marriage. There is a dispute between the sages and Yehuda regarding the number of puberty hairs required to lose the right to refuse: Yehuda holds that two hairs are sufficient, while others may require more. The strict opinion holds that once she is 12 years old with two hairs, her right to refuse is terminated.
5. **Selling Father's Assets:** As previously discussed, a minor boy is not permitted to sell his father's assets until he reaches 20 years old. This rule applies even if he brought puberty hairs at 13. The Rashbam emphasizes that despite having puberty hairs at 13, he is still considered a minor for the purpose of selling inherited real estate until he reaches 20. The age of 20 must be a full 20 years, meaning he must be 20 years and one day old.
The Gemara summarizes the established halachic rulings:
The cutoff point for selling inherited assets is 20 years old, not 18, meaning one must complete 20 full years. This applies to a youth who is not considered sharp in business. However, according to Gidava Menashe, if a youth is over 13 and is sharp in business, his sale is valid even before 20.
According to Amor Zutra, a youth who is less than 20 years old can testify on movable property but not on real estate, because his ability to testify is linked to his ability to sell the specific type of property.
The opinion of Amor is that a gift is different from a sale, and a minor can gift assets even if he cannot sell them.
Finally, the halacha follows Rab Nachman Amar Shmuel, confirming that for betrothal, divorce, refusal, and levirate release, a physical check for puberty hairs is required when a boy or girl reaches 13 or 12 years old, respectively. We do not simply assume their adult status based on age alone.
The discussion then shifts to the laws of a deathbed gift, known as a Matanah Shchiv Mera. Generally, if a person on their deathbed verbally declares their wish to give assets to someone, and they subsequently pass away, their words are considered a valid act of acquisition, even without a formal Kinyan (act of acquisition), provided there are witnesses. This is because a dying person's words are given special weight. However, the Mishnah introduces a dissenting opinion by Navi al-Azhar. He holds that regardless of whether a person is healthy or on their deathbed, a formal Kinyan is always required to transfer assets. For real estate, this means an acquisition through money, possession (Hazaka), or a deed (Shtar). For movable property, it requires an acquisition by pulling (Meshicha). According to Navi al-Azhar, if a formal Kinyan is not performed, the assets revert to the inheritors, even if the person dies.
The sages challenged Navi al-Azhar's position by citing a story (Maaseh) involving the mother of Rochel. She was ill and, on her deathbed, verbally declared her wish to give her daughter a valuable pin and jewelry. She then died, and her will was carried out without a formal Kinyan. This story appears to contradict Navi al-Azhar's view. The Rashbam offers two interpretations of this challenge: Either the woman gave away all her assets but did not explicitly state "I am dying," and Navi al-Azhar still required a Kinyan; or she gave away only a partial amount of her assets, and even in such a case, the sages would normally require a Kinyan unless she explicitly said "I am dying." In either scenario, the fulfillment of her verbal gift challenges Navi al-Azhar's insistence on a Kinyan.
Navi al-Azhar dismisses this proof, stating that the children involved were "Sha'een," a term implying they were lawbreakers. He cursed them, saying, "I wish their mother should bury them!" The Gemara explains that these individuals were "Sha'een" because they planted thorns in a vineyard, which is forbidden as a mixture of crops (Kalai Kerem). Navi al-Azhar held that even thorns, despite not being edible, constitute a forbidden mixture because they have value as camel food. Therefore, if someone plants thorns in a vineyard, both the thorns and the grapes become forbidden. This was a point of dispute between Navi al-Azhar and the other sages, who might not have considered thorns as a forbidden mixture since they are typically removed from a field, unlike edible crops like wheat.
The discussion concludes with the ruling of Navi al-Azhar, who states that an act of acquisition (Kinyan) for a deathbed gift can be performed even on Shabbat. This applies to cases where a Kinyan is required, such as when a person is giving over only a partial part of their estate. While the sages generally waive the Kinyan requirement for a complete deathbed gift to avoid distressing the dying person, if the person insists on performing a Kinyan, it should be facilitated even on Shabbat. This is because if their wishes are not immediately satisfied, they might become agitated and potentially die sooner. Therefore, even if halachically a Kinyan might not be necessary for a full deathbed gift, if the dying person believes it is, it should be performed to appease them. This also applies to a healthy person who makes a gift and then dies suddenly, where a Kinyan is always required.