The Ed B Sit edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, Masechet Chulin, has been dedicated by our good friend Mr. Joey Jamal and his wife in honor of their son Jack's engagement to Shirley Sutton. Be’ezrat Hashem, that they should get married besha’ah tovah u’mutzlachat, and in the merit of the limud that we will engage in over the next several months in Masechet Chulin, may they enjoy much nachat, shalom bayit, peace, prosperity, and all the brachot. Amen. We begin the daf on Daf Mem, at mem-tet amud bet, with a new Mishnah towards the bottom. The Mishnah states: Hashochet leshem harim, leshem gevaot, leshem yamim, leshem neharot, leshem midbarot, shechitato pesulah. If one slaughters an animal for the mountains, hills, rivers, streams, or deserts, his slaughtering is invalid.
The Mishnah further clarifies that even if one slaughters for an avodah zarah, the slaughtering is still pesulah, meaning the animal is assurah b'achilah. The Gemara will inquire why this is the case, especially since these entities do not become avodah zarah. The rule is that anything attached to the ground cannot become an avodah zarah. Therefore, even if one slaughters for a mountain that is worshiped, it does not transform into an avodah zarah.
Moreover, the Gemara questions why it is only assur b'achilah. If it is avodah zarah, it should also be assur b'hana'ah. The Gemara references Rashi, who explains that if someone makes a river an avodah zarah and slaughters an animal leshem that river, the slaughtering is pesulah. The discussion continues with a case of two people holding a knife to slaughter an animal. If one person intends to slaughter leshem avodah zarah while the other intends to slaughter normally, the slaughtering becomes invalid. We do not follow the intention of the one with the good kavanah; rather, we follow the one with the bad kavanah.
The Gemara then presents a contradiction regarding the status of zivchei metim. If the slaughtering is pesulah for avodah zarah, it should also be considered zivchei metim, which is assur b'hana'ah. The Gemara explores this contradiction further, referencing cases where the animal is not owned by the person slaughtering it. The discussion emphasizes the difference between the ownership of the animal and the intention behind the slaughter.
Rav Huna's view is that if one slaughters an animal belonging to his friend in front of an avodah zarah, even if he only performs one act of slaughtering, he renders it assur b'hana'ah. This presents a significant chiddush, as it allows one to forbid another's property through a simple act. The rationale is that a person can only be oser something that belongs to him, but when he performs an act of slaughter on someone else's animal, he creates a new halachic reality.
The Gemara cites a case where a person slaughters a chatat on Shabbat outside the azarah for avodah zarah, incurring three prohibitions: one for slaughtering on Shabbat, one for slaughtering outside the azarah, and one for slaughtering for avodah zarah. The question arises: how can one incur all three prohibitions if the chatat is not his? The answer lies in the nature of the chatat itself, which does not belong to the individual and thus requires a full act of slaughter to render it invalid.
Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the discussion surrounding the chatat is significant because it illustrates the complexities of ownership and intent in the realm of halacha. The nuances of these laws highlight the importance of kavanah and the legal implications of actions taken in relation to avodah zarah. The conversation around the chatat serves as a vehicle to explore broader themes in Jewish law and ethics, showcasing the depth and intricacy of halachic discourse.