The Eri B. Sit Edition is an audio series of the Babylonian Talmud. May Shemuel, Abraham, Shaul, and the parents from whom they came find favor in the eyes of both people and God, and may the Holy Spirit fill all their hearts with goodness. May their work be blessed. Amen and amen.
Today’s page, 18, is being studied for the elevation of the soul of Abraham Ben Esler and Moshe Ben Nuna. May the spirit of God bring them rest in the Garden of Eden. Amen. Today’s page is also being studied for the complete recovery of Yosef Ben Sabbuta. May he have a complete recovery of body and soul, and may he be restored quickly. Amen.
We begin today’s page on 17b, three, four, five, and six lines from the bottom, with the words, “Rather, from here.” Let us review where we are holding in this discussion. We learned the position of Rabbi Yehuda in the Mishnah. Rabbi Yehuda says that if a person declares the valuation of a poor person upon himself, then becomes wealthy, and afterward becomes poor again, he must pay according to the valuation of a wealthy person.
The question was: Why? The answer was that the verse says, “If he is poor,” which teaches that he must be poor from beginning to end. Once he entered a state of wealth, he is fixed in that category. The Gemara now says: According to this logic, let us ask about a similar verse and see whether the same reasoning applies.
In the laws of testimony, is a witness required to remain qualified from beginning to end—from the time he saw the testimony until the time he actually delivers it in court? Perhaps you will say yes, but that cannot be correct. A person may have seen testimony before he became the son-in-law of the litigant. At that time, he was not related to him. The litigant then married the witness’s daughter, making the witness his father-in-law.
Similarly, a person may have been able to see and then become blind; he may have been able to hear and speak and then have become unable to hear or speak; or he may have been sane and then become insane. At the time when he is required to come to court, he is disqualified and is not in a proper state to testify.
What is the case if he knew the testimony before he became the litigant’s son-in-law, and then became his son-in-law? His wife—the litigant’s daughter—then died, and he was no longer his father-in-law. Can we accept his testimony? He was also able to see, then became blind, and afterward regained his sight. He was sane, then became insane, and afterward became sane again. In all these cases, he was disqualified at an intermediate point, but he was qualified both when he saw the testimony and when he testified. The law is that as long as he saw the testimony while qualified and testified while qualified, we do not care what happened in between.
The Gemara answers that testimony is different. Regarding testimony, the Torah indicates that the essential elements are that the witness saw the testimony and that he delivers the testimony. Those are the two primary points. We do not care what happened in between. What, then, does the additional word teach? It teaches that the witness must remain consistent—but if consistency is not required, what does that word come to teach?
Look at the following teaching. A group of one hundred people is standing together, and a man knows that the two witnesses he needs are somewhere in that group. He says to the group, “I make you swear that if you know testimony, you must come and testify for me.” They swear, but they are lying. What is the law?
In the first case, he spoke generally to the group. In the second case, he said, “Whoever knows testimony must come and testify.” That is more specific. The Gemara explains that as long as he designates the witnesses, if they falsely swear that they do not know the testimony, the additional word teaches that they are liable. This is opposed to merely addressing a group and saying, “Swear to me that if you know testimony, you will testify.” That is too general. But when he speaks to the witnesses themselves, the law is different.
Now we return to the Mishnah. The Mishnah presents an interesting case. A person is poor, but his father is on his deathbed. The father dies and leaves him an inheritance of ten thousand coins. The son says that it does not matter and that he still has the status of a poor person. Why would he say that? His father left him an inheritance, so he is now wealthy and should have to pay according to the valuation of a wealthy person.
The Mishnah says that he still retains the status of a poor person. The Gemara asks: Why does it say that his father died? It sounds as though, when the Mishnah says that his father died, the father had not yet died; rather, he was destined to give him the money as an inheritance. If he is destined to receive the inheritance but has not yet received it, what difference does that make? He is still poor.
The Gemara answers that the case is one in which the father was on his deathbed. I might have said that most people who are on their deathbeds ultimately die, and therefore it is as though the money has already come to the son. The Mishnah teaches that this is not so. We do not consider the money to be his until the father actually dies.
The next case in the Mishnah concerns a person whose ship is coming, carrying a large amount of merchandise. The Gemara asks: Why does the Mishnah consider him poor? The merchandise is on his ship, so he should be wealthy. The Gemara answers that the merchandise does not belong to him. He was hired to transport it; perhaps he receives a percentage or a fixed payment.
Since the merchandise is not his, he is still poor. But he has money owed to him. If he is a worker and they are going to pay him for performing the job, perhaps he should be considered wealthy. The Gemara answers that the obligation to pay him does not arise until the end. He does not acquire the money incrementally as he works. The payment becomes due only when the work is completed. Therefore, until he is paid, he has nothing.
What about the ship itself? It sounds as though it belongs to him. If he owns the ship, does that not make him wealthy? The answer is that the ship is a tool of his trade. The person who declares a valuation upon himself is not assessed for the tools that he needs in order to make a living.
If the person is a farmer, the assessor gives him back the yoke that he needs for his oxen. A person comes and says, “My valuation is upon me.” When the court comes to assess him, it does not take away the tools of his trade, because he needs them in order to work. Similarly, if he is a donkey driver, the court does not take his donkey, because he needs it for his livelihood. The same is true of the ship. He needs the ship to transport merchandise back and forth, so it is not considered evidence that he is wealthy. Essential items that a person needs for his livelihood are not included in the assessment.
Now we return to the next Mishnah. Do you remember that when we calculate the years, the years follow not the person who made the declaration, but the person to whom the declaration applies?
For example, there is a child who is less than sixty years old, and a person says, “I give the valuation of this elderly person.” The valuation of someone over sixty is lower. Nevertheless, he pays the valuation of the elderly person, because the valuation follows the person to whom he referred. Conversely, if an elderly person says, “I give the valuation of this child,” he pays the valuation of the child, which is higher.
The same applies to gender. The valuation follows the person designated by the declaration. If a man says, “I give the valuation of this woman,” he pays the valuation of a woman, even though a woman’s valuation is lower than a man’s. Conversely, if a woman comes along and someone declares the valuation of a man upon himself, he pays the valuation of a man.
The valuation also follows the person’s age at the time the declaration was made. If a person says, “I give the valuation of so-and-so,” and at the time he made the declaration that person was under five years old, the valuation is five shekels. If, by the time he comes to pay, the child has reached the age of five but is still under twenty, he pays twenty shekels. If he was under twenty when the declaration was made but has become over twenty by the time he pays, he pays fifty shekels. The valuation is determined at the time he made the declaration, not at the time of payment.
There is a comparison between a person who says, “My monetary value is upon me,” and one who says, “My valuation is upon me.” The Gemara says that there are two similarities between these cases.
The first is that the item is assessed according to its current value. Look at Rashi. The expression means that we follow the value at the time of the assessment. The Torah says that he gives the valuation that applies on that day. We do not say, “Let us wait; perhaps we can obtain a higher price somewhere else.” If an assessor comes and determines that a jewel is worth thirty selaim, that is its value for the purpose of the assessment.
Even if someone says, “Take it to a large city, where perhaps it can be sold for fifty selaim,” that does not matter. An item is valued according to what it is worth at this moment and in this place. Similarly, when a person declares the value of a jewel upon himself, we determine its present value. We do not follow the amount that might be obtained in a different place or in a larger city.
The second similarity is that we assess according to the person’s most significant part. We have already discussed this. If someone says, “The valuation of my head is upon me,” the head is a vital organ that a person cannot live without. Therefore, “the valuation of my head” is treated as though he said, “My entire valuation is upon me.” He pays the valuation of his whole body, because we follow the vital organ.
Similarly, when a person says, “The monetary value of my head is upon me,” it does not mean only the monetary value of his head. It means the monetary value of his entire body. Those are the two similarities between these cases.
There is another comparison. Perhaps one might say that just as with monetary value, payment is made according to the time of the assessment, the same should apply to a valuation. When a person says, “My monetary value is upon me,” we assess him when he comes to court. The monetary value means how much he could be sold for as a slave, and that assessment is made when he appears before the court.
If a person declared, “My monetary value is upon me,” in the first year, and ten years later comes to court to pay, we do not ask what he was worth ten years earlier. We determine what he is worth now. One might therefore think that valuations should also be determined now, at the time of payment.
But we know that the Mishnah does not say that. A valuation follows the time when the declaration was made. Therefore, there is a distinction between valuations and monetary values. Monetary values are assessed at the time of the assessment, whereas a valuation is determined at the time of the declaration.
Rashi explains that with monetary values, payment is made at the time of the giving. The person is assessed like a slave. If someone says, “My monetary value is upon me” in Tishrei and comes to court in Nisan, who knows what he was worth at the time of the declaration? Therefore, he is assessed according to his value when he comes to court.
The next Mishnah makes an important point. The Torah teaches that the valuation depends on age and gender. We will now discuss the age itself. A child who is thirty days old has a particular valuation. What is the status of the thirtieth day? Is the thirtieth day considered like the thirty-first day, meaning that the child has entered the next category? Or is the thirtieth day considered like the twenty-ninth day?
The same question applies to twenty years. What is the status of the twentieth year itself? Is twenty considered less than twenty, or does the twentieth year enter the higher category like the twenty-first year? The Mishnah teaches that the thirtieth day is considered below thirty. Therefore, if a person says, “The valuation of this child is upon me,” and on that day the child is exactly thirty days old, we consider him as though he were still twenty-nine days old.
There is no valuation at that point, because the valuation begins only once thirty complete days have passed. In practical terms, it begins on the thirty-first day. The thirtieth day itself is considered below thirty.
The same principle applies to five years and twenty years. Exactly five years is considered below five, and exactly twenty years is considered below twenty. It is not only sixty years that is treated this way. The person must be sixty years and a little more. Sixty itself remains in the lower category.
We learn this principle from the law of sixty. Just as the sixtieth year is considered below sixty, the fifth and twentieth years are also considered below those ages. But the Gemara challenges this reasoning. The case of sixty is stringent: By putting sixty into the lower category, the person pays the higher amount, because after sixty the valuation decreases. Who says that we should apply the same rule to five and twenty? There, treating the age as lower can result in a lower payment, which would be lenient.
Therefore, the Gemara says that we need a verbal analogy. The word “year” appears with regard to sixty and with regard to twenty. We use the verbal analogy to teach that the same rule applies: the exact year itself remains in the lower category.
Even if one raises a question against the verbal analogy, the Gemara says that sometimes a verbal analogy is based on words that are entirely superfluous. When the words are extra, the verbal analogy cannot be challenged by this type of question. Here, the word “year” is extra, so the verbal analogy is conclusive.
The Gemara asks whether our Mishnah does not follow the opinion of Rabbi Meir. In general, Rabbi Meir maintains that whenever the Torah gives a number, the number itself is included. The rule is “up to and including.” If the Torah says sixty, it means up to and including sixty. If that is so, why would we need a verbal analogy from sixty to five and twenty? Rabbi Meir would already know from his general principle that the stated number is included.
How do we know that Rabbi Meir maintains the rule of “up to and including”? We learn it from the laws of Passover. The Torah says that from the first day until the seventh day, leaven may not be eaten. This does not mean that the first day is excluded and that the prohibition applies only from the second through the sixth days. It means that the first day is included.
The Gemara attempts to challenge this proof from the verse concerning a person afflicted with a skin disease, which says that the affliction extends from his head to his feet. Perhaps “from his head to his feet” does not include the head and feet themselves. If so, the language of “from” and “until” would not prove that the endpoints are included.
The Gemara answers that the verse concerning Passover is different. The Torah explicitly gives the date of the twenty-first day of Nisan. Since the Torah tells us that the prohibition applies until the twenty-first day, and the preceding verse speaks of seven days, we count backward and see that the first day is included. The Torah has supplied the count, and therefore the expression is understood inclusively.
Rabbi Meir says that a separate exposition is not needed. The first day is included, and the seventh day is included, because his general rule is that “up to and including” includes the stated number. Accordingly, he would not need the exposition concerning the years of valuations either, because the number itself would already be included.
The Gemara’s question is therefore that, just as Rabbi Meir does not need the exposition concerning Passover, he should not need the verbal analogy concerning valuations. The Gemara answers that in the laws of valuations there are two verses. One verse implies that the stated number is included, while another implies that it is not included. The two verses balance one another, which is why the verbal analogy is necessary.
One verse says, “From one month until five years,” implying that five years is included in the lower category. Another verse says, “From five years until twenty,” implying that five years is included in the higher category. The same five-year point is therefore being placed in both categories. Since the verses point in opposite directions, we do not know which way to proceed. The verbal analogy resolves the matter.
The Gemara now discusses the verse concerning the skin disease. It says that the affliction is from his head to his feet. The Gemara asks: Does that mean that the head is included, but the feet are not? Or does it mean that neither the head nor the feet is included? How do we know what the verse means?
One answer is that the signs on the body are different from the signs on the head. The signs on the head are yellow spots in the hair, while the afflictions on the body are white. Since they are different types of signs, we do not combine them. Therefore, when the verse says that the affliction covers the entire body, it does not include the head.
To clarify, the discussion is not about whether the person is rendered impure by the skin disease. The law is that when the affliction covers his entire body, he is declared pure. The question is what “his entire body” means. The verse teaches that the white affliction on the body is considered; the yellow affliction in the hair is a different matter and is not included.
Another answer is that the verse says that the affliction must be seen by the priest. If it is in the person’s head, under his hair, it cannot be seen properly. Therefore, the verse is referring only to the visible affliction on the body and not to the head.
Rabbi Elazar says that the rule applies not only to sixty years, but to sixty years and a month and a day. Where does he derive this? When the Levites were counted in the wilderness, the Torah said, “from one month and upward.” The expression “and upward” indicates that once the complete month has passed, the next category begins.
Here, too, the verse says “sixty and upward.” This teaches that the person must be sixty years and a month and a day before entering the next category. The same expression is used for the Levites, where the law requires a complete month, so it teaches that “sixty and upward” means sixty years, one month, and one day.
The Gemara challenges this. If that is so, what do we need the verbal analogy for? The expression “and upward” should already teach that the person must be sixty years and a day, or perhaps sixty years and a month and a day. The answer is that the verbal analogy is needed to add the month. Without the verbal analogy, we would know only that the sixtieth year is not enough; the verbal analogy teaches that the next category begins only after a month and a day.
We now have a number of cases in which the age of a person or an object matters. An animal must be a certain age. If a house in a walled city is sold, it can be redeemed for only one year; if it is not redeemed within that year, it remains with the purchaser. In the case of ancestral property, it cannot be redeemed until two years have passed. A servant works for six years, and in the seventh year he goes free. There is also a law involving a son and a daughter.
The common denominator among all these cases is that they depend on years. How are those years counted? They are counted from day to day. We do not say that every time Tishrei arrives a new year begins. Rather, if the year began on the twenty-seventh of Nisan, the year ends on the following twenty-seventh of Nisan. That is one complete year.
These are not calendar years. They are complete years from one date to the corresponding date. This differs from the calculation of the years of kings, where the calendar year changes at the appropriate time. Here, we require complete years, calculated from day to day.
The Gemara now proves this principle one case at a time. First, how do we know that an animal must be a year old before it may be brought? The verse says, “Its year,” teaching that it must be its own year, not merely the year of the world. The calendar year is not what determines its age.
What about the law of a house in a walled city? The seller has one year from the time of the sale to redeem it. The same answer applies: the verse refers to its year, not the calendar year.
Regarding ancestral property, the Torah says that the purchaser receives two years of produce. The Gemara explains that this means he must receive two harvests, and it is possible that he will receive three harvests within two years.
For example, if the property was sold in Nisan and wheat was already growing in the field, the purchaser could harvest that crop immediately. Another crop could grow and be harvested during the first year, and a third crop could grow and be harvested during the second year. Thus, from one Nisan to the next Nisan and then to the following Nisan, he can receive three harvests.
If we counted by calendar years, however, once Tishrei arrived, one year would already be considered complete, and when the next Tishrei arrived, the second year would be complete. He would receive only two harvests. The only way he can receive three harvests within two years is if we count from day to day.
How do we know this regarding a servant? The verse says, “For six years he shall serve, and in the seventh year he shall go free.” The simple meaning is that he works for six years and goes free in the seventh. The Gemara reads it differently: he works for six years and may also work during the seventh year.
How can he work during the seventh year? Sometimes he is purchased in the middle of the year. Although, according to the calendar, part of the seventh year has already arrived, he continues working until six complete years from the date of his purchase have passed. Thus, the verse means that he works for six years and sometimes also works during what is called the seventh calendar year. This proves that the calculation is from day to day.
The Gemara also asks about the law involving a son and a daughter. What case is meant there? According to the discussion of valuations, when we say that a child is five years old, we do not mean merely that five calendar years have passed. It means that five complete years have passed from the day of his birth.
Rav Yosef says that the reference is to a chapter in Tractate Niddah that lists various laws applying to children, depending on whether they are thirteen years and one day old or younger. All those laws are counted from day to day. The first rabbi, Rav, understands the passage as referring to valuations, while Rav Yosef says that it refers to the cases in Tractate Niddah.
The Gemara asks whether Rav Yosef is disagreeing with Rav. Why did Rav Yosef have to say that the case is in Tractate Niddah? Rav Yosef answers that he gave one example while Rav gave another, but they agree with one another.
The Gemara says that it makes sense that they are not arguing. Rav, who said that the valuation is counted from day to day, is himself the one who said in Tractate Niddah that all the ages discussed in that chapter are counted from day to day. Clearly, Rav maintains that the case of a child is also calculated in this way.
Why, then, did Rav Yosef not choose the example of valuations? The answer is that all the other cases we mentioned—animals, sixty years, a servant, a house in a walled city, and ancestral property—are explicitly derived from verses. The laws of valuations are also based on verses, including the verses that say “from five years” and “from sixty years.” Therefore, Rav Yosef chose the example from Tractate Niddah, where the principle is also followed even though the derivation is not based on the same type of explicit verse.
The Gemara asks further: If Rav Yosef was listing only cases that are explicitly written in the Torah, then the case of valuations should have used the terms “male” and “female.” The Torah gives the categories for valuations as male and female, whereas the passage says “son” and “daughter.” Why does it not say “male” and “female”?
Rav Yosef derives his position from the language. The verse says “son” and “daughter.” If it were referring to valuations, it should have said “male” and “female,” because that is the language the Torah uses for valuations. Since it says “son” and “daughter,” it must be referring to the laws concerning children discussed in Tractate Niddah.
The Gemara then raises one final point. The Torah says that when a woman passes the age of sixty, her valuation is reduced to ten shekels. From the ages of twenty to sixty, her valuation is thirty shekels. Thus, after sixty, she retains one-third of her previous valuation.
For a man, however, the valuation from twenty to sixty is fifty shekels, while after sixty it is fifteen shekels. That is less than one-third. Why does the valuation of a man decrease more after sixty than the valuation of a woman?
Rashi explains that when there is an elderly man in the house, he creates inconvenience. He needs assistance and is less useful. But when there is an elderly woman in the house, she remains industrious. She can still work, help, and contribute to the household. Therefore, her value does not decrease as much.
That is why a woman’s valuation decreases from thirty to ten, retaining one-third of its original amount, while a man’s valuation decreases more sharply after sixty. An elderly man becomes less useful, whereas an elderly woman can still be industrious and assist in the home.
May we merit to understand and fulfill what we learn. We conclude this discussion.