A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Eli Mansour

Daf Yomi

Yevamot 65A - 65B (12th Cycle Daf Yomi Shiur)

Lectured by Rabbi Eli Mansour

Published
March 7, 2006
Duration
01:04

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The Daf Yomi B-Set edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, specifically the section on Yevamot, has been dedicated and sponsored by our dear friend Mr. Isaac Jamal and his wife in honor of their family. May they be blessed with success in all their endeavors, and may Mr. Jamal merit to raise his children in the ways of the Torah, bringing him much joy and fulfillment. Today’s study is also dedicated to the memory of Avraham ben Esther, may his soul be at rest. We begin today's discussion on Daf Samech Chet, starting from four lines from the top of the first amud.

The Tana teaches: If a woman was married to her first husband for ten years without having children, she must divorce him. If she then marries a second husband and also remains childless for another ten years, the halacha states that when she marries a third husband, he must already have children. This ruling follows the opinion of Rabbi, who establishes a presumption that after two marriages without children, the woman is considered unable to bear children. Therefore, it is necessary for the third husband to have children already, as the mitzvah of procreation is upon the husband.

The Gemara then raises a question: What if she marries a man who does not have children? In such a case, the marriage is invalid, and she would leave without a ketubah. The Gemara clarifies that if the husband was unaware of her previous marriages and the fact that she was childless for twenty years, the marriage is considered to have been entered into under false pretenses. Thus, the ketubah is null and void. However, a get is still required because the presumption of her being barren is not absolute; it is based on a chazaka, a presumption that may not reflect the reality.

Next, the Gemara presents a scenario: If she marries a third husband and remains childless, can the first two husbands claim their ketubah payments back? The halacha states that if a man divorces his wife after ten years of childlessness, he is obligated to pay the ketubah because the presumption of her barrenness has not yet been established. However, now that she has married a third husband without having children, the question arises whether the first two husbands can retroactively claim that they should not have had to pay her the ketubah.

The Gemara discusses two possible claims: The first husband may argue that the woman is at fault for her inability to bear children, while the woman may counter that she was able to bear children during her previous marriages. The Gemara concludes that it is reasonable for her to assert that she has become weaker over time, which complicates the matter. The principle that "the burden of proof lies upon the claimant" is established; if the husbands wish to reclaim their payments, they must provide evidence of her barrenness.

The discussion continues with a hypothetical situation where she marries a fourth husband and has children. The question arises whether she can now claim her ketubah from the third husband, asserting that she is indeed capable of having children. The Gemara advises that it is better for her to remain silent, as revealing her current fertility might lead the third husband to argue that he divorced her under the assumption that she was barren, thus invalidating the get and potentially declaring her children as mamzerim.

The Gemara further explores the implications of the get, clarifying that the husband, when granting a divorce, does so with the understanding that the woman may eventually be able to bear children. Therefore, the divorce remains valid despite her current ability to conceive.

As the discussion unfolds, the Gemara examines various cases and the halachic implications of each scenario, including instances of miscarriages and the obligations of the husband in relation to the wife’s capacity to bear children. The overarching principle remains that the husband is obligated to fulfill the mitzvah of procreation, while the woman’s legal status may shift based on her circumstances and the claims made by both parties.

Ultimately, the Gemara illustrates the complexities of marital obligations and the nuances of halachic rulings regarding childbearing, emphasizing the importance of understanding the underlying principles that govern these laws. The discussions reveal not only the legal ramifications but also the profound ethical considerations that arise within the context of marriage and family life in Jewish law.