The Eri B. Sitt Edition, an audio series on the Talmud Bavli, is dedicated by our dear friend Mr. Elliot Shasho. May God preserve and sustain him. May the merit of studying Massechet Ketubot stand for him. With God’s help, may this be a good and blessed year for him, filled with happiness, wealth, honor, and peace in his home. May he continue to support Torah and all holy projects. Amen.
We begin today’s daf, 23b. We are at the Mishnah, eight lines from the bottom. The Mishnah begins, “Similarly, if two men say, ‘I am a priest,’ and each one says about the other, ‘He is a priest,’ they are not believed.”
In other words, each person comes and testifies that he is a priest. A person’s own testimony is not sufficient to establish that he is a priest. Therefore, we would not allow him to eat terumah, we would not give him the priestly honor when the Torah is read, and we would not allow him to raise his hands for the priestly blessing. More generally, we would not grant him the privileges that priests enjoy based solely on his own testimony.
Normally, we have the general principle that one witness is believed regarding matters that are prohibited or permitted. For example, one witness can establish that an item is permitted. However, when it comes to priestly status, the Sages were stringent because this involves lineage. A person’s own statement that he is a priest is therefore not accepted.
The Mishnah then discusses a different case: one man says, “I am a priest, and my friend is a priest,” and the other man says the same thing about himself and his friend. In that case, the first authority in the Mishnah says that they are believed with regard to allowing one another to eat terumah.
Thus, according to the first opinion, a person is not believed to establish his own priestly status, but another person is believed to testify that he is a priest. One witness can elevate a person to priestly status, but that witness cannot be the person himself; it must be someone else.
We must also say that the first authority is not concerned about collusion. Each man is saying, “I am a priest, and my friend is a priest,” so perhaps they are making an arrangement: “I will protect you, and you will protect me. You say that I am a priest, and I will say that you are a priest.” The first authority is clearly not concerned that they are acting in collusion. Therefore, when each man testifies that the other is a priest, the testimony is accepted for the purpose of allowing him to eat terumah.
Rabbi Yehuda disagrees. He says that one witness is not sufficient. Even if a person from the street comes and testifies that someone else is a priest, that testimony is not enough. Certainly, when two men testify for one another and there is a concern about collusion, Rabbi Yehuda does not accept their testimony.
Rabbi Yehuda’s position is that even when there is no concern of collusion, one witness is still insufficient. In other words, the first authority says that one witness can establish priestly status, whereas Rabbi Yehuda says that one witness cannot establish priestly status even when there is no concern that the witnesses are acting together.
Rabbi Elazar then says: When do we say that a person cannot be elevated to priestly status on the basis of one witness? That is only when there are people challenging him—when others come and dispute his status. But when nobody is challenging him, one witness can elevate him to priestly status.
Rashi explains that Rabbi Elazar and the first authority are not necessarily arguing. Even the first authority may agree that one witness is believed only when nobody is challenging the person. The disagreement may instead concern whether one witness is believed even in a case of collusion—when two people are testifying for one another—or whether, according to Rabbi Elazar, one witness is believed only when there is neither a challenge nor a concern of collusion.
The Mishnah concludes by repeating Rabbi Yehuda’s position: a person cannot be elevated to priestly status on the basis of one witness. The Gemara will explain precisely how Rabbi Yehuda’s statement differs from the position of the first authority.
The Gemara now returns to the previous Mishnayot that discussed the principle of “the one who prohibited is the one who permitted.” We learned four cases in which a person first made a statement that created a prohibition and then made a statement that removed it.
The first case involved a field. A person said, “The field belonged to your father, but he sold it to me.” He was the person who initially made the field prohibited to himself by acknowledging that it had belonged to the other person’s father, but he then permitted it by saying that the father had sold it to him. Rabbi Yehoshua agrees in that case that he is believed.
The second case involved witnesses who signed a document. They said, “Those are our signatures, but we were under duress when we signed.” They first validated the document by confirming their signatures and then challenged it by claiming that they had signed under duress. Rabbi Yehoshua also agrees in that case that they are believed.
The third case involved a woman who said, “I was married, but I was divorced.” Her first statement made her prohibited, since a married woman may not marry another man, and her second statement permitted her by saying that she had been divorced.
The fourth case involved a woman who said, “I was taken captive, but I remained pure.” Her captivity created a concern that she might have been violated, while her statement that she remained pure removed that concern. This too is a case in which the person first created the prohibition and then removed it.
The Gemara asks: Why are all four cases necessary? If the same principle applies in one case, why must the Mishnah teach all the others?
If the Mishnah had taught only the case of the field, one might have said that Rabbi Yehoshua agrees there because it is a monetary matter. Why should the person be believed? The answer would be that if he were not certain that the field had belonged to the other person’s father and that the father had sold it to him, he would not make such a statement. Why would someone voluntarily cause himself a monetary loss by saying, “It belonged to your father”? He must intend the entire statement as one testimony: “It belonged to your father, and he sold it to me.”
If we treated the two parts as separate testimonies, we would say that he first retracted his statement that the field belonged to the father and then added a new claim that the father sold it to him. But since a person would not voluntarily cause himself a loss, we understand the statement as one continuous testimony. That is why Rabbi Yehoshua agrees that he is believed.
However, in the case of the witnesses who signed the document, there is no monetary loss to the witnesses themselves. They say, “Those are our signatures, but we were under duress.” Their claim about duress affects the lender and borrower, the people named in the document, but it does not directly affect the witnesses. One might therefore think that the witnesses first testified that the document was valid and then changed their testimony by saying that they had been under duress. Perhaps this is not one continuous testimony.
The Gemara therefore teaches that even in that case, Rabbi Yehoshua says that the testimony is viewed as one continuous statement. The witnesses are believed when they say, “Those are our signatures, but we were under duress.”
The Gemara then reverses the argument. If the Mishnah had taught only the case of the witnesses, one might have said that they are believed because their statement about duress affects other people and does not benefit them personally. Since they have no reason to change their testimony, we understand the two parts as one continuous statement.
But in the case of the field, the person benefits personally when he says that the father sold it to him. Perhaps he first said, “The field belonged to your father,” and then added that the father sold it to him because he had something to gain. The Gemara therefore teaches that even when the person who testifies benefits from the second part of his statement, we still say that the original statement and the later statement form one continuous testimony.
The Gemara then turns to the two cases involving women. If the Mishnah had taught only the case of the field and the case of the witnesses, one might have said that Rabbi Yehoshua is lenient because these are monetary matters. When it comes to a woman’s status, however, perhaps Rabbi Yehoshua would be stringent, because the consequences are more serious.
Therefore, the Mishnah teaches the case of the woman who says, “I was married, but I was divorced.” Even though this involves a matter of personal status, she is believed. One might then say that the case of the woman who was taken captive is unnecessary, because if we believe a woman who says that she was married and divorced, certainly we should believe a woman who says that she was taken captive but remained pure.
The Gemara answers that the case of the woman who was taken captive is necessary for the continuation of the Mishnah. The Mishnah teaches that if she married and witnesses later came and testified that she had been taken captive, she may remain married. The case of captivity is therefore needed for that legal consequence.
However, the Gemara notes that on the previous daf there was a dispute about which case this ruling refers to. If the ruling that she may remain married after witnesses arrive refers to the case of the woman who was taken captive, then the case of captivity is indeed necessary. But if the ruling refers to the earlier case, where she said, “I was married and divorced,” then the case of captivity would appear unnecessary. If she may remain married even when witnesses testify that she was a married woman, certainly she may remain married in the less severe case of captivity.
The Gemara answers that the case of captivity is needed for the next Mishnah, which discusses two women who were taken captive and each one testifies on behalf of the other. Each woman says that the other remained pure. The Mishnah teaches that they are believed.
The Gemara asks why that case is necessary. What is the novelty? Perhaps one would be concerned about collusion. Since the two women are testifying for one another, perhaps they made an agreement: each one will say that the other remained pure. The Mishnah teaches that we are not concerned about such collusion.
But this same principle was already taught in the case of the priests. One man says, “I am a priest, and my friend is a priest,” while his friend says the same thing about him. The Mishnah teaches that we are not concerned about collusion. Why, then, is the case of the two women necessary?
The Gemara answers that the case of the priests is necessary because Rabbi Yehuda disagrees there and says that we are concerned about collusion. Therefore, the Mishnah must teach the case of the two women as well, to teach that even though each woman testifies for the other, we are not concerned about collusion in that case.
Let us review the four cases. The first was the field: “It belonged to your father, but he sold it to me.” Rabbi Yehoshua believes the person because this is a monetary matter, and a person would not make a statement that harms himself unless he were certain that the father had sold him the field. The two parts of his statement are understood as one continuous testimony.
The second was the witnesses who said, “Those are our signatures, but we were under duress.” Although the witnesses themselves do not suffer a monetary loss from their statement about duress, Rabbi Yehoshua still considers it one continuous testimony.
We then asked about the cases involving women. The case of the married woman who said, “I was married, but I was divorced,” teaches that this principle applies even in matters of personal status. The case of the woman who was taken captive is needed for the ruling that she may remain married if witnesses come after her marriage, and also for the case of two women who testify for one another.
The Mishnah now presents a related teaching: If two men say, “I am a priest, and my friend is a priest,” and each testifies for the other, they are believed to allow one another to eat terumah. They are not believed, however, to establish one another’s complete priestly lineage.
According to Rashi, they are not believed to establish that the person has an uncontested priestly lineage for purposes such as marriage. If one witness says that a person is a priest, we may allow him to eat terumah, but we do not necessarily regard him as a fully established priest with regard to lineage.
Some understand Rashi more stringently. Perhaps the person may not marry any Jewish woman on the basis of this testimony, because we do not know his status. Perhaps he is a person of defective lineage or another status that would affect whom he may marry. One witness is sufficient for the limited matter of terumah, but not to establish that he may marry without further investigation.
There is a difficulty with that understanding of Rashi. The Gemara in Kiddushin says that a person is generally presumed to have valid lineage, and that one does not have to investigate every person before allowing marriage. One does not ordinarily check the entire family history of every man or woman who wishes to marry.
Some answer that the general principle applies to families that already have an established presumption of valid lineage. Here, however, we may be speaking about a man who came from overseas, from a place where nobody knows his family. There is no established family record. In that situation, the testimony of one person that he is a priest is sufficient to allow him to eat terumah, but not sufficient to establish his lineage for marriage.
Other early authorities disagree with Rashi. They explain that the issue is not that the man may not marry any Jewish woman. Rather, the concern specifically relates to priestly lineage. He may marry an Israelite or a Levite, but we are concerned that he might be a disqualified priest. If he marries a woman who is permitted only to a fully established priest, she may become disqualified, and their children may also have that status.
Some explain the entire matter differently. The concern may relate to serving in the Temple. According to that understanding, one witness is sufficient to allow the person to eat terumah, but he may not serve in the Temple on the basis of one witness. This is another interpretation of the Mishnah.
These opinions reflect different explanations of why one witness is believed for terumah. One possibility is the principle that one witness is believed regarding matters of prohibition and permission. Eating terumah is a matter of prohibition and permission, whereas marriage involves a more serious matter of personal status, for which two witnesses are required.
Another possibility is that one witness is believed when the matter will eventually become publicly known. If the person is not really a priest, the matter will eventually be discovered. That may be the reason one witness is believed with regard to terumah, but not with regard to lineage.
The Mishnah continues: They are not believed until there are three people—two witnesses testifying about one man and two witnesses testifying about the other. In other words, each person may testify about his friend, but to establish the matter fully, testimony from two witnesses is required for each man.
Rabbi Yehuda says that they are not believed even to allow one another to eat terumah unless there are three people, meaning two witnesses for one man and two witnesses for the other.
At this point, the Gemara assumes that Rabbi Yehuda’s reason is that he is concerned about collusion. One witness would ordinarily be sufficient for terumah, but in this case each man is testifying for the other. Rabbi Yehuda says that we suspect an arrangement: “You will testify that I am a priest, and I will testify that you are a priest.”
According to this understanding, Rabbi Yehuda agrees that one witness is generally believed with regard to terumah. His objection applies specifically when there is collusion. Therefore, when the Mishnah says that one witness does not elevate a person to priestly status, it must be referring specifically to a case of collusion.
The Gemara then challenges this understanding. Does Rabbi Yehuda really hold that we are concerned about collusion while the Sages are not? We find another Mishnah involving donkey drivers who bring produce to the city to sell.
One donkey driver says, “My friend’s produce is old and therefore usable, while my own produce is new and not yet fully usable. I did not separate the tithes from my produce, but my friend’s produce is properly tithed.” The other donkey driver says the same thing about his friend. The Mishnah says that each one is believed regarding his friend’s produce.
If Rabbi Yehuda is concerned about collusion, how can he accept the testimony of one donkey driver about the other? Perhaps they have made an agreement: “You will praise my produce in this city, and I will praise yours in the next city.” This appears to show that Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned about collusion.
Rashi explains that these donkey drivers are merchants who bring produce from a place where it is inexpensive and sell it in the cities. One of them praises his friend’s produce while criticizing his own. He says, “My produce is new and has not yet been properly prepared, while my friend’s produce is old and usable. I have not separated the tithes from mine, while my friend’s produce is properly tithed.”
Rabbi Yehuda says that the donkey drivers are not believed with regard to the tithes. The Gemara therefore appears to create a contradiction between Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling in the case of the priests and his ruling in the case of the donkey drivers.
One general rule is that if we must change an attribution, it is easier to change the attribution in a baraita than in a Mishnah. The Mishnah is generally considered more precise. The teaching about the priests is a baraita: “I am a priest, and my friend is a priest.” Therefore, perhaps Rabbi Yehuda is not the one who is concerned about collusion in that source. Rather, the Rabbis are the ones who say that the two men are not believed, while Rabbi Yehuda himself does not suspect collusion.
According to this explanation, Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned about collusion. That is why, in the case of two priests testifying for one another, each one is believed. He also accepts the testimony of the donkey drivers. The statement that the donkey drivers are not believed would then be the opinion of the first authority, not Rabbi Yehuda.
The difficulty is that we must now explain the Mishnah according to this view. When the Mishnah says that Rabbi Yehuda does not allow one witness to elevate a person to priestly status, we must say that the ruling concerns lineage and marriage, not eating terumah. With regard to terumah, even in a case where two people testify for one another, one witness is sufficient. With regard to lineage, however, two witnesses are required.
Abaye offers another answer. There is no need to reverse the opinions. Rabbi Yehuda is indeed concerned about collusion, which is why he does not accept the testimony of two priests who testify for one another. Why, then, does he accept the testimony of the donkey drivers?
The answer is that the Sages were lenient regarding doubtful tithe produce. Most unlearned people do separate the tithes from their produce. The reason one may not eat the produce of an unlearned person without separating tithes is that a minority do not separate them. The produce is therefore called doubtful tithe produce.
Since the majority of such people do separate tithes, the testimony of the donkey driver that his friend’s produce is properly tithed can be accepted. Even without his testimony, there is already a presumption based on the majority. His statement merely confirms what is already likely.
That is different from priestly status. There is no comparable basis for assuming that the man is a priest. Therefore, when two men testify for one another, Rabbi Yehuda remains concerned that they may be acting together.
Rava then presents the difficulty from the other direction. We have explained the contradiction between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yehuda, but why not ask the same question regarding the Rabbis? In the baraita concerning the priests, the Rabbis say that each man is believed when testifying for the other. In the case of the donkey drivers, however, the first authority says that they are not believed regarding the tithes. Why do the Rabbis appear to contradict themselves?
The Gemara answers that the contradiction between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yehuda can be resolved as Abaye explained. Rabbi Yehuda generally suspects collusion, but the case of the donkey drivers is different because there is a basis in the majority for believing their testimony.
As for the Rabbis, the case of the donkey drivers involves a special circumstance: the person is carrying the tools of his trade. The donkey drivers bring with them the implements they use to measure and sell their produce. If someone were bringing produce merely for personal use, he would not necessarily carry those implements. The fact that he is carrying them demonstrates that he came to sell.
When a man comes to a city carrying the tools of sale and says, “My produce is inferior, but my friend’s produce is good,” there is a reason to suspect collusion. His tools show that he intends to sell the produce. Perhaps he is criticizing his own produce only because, in the next city, his friend will praise it and help him sell it.
Thus, when the person is carrying the tools of his trade, we are concerned about collusion. This explains why the Rabbis do not accept the testimony of the donkey drivers in that case. In the case of the priests, however, there is no comparable indication that the two men are acting together, and the Rabbis are therefore not concerned about collusion.
The Gemara brings a similar principle from another Mishnah involving a potter who is careful about ritual purity. The potter left his vessels in the public domain while he went to obtain water. The vessels on the inside are pure, while those on the outside are impure.
The Gemara asks how this distinction can be made. Another teaching says that both the inner and outer vessels are pure, while yet another teaching says that all of them are impure.
Rava bar Ukva explains that these different rulings depend on whether the potter is carrying the tools of his trade. If the vessels are being offered for sale, the buyers are likely to touch them while examining the merchandise. In that case, all the vessels become impure, because everyone handles them.
If the vessels are not being offered for sale, then nobody has a reason to touch them, and they remain pure. The case in which the outer vessels are impure and the inner vessels remain pure refers to a situation in which the vessels were placed beside the protrusions along the side of the public road.
In earlier times, these protrusions narrowed the public domain and protected the walls from passing animals or carts. When the potter placed his vessels beside them, the space became even narrower. We are concerned that the clothing of people walking through the public domain may have passed over the airspace of the outer vessels. The outer vessels are therefore impure, while we are not concerned that the clothing reached the inner vessels.
This is the same principle as the case of the donkey drivers. If the person is carrying the tools of his trade, that is evidence that he is preparing to sell, and there is a reason to suspect that he and his friend are cooperating. If he is not carrying those tools, there is no reason to suspect collusion.
The Gemara then offers another explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. Perhaps the disagreement is not about collusion at all. Rather, it concerns whether allowing a person to eat terumah establishes him as a priest for purposes of lineage.
Rabbi Yehuda may hold that when people see a person eating terumah, they will assume that he is a fully established priest. If we allow him to eat terumah based on the testimony of one witness, people may rely on that status for marriage and other matters of lineage. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda requires two witnesses even for terumah, because allowing him to eat terumah will lead people to establish his priestly lineage.
The Rabbis disagree. They say that allowing a person to eat terumah does not automatically establish his lineage. One may distinguish between the limited permission to eat terumah and the broader status of priestly lineage. Therefore, one witness is sufficient to allow him to eat terumah.
According to this explanation, Rabbi Yehuda does not necessarily suspect collusion. The reason he requires two witnesses in the case of the two priests is that permitting one of them to eat terumah may cause people to assume that he is a fully established priest. Since that assumption could affect marriage, two witnesses are required.
The Rabbis, however, maintain that eating terumah does not create that assumption. Therefore, when each man testifies about the other, they are believed with regard to terumah.
The Gemara now asks whether a person’s signature on a document can establish his priestly status. Suppose a document says, “I, so-and-so the priest, borrowed money,” and witnesses signed the document. Can the signature establish that the person is a priest for purposes of lineage?
Perhaps the witnesses are signing only to confirm the monetary transaction. If so, their signatures cannot establish the borrower’s priestly status. Alternatively, perhaps when witnesses sign a document, they confirm everything written in it, including the statement that the borrower is a priest. This is the Gemara’s question.
A related question concerns a priest who raises his hands to give the priestly blessing in the congregation. Can the fact that he performed the priestly blessing establish that he is a priest for purposes of lineage?
The Torah requires priests to give the priestly blessing. According to the opinion that performing the priestly blessing establishes a person as a priest for purposes of lineage, the first time a person raises his hands to give the blessing, two witnesses would be required to testify that he is a priest. Once he performs the blessing, people may regard him as a fully established priest, and that could affect whom he may marry.
Alternatively, perhaps performing the priestly blessing does not establish lineage. In that case, one would not need two witnesses before allowing him to raise his hands. The question applies whether one holds that eating terumah establishes lineage or whether one holds that it does not.
According to the opinion that eating terumah does establish lineage, one may still ask whether performing the priestly blessing has the same effect. The Gemara says that the two cases may differ. If a non-priest eats terumah, he incurs a severe punishment, and therefore his eating terumah is a strong indication that he is indeed a priest. A person would not ordinarily eat terumah and expose himself to such a punishment if he were not a priest.
Performing the priestly blessing, however, may involve only the violation of a positive commandment if the person is not a priest. Since the violation is less severe, perhaps the fact that he performed the priestly blessing is not a strong enough indication to establish his priestly lineage.
The Gemara then considers the opposite possibility. According to the opinion that eating terumah does not establish lineage, perhaps that is because a person can eat terumah privately. Since nobody sees him, his eating does not lead the public to establish him as a priest.
Performing the priestly blessing is different because it takes place publicly. Everyone sees him raising his hands and blessing the congregation. Perhaps that public act is sufficient to establish him as a priest, in which case two witnesses would be required the first time he performs the blessing.
Alternatively, perhaps there is no distinction between the two cases. Just as eating terumah does not establish lineage, performing the priestly blessing also does not establish lineage. This remains unresolved at that stage of the discussion.
The Gemara then brings a baraita from the return of the exiles from Babylonia to the Land of Israel during the time of the Second Temple. The verse discusses families of priests, including the descendants of Hobaiah, Hakkoz, and Barzillai the Gileadite. The family of Barzillai was called by that name because the father of the family had married a daughter of Barzillai the Gileadite.
When these families returned, they sought their genealogical records but could not find them. They therefore could not establish their priestly lineage. The governor told them that they could not eat from the most sacred offerings until a priest would arise with the Urim and Tumim. At that time, the Urim and Tumim would reveal who was truly a priest and who was not.
The Gemara makes a distinction from the wording of the verse. It says that these people could not eat the most sacred offerings, but it does not say that they could not eat terumah. They had previously been eating terumah in Babylonia, and they were allowed to continue doing so when they returned to the Land of Israel.
This shows that they had a presumption with regard to terumah, but not with regard to the most sacred offerings. They did not have an established presumption that they could eat offerings from the altar, but they did have an established practice of eating terumah. They were therefore allowed to continue their previous practice.
The same may have applied to the priestly blessing. Since they had regarded themselves as priests in Babylonia, they may also have performed the priestly blessing there. When they returned, they were allowed to continue the practice based on their established status.
The Gemara then asks: If performing the priestly blessing establishes a person as a fully qualified priest for purposes of lineage, what did the governor accomplish by allowing these families to continue giving the blessing? Once they gave the blessing, people would establish them as priests and would assume that they could also eat the most sacred offerings.
The answer appears to be that performing the priestly blessing does not establish a person’s lineage for all purposes. Therefore, the governor could allow them to continue giving the blessing while still prohibiting them from eating the most sacred offerings. Their established practice allowed them to continue with terumah and the priestly blessing, but it did not allow them to advance to the more serious status of eating the most sacred offerings.
The Gemara challenges this proof. Perhaps the presumption of these families had already been weakened in the eyes of the public. Everyone knew that they could not eat the most sacred offerings. Since their status was already publicly compromised, allowing them to give the priestly blessing would not cause people to regard them as fully established priests. That is why they could continue the blessing without creating a new presumption concerning their lineage.
According to this answer, the case of these families does not prove that performing the priestly blessing never establishes lineage. It may only show that in their special case, the public already knew that their priestly status was limited. Therefore, the blessing did not lead people to assume that they possessed full priestly lineage.
The same difficulty applies to terumah. If the families were allowed to continue eating terumah, why would that not establish them as priests for all purposes? The answer is again that their status had already been weakened. Since people knew that they could not eat the most sacred offerings, they would not assume from their eating terumah that they had completely established lineage.
The Gemara then returns to the statement that a strong presumption can preserve a person’s status. The Gemara asks: What was the novelty of saying that a strong presumption is significant? In this case, perhaps they were allowed to eat terumah simply because they had always eaten terumah. There is nothing especially novel about maintaining an ordinary established practice.
The Gemara answers that the novelty is that they were allowed to continue eating terumah even after entering the Land of Israel. Terumah in Babylonia was subject to a rabbinic obligation, while terumah in the Land of Israel has a stronger status. One might have thought that their presumption would be enough for the lesser obligation in Babylonia but not for the stricter situation in the Land of Israel. The teaching therefore emphasizes that the strength of the presumption allowed them to continue eating terumah even there.
The Gemara ultimately uses this discussion to clarify the question of whether eating terumah or performing the priestly blessing establishes lineage. One opinion says that these actions ordinarily may lead people to regard a person as a fully qualified priest. However, the families who returned from Babylonia were different because their priestly status had already been publicly weakened by the fact that they could not eat the most sacred offerings.
Therefore, their continued eating of terumah and performance of the priestly blessing did not cause the public to assume that they had full priestly lineage. The presumption allowed them to maintain their previous practices, but it did not restore them to every aspect of priestly status.
May the study of these laws and distinctions be a merit for all those who support Torah and all holy projects. Amen.