The third chapter of the Talmud Bavli begins by discussing the case of an "ones." An "ones" refers to a situation where a man has a forced relationship with an unmarried virgin, known as a "na'arah betula." The Torah's law dictates that if he violates this na'arah betula, he must pay a fine, or "kenas," of fifty silver shekels to the girl's father. The verse in Deuteronomy states: "If a man finds a virgin girl who is not betrothed, and he seizes her and lies with her, and they are discovered, the man who lay with her shall give to the father of the girl fifty silver shekels."
Beyond this penalty of fifty silver shekels, he is also obligated to make other payments. These include compensation for pain and suffering, known as "tzar," for embarrassment, known as "boshet," and for any physical damage, known as "nezik." Furthermore, in addition to these monetary obligations, the Torah mandates that he must marry the girl if she desires, and he is forbidden from divorcing her for the rest of his life. The logic behind this is that since the father would now struggle to marry off his daughter due to her violation, the man is compelled to marry her, and she is given the option. He must take her and cannot divorce her. This is the law of an "ones."
This differs from the case of a "mefateh," which describes a girl who was seduced and willingly engaged in the act. In such a case, there is also a fine that the man must pay, as the verse states, in addition to other payments. The Mishnah, at the beginning of this chapter, discusses various women whom it is forbidden to marry, yet if a person violates them, he would still be obligated to pay the fine to the father. One might argue that since the verse states, "and she shall be his wife," this law should only apply to women whom it is permissible to marry. Perhaps for women whom one cannot marry, the law of the fifty silver shekels would not apply if they are violated. However, the Mishnah does not agree with this interpretation. The Mishnah states that the law applies to most women, even those who are ordinarily forbidden to a person.
The Mishnah begins by listing: "These are the girls who have a fine." This refers specifically to a "na'arah," a girl who has grown two pubic hairs, but is not yet a "bogeret." There are six categories of women who are considered "na'arot" for whom this law applies. However, a "ketana" (minor) or a "bogeret" (mature woman) does not incur this fine. The Torah's language in the case of an "ones" specifies a "na'arah," which denotes a very limited age range: from twelve years old until twelve and a half years old, before she shows signs of full maturity. A girl under twelve is considered a "ketana," and at twelve and a half years, she is considered a "bogeret." Thus, the law of "ones" for a "na'arah" applies between twelve and twelve and a half years of age. If a man violates her, he must pay the father fifty silver shekels as a penalty.
The Mishnah then lists specific women to whom this applies: a "mamzeret" (a child born from certain forbidden unions). Even though it is forbidden to marry a mamzeret, the law of the fine applies. The Gemara asks why the Mishnah specifies a mamzeret, implying it would not apply to a "keshera" (a woman permissible to marry). The Gemara explains that the Mishnah is listing cases where the law of "ones" applies even to women who are generally forbidden, but it certainly applies to a keshera. So, if a person violates a mamzeret, he must pay the fine. The Mishnah also mentions a "netina." The Netinim were descendants of the Gibeonites, whom Joshua allowed to convert but forbade from marrying into the Jewish nation. They were designated as woodchoppers and water carriers. Since Netinim are forbidden to marry into the community, if a person violates a netina, he must still pay the fifty silver shekels.
Next, the Mishnah discusses a "kutit." When the King of Assyria exiled the ten tribes from the Land of Israel, he settled people from a place called Kuta in Samaria. These "Kutim" converted, but there is a dispute whether their conversion was valid. This opinion holds that they were "Gireh Arayot" (converts out of fear of lions), meaning their conversion was not sincere, and they retain the status of non-Jews. The Torah forbids marrying a non-Jew, stating, "You shall not intermarry with them." Therefore, if a person violates a kutit, even though she is not marriageable, he must still pay the fifty silver shekels.
The Mishnah continues with the case of a "giyoret" (a female convert) or a woman who was taken captive and subsequently redeemed. The point in these cases is that for the law of "ones" to apply, the woman must be a "betula." These women are not typically considered virgins. However, the Mishnah specifies "less than three years and one day old." If, for instance, they were redeemed from captivity, it is assumed they were violated. But if they were less than three years old, their virginity "returns." Similarly, if a girl converted when she was less than three years old, even if she was violated, her virginity returns. Or, if a female slave was freed after being less than three years old, her virginity returns. The innovation in all these cases is that their virginity is restored, making them considered "betulot," and thus the law of "ones" applies. Therefore, if a person violates any of these women, he must pay the fine. This applies even if she was violated during captivity, as her virginity returns.
The Mishnah then introduces a final section, discussing women who are not only forbidden by a negative commandment (like a mamzeret or netina or kutit), but even by the severe punishment of "karet" (excision). If a man violates such a woman, he must still pay the fine. These cases include: a man who violates his sister, his father's sister, his mother's sister, his wife's sister, or his brother's wife. The case of his brother's wife refers to a situation where his brother had betrothed this woman and then divorced her. If his brother were still married, violating her would be considered "Eshet Ish" (a married woman), which carries the death penalty by the court. When there is a death penalty imposed by the court, the law of the fifty silver shekels does not apply. Thus, the Mishnah presents a case of "karet" where his brother was engaged to the woman, divorced her, but she remains forbidden to him, even after the divorce. Therefore, in this case, he pays the fifty silver shekels. Similarly, for his uncle's wife (his father's brother's wife), the same scenario applies: they were married, divorced, and she remains forbidden by "karet." The Mishnah also includes a man who violates a "nidah" (a menstruating woman), which also carries "karet." The Mishnah asserts that for all these cases, the fine applies, even if the transgression involves "karet." The Gemara explains that the law of the fifty silver shekels applies when there is a prohibition by a negative commandment or even by "karet," but not when there is a death penalty imposed by the court.
The Gemara elaborates on the logic: a general rule states that when two punishments are levied upon a person, the stricter punishment is imposed. For example, if a person is liable for a death penalty and also a monetary payment, he receives the death penalty and is exempt from the monetary payment. This principle, "kim lei bidraba minei" (we impose upon him the stricter of the two), applies when there is a death penalty imposed by the court. However, "karet" is not considered subject to this rule. Therefore, in cases of "karet," one receives "karet" and also pays the fifty silver shekels. But if it were a death penalty imposed by the court, he would receive the death penalty and be exempt from the fifty silver shekels.
The Gemara then asks about the Mishnah's opening statement, "These are the girls who have a fine." This implies that the law of "ones" applies only to a "na'arah," but not to a "ketana." The Gemara asks, "Who is the author of our Mishnah?" Rabbi Judah says it is Rabbi Meir. How do we know this? A Baraita teaches: "A ketana from one day old until she brings two pubic hairs, the father can sell her." This means the Torah grants the father the right to sell his minor daughter as a maidservant. As long as he has the right to sell her, she is not subject to the law of "ones," and therefore there is no fine for the father. Once she brings two pubic hairs, until she becomes a "bogeret" (twelve and a half months), she is subject to the fine, and the father no longer has the right to sell her. This illustrates a controversy: Rabbi Meir holds that when there is the right to sell, there is no fine, and when there is a fine, there is no right to sell. The fine starts at twelve years old and ends at twelve and a half months. Thus, the law of the fine applies only when she is a "na'arah."
The Gemara then challenges this: Can you sell a girl who is a "na'arah"? If she was sold as a minor, she is automatically freed once she becomes a "na'arah." So, it is unnecessary to state that you cannot sell her as a "na'arah." The Sages, however, hold that the law of the fine starts from three years old until she becomes a "bogeret." This implies that the Sages believe the law of the fine applies even to a "ketana." The Gemara asks: If the fine applies from three years old, but the father does not lose the right to sell her, how can we reconcile this? The Gemara explains that according to the Sages, even when there is a fine, there is also the right to sell. The novelty is that the fine does not begin until three years old. The right to sell, according to the Sages, begins from day one. That is why they only discussed the three-year mark, as that is when the law of "ones" begins. But the right to sell, according to the Sages, starts from one day old. Therefore, the Mishnah cannot be according to the Sages, because according to them, the law of "ones" applies even to a "ketana," not just a "na'arah."
The Gemara asks: For the women listed in the Mishnah, why must the man pay a fine to the father? The verse states that part of the law of an "ones" is "and she shall be his wife," which implies a woman who is fitting for him. Since these women are not fitting for him, the law of the fine should not apply. The Gemara answers that there are extra words written in the section about "ones," and these extra words serve to include even women who are not fitting. What are these extra words? The word "na'arah" appears twice in the passage. One verse says, "If a man finds a virgin girl," and another says, "and the man who lay with her shall give to the father of the girl." The first mention of "na'arah" is necessary to teach the regular law. But the second "ha-na'arah" (the girl) is extra. The verse could have simply said, "and he shall give to her father." The second "na'arah" is extra in two ways: the word "na'arah" itself, and the prefix "ha" (the). So, there are effectively three mentions of "na'arah" here. The Gemara analyzes the purpose of these three mentions. The first "na'arah" teaches the basic law. One extra "na'arah" comes to include women forbidden by a negative commandment, such as a mamzeret or a netina. And the other extra "na'arah" comes to include women forbidden by "karet," such as a nidah, his brother's wife, or his father's sister. This is how Resh Lakish knows to include these cases.
Rabbi Papa offers a different derivation. According to Rabbi Papa, the verse uses the word "betula" (virgin) in the law of "mefateh" (seducer), not "ones." There is a "gezeirah shavah" (a verbal analogy) that links the laws of "mefateh" and "ones," so whatever applies to "mefateh" also applies to "ones." In the passage about "mefateh," the word "betula" appears three times. One verse mentions "betula," then another mentions "the price of the virgins," and again, "betula." The first "betula" is for the basic law of "mefateh." One extra "betula" comes to include women forbidden by a negative commandment. And the third "betula" comes to include women forbidden by "karet." Since this is established for "mefateh," it also applies to "ones." So, we have a fundamental disagreement between Resh Lakish and Rabbi Papa, not on the actual law, but on its source. According to Resh Lakish, the law is derived from the extra "na'arah" in the "ones" passage, while according to Rabbi Papa, it is derived from the extra "betula" in the "mefateh" passage.
The Gemara asks Rabbi Papa: What about Resh Lakish's derivation from "na'arah"? Resh Lakish uses one "na'arah" to teach that the fine is paid only when the girl is alive, not if she dies. If she dies, the father is exempt from paying the fifty silver shekels. This is because the verse says, "to the father of the girl," implying a living girl, not the father of a deceased girl. So, Resh Lakish needs that extra "na'arah" for this teaching. Conversely, the Gemara asks Resh Lakish: Why doesn't he derive the law from "betula" as Rabbi Papa does? Resh Lakish uses those words for the "gezeirah shavah" that links the two passages. A Baraita states that for a "mefateh," he must pay "silver." This does not specify how much. The Gemara concludes that it must be "the price of the virgins," which is fifty silver shekels, as known from the law of "ones." When the verse for "ones" says "fifty silver," it doesn't specify the type of coins. But for "mefateh," it says "yishkol" (he shall weigh), which implies shekels. Thus, from "mefateh," we learn the currency, and from "ones," we learn the amount. This "betula" is the linking word, so it is already used.
The Gemara then asks Resh Lakish: If you learn from "na'arah" that the girl must be alive, why don't you learn from "betula" for the "gezeirah shavah"? And to Rabbi Papa: If you learn from "betula" for the "gezeirah shavah," why don't you learn from "na'arah" that the girl must be alive? The Gemara accepts both derivations as valid and necessary. It then revamps the derivation, stating that there are actually six verses written: three mentions of "na'arah" and three mentions of "betula." Two of these are for the basic laws (one "na'arah" and one "betula"). This leaves four extra words. One "na'arah" is used for Abaye's teaching that the girl must be alive. One "betula" is used for the "gezeirah shavah." This leaves two words. One is for including women forbidden by a negative commandment, and the other is for including women forbidden by "karet."
This derivation serves to exclude other opinions. For example, the Mishnah states that a mamzeret and his sister incur a fine. This excludes the opinion of Shimon HaTimni. We have a significant dispute regarding the verse "and she shall be his wife." Shimon HaTimni says: "A woman in whom there is 'havayah' (existence), meaning a woman for whom kiddushin (betrothal) takes effect." Whenever the word "tihiyye" (shall be) appears, it implies "havayah," meaning kiddushin takes effect. So, for Shimon HaTimni, the law of the fine applies only to women for whom kiddushin is valid. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: "A woman whom you are able to keep married." What is the difference between these two opinions? The first says "marriageable," and the second says "able to stay married to."
The Gemara clarifies that there is a significant difference concerning a mamzeret or a netina. For a mamzeret, kiddushin does take effect, because we have a rule that kiddushin takes effect for women forbidden by a negative commandment. Therefore, according to Shimon HaTimni, the law of "ones" would apply to a mamzeret. However, Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says that the law applies only to a woman whom you are able to keep. A mamzeret cannot be kept as a wife; one must divorce her. Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya, the law of "ones" would not apply to a mamzeret. This is the practical difference between the two opinions. Shimon HaTimni's view, "a woman in whom there is 'havayah'," excludes a sister, for whom kiddushin does not take effect because she is forbidden by "karet." For all those forbidden by "karet," kiddushin does not take effect. The word "tihiyye" is understood by Shimon HaTimni as "havayah" (kiddushin takes effect), while Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya understands it as "kiyum" (able to keep).
The Gemara then raises a difficulty based on Rabbi Akiva's opinion. Rabbi Akiva holds that kiddushin does not take effect even for women forbidden by a negative commandment, and that children born from such unions are "mamzerim." So, according to Rabbi Akiva, kiddushin does not take effect for either "chayavei lavin" (those forbidden by a negative commandment) or "chayavei karet" (those forbidden by excision). The Gemara in Yevamot explicitly states that Shimon HaTimni does not agree with Rabbi Akiva. However, if we were to assume Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya holds like Rabbi Akiva, then what is the difference between "havayah" and "kiyum"? According to Rabbi Akiva, you cannot keep a mamzeret, and kiddushin does not take effect for her either. So, what distinction is Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya making? According to Rabbi Akiva, none of these women (forbidden by negative commandment or by karet) have "havayah," and none can be kept. So, what is Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya's teaching coming to exclude?
The Gemara answers that the difference lies in the case of an "almanah" (widow) to a "Kohen Gadol" (High Priest), according to Rabbi Simai. Rabbi Simai teaches that Rabbi Akiva considers children born from any negative commandment to be "mamzerim," because if kiddushin does not take effect, the child is a mamzer. However, Rabbi Akiva makes an exception for an almanah to a Kohen Gadol. While it is forbidden for a Kohen Gadol to marry an almanah, Rabbi Akiva says that in this specific case, the children are not mamzerim. Why? Because the Torah states regarding a Kohen, "He shall not take... and he shall not profane," implying that his children will be "chalalim" (profaned priests), but not "mamzerim." This means that even according to Rabbi Akiva, there is one exception where kiddushin does take effect for a "chayavei lavin": an almanah to a Kohen Gadol.
Now, let's reconsider Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya's opinion: "and she shall be his wife" means only a woman whom you are able to keep married. If a Kohen Gadol violates an almanah, is he able to remain married to her? No. Therefore, the law of "ones" would not apply to an almanah violated by a Kohen Gadol. However, if Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya had learned "havayah" (kiddushin takes effect), would kiddushin take effect for an almanah to a Kohen Gadol? Yes, according to Rabbi Akiva's view as explained by Rabbi Simai. So, Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya's choice to interpret "tihiyye" as "kiyum" (able to keep) creates a practical difference specifically for an almanah to a Kohen Gadol. This also applies to a "gerusha" (divorced woman) to an ordinary Kohen. Rabbi Akiva says that in this case, the children are "chalalim," not "mamzerim," meaning they are disqualified from the priesthood but not from the Jewish community. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya's interpretation is precise in excluding these specific cases.