The Eri B. Sitt Edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, presents Tractate Ketubot, which has been dedicated by our dear friend Mr. Elliot Shasho. May God protect him and grant him life. May the merit of the study of Tractate Ketubot stand in his favor. From year to year, with God's help, may this be a good and blessed year for him, filled with happiness, wealth, honor, peace in the home, and every blessing. With God's help, may he continue to support Torah and all holy projects. Amen.
Today's page has also been dedicated by Mr. Victor Gindi, for continued success in all his endeavors, good health, happiness, and all good things. Amen.
We are studying the laws of the priestly portion. We are four lines from the top of the page, after the discussion of a woman who is engaged for twelve months from the time her future husband proposes to her. After those twelve months, she begins receiving her support. If the husband is a priest and she is the daughter of an Israelite, then, for practical purposes, she may begin eating the priestly portion.
Rabbi Tarfon's opinion was not only that she may begin eating the priestly portion; he also allows the husband to give her all of her support in the form of the priestly portion. The difficulty is that part of the month she is ritually impure. During that time, she cannot eat the priestly portion in a state of impurity. She will therefore have to go out and sell it, purchase ordinary produce with the proceeds, and use that for her support. According to Rabbi Tarfon, the entire amount of support may therefore be given to her in the form of the priestly portion, and she is responsible for selling what she cannot eat.
Abaye says that the disagreement between Rabbi Tarfon and the Rabbis applies specifically when the daughter of a priest marries a priest. A priest's daughter is already accustomed to eating the priestly portion. She ate it in her father's home even before she became engaged or married, and she knows how to handle it when she becomes ritually impure. She knows that she must sell it and purchase ordinary produce. In that case, Rabbi Tarfon allows the husband to give her the entire amount in the form of the priestly portion, because she is already familiar with the process and is not likely to become confused.
However, when the daughter of an Israelite marries a priest, everyone agrees that her support is divided equally between ordinary produce and the priestly portion. She was not accustomed to eating the priestly portion in her father's home, and we do not want to burden or confuse her. She receives half in ordinary produce, which she can eat when she is ritually impure, and half in the priestly portion, which she can eat when she is ritually pure.
Abaye gives another important qualification. The disagreement between Rabbi Tarfon and the Rabbis applies only to a woman who is engaged, and only when she is the daughter of a priest. Two conditions are necessary: she must be a priest's daughter, and she must still be engaged. During the engagement, she continues living in her father's home. If she becomes ritually impure, she can return home with the priestly portion, tell her father that she cannot eat it during that period, and her father can help her sell it. Since she is still engaged and has that assistance, Rabbi Tarfon allows her entire support to be given as the priestly portion.
But once she is married, even if she is separated from her husband and he is sending her support, she is living on her own. She no longer has anyone to help her sell the priestly portion. In that case, everyone agrees that she receives half in ordinary produce and half in the priestly portion.
A teaching supports these two qualifications. Rabbi Tarfon says that she receives all of her support in the form of the priestly portion, while Rabbi Akiva says that she receives half in ordinary produce and half in the priestly portion. This first statement is referring to the daughter of a priest, who is accustomed to eating the priestly portion and knows that she must sell it when she is ritually impure. But if she is the daughter of an Israelite, who is not accustomed to eating the priestly portion, everyone agrees that she receives half in ordinary produce and half in the priestly portion.
When does this apply? It applies while she is engaged, because she still has a connection to her father's home. She can return there, and her father can help her sell the priestly portion in order to purchase ordinary produce. Once she is married and living on her own, while her husband sends her support, everyone agrees that she receives half in ordinary produce and half in the priestly portion.
The teaching then continues and records another opinion. We have explained that according to Rabbi Tarfon she receives all of her support in the priestly portion, while Rabbi Akiva divides it equally. Rabbi Judah changes the proportions and says that she receives two-thirds in the priestly portion and one-third in ordinary produce.
What is the basis for Rabbi Judah's calculation? The Maharsha explains that an average woman is ritually impure for approximately ten days of the month. For example, she may see menstrual blood for three days and then have to wait seven clean days. That accounts for ten days, or one-third of the month. She is ritually pure for the remaining twenty days, or two-thirds of the month. Therefore, her support is divided according to the number of days: two-thirds in the priestly portion for the twenty days when she is pure, and one-third in ordinary produce for the ten days when she is impure. She can sell that ordinary produce and use the proceeds for her support.
The Gemara asks what practical difference there is between Rabbi Judah's opinion and Rabbi Tarfon's. According to Rabbi Tarfon, when we say that she receives all her support in the priestly portion, she receives an amount of priestly produce equivalent to the amount of ordinary produce that would otherwise have been given to her. If she would normally receive five pounds of ordinary produce, she receives five pounds of the priestly portion.
Even though she will not receive the same value when she sells that priestly produce, the innovation of Rabbi Tarfon's opinion is that the husband gives her the same quantity he would have given her in ordinary produce, entirely in the form of the priestly portion. Since priestly produce has fewer potential buyers, she will ultimately receive less money when she sells it.
Rabbi Judah's opinion is that she receives a larger quantity of the priestly portion so that, after selling it, she will receive the same value that she would normally have received in ordinary produce. In other words, she must sell it, but the amount given to her is increased so that she breaks even.
Another opinion says that she receives twice the amount of the priestly portion. Why? Since she has to search for a customer and may have to accept a lower price, we want to make the process easy for her. If she would normally have received a certain amount of ordinary produce, she receives twice that amount in priestly produce. She can then sell it at whatever price she obtains and will still end up with the proper amount of ordinary produce. She does not have to spend time searching for the ideal customer or insisting on the full market price.
The Gemara asks what practical difference there is between this opinion, which gives her all her support in the priestly portion, and the opinion of Rabbi Judah, who gives her an increased amount so that she will receive the proper value after selling it. The difference is the burden involved in finding customers and obtaining a fair price. According to Rabbi Judah, she receives only enough additional produce to compensate for the lower price, but she must still search for customers and negotiate. According to the other opinion, she receives twice the amount, so she can sell it quickly, even at a low price, and still receive the appropriate amount of ordinary produce.
To summarize this section: when the Mishnah says that she may receive all her support in the priestly portion, that applies only to the daughter of a priest. In the case of the daughter of an Israelite, everyone agrees that the support is divided equally. The ruling of all priestly produce applies only while she is engaged and still living in her father's home, where her father can help her sell it. Once she is married and on her own, she does not receive everything in the form of priestly produce.
There are also several opinions about what “all priestly produce” means. Some say it means pound for pound: whatever amount of ordinary produce she would have received, she receives that amount of priestly produce. Others say that she receives somewhat more, so that after selling it at a lower price she will receive the value of the ordinary produce she would have received. Still others say that she receives twice the amount, so that she does not have to trouble herself to find a customer willing to pay a fair price.
The Mishnah then continues with the case of an engaged woman whose fiancé dies and who consequently falls to the brother for levirate marriage. Suppose she was engaged to the first man for six months and then remained with the brother for another six months. Even though, in total, twelve months have passed, the brother does not cause her to become eligible to eat the priestly portion. Only the original husband causes her to become eligible after twelve months.
The Mishnah gives another case. Suppose she was engaged to the first man for eleven months and twenty-nine days, and then spent one day with the brother. Even though, altogether, twelve months have passed and the majority of the time was spent with the original husband, she still does not become eligible to eat the priestly portion through the brother.
The reason is that the Torah says that the woman who eats the priestly portion is one who is the acquisition of the priest's property. The brother's connection to her is not an independent acquisition of property. She is coming to him through the acquisition of the deceased brother. The deceased had the original legal acquisition, and the surviving brother is merely taking up the brother's position for the purposes of the levirate bond.
However, when the surviving brother consummates the levirate marriage with her, the situation changes. At that point she becomes his full-fledged wife. One should not think that a levirate marriage is somehow an incomplete marriage. Once the brother consummates the marriage, the legal relationship is complete, and she becomes eligible to eat the priestly portion through that act of marriage.
The Gemara discusses the two cases in the Mishnah: six months with the original husband and six months with the brother, and eleven months and twenty-nine days with the original husband followed by one day with the brother. The Gemara asks: if the Mishnah wanted to teach that even when she spent the majority of the twelve months with the original husband she still does not eat the priestly portion through the brother, why was it necessary to teach the first case, in which half the time was spent with each man?
The Gemara answers that the second case need not have been stated. This is an example of the style sometimes used by the Mishnah: once the first case has been taught, the second case is included even though it follows logically. If she does not become eligible when the majority of the time was spent with the original husband, it is obvious that she does not become eligible when the majority of the time was spent with the brother.
There is an important disagreement between Rashi and Tosafot regarding a different case. Suppose she spent a full twelve months with the original husband, became eligible to eat the priestly portion, and only afterward did he die and she fell to the brother for levirate marriage. Rashi understands the Mishnah to mean that it makes no difference. Once she falls to the brother, even if she had already spent twelve full months with the original husband, the brother does not cause her to continue eating the priestly portion.
Tosafot disagrees. Tosafot says that once she spent twelve months with the original husband and began eating the priestly portion as a result, she continues to eat it when she enters the levirate relationship. Tosafot explains that the statement concerning the acquisition of property is only an interpretive support, whereas in truth the brother does have the relevant legal acquisition in this case. Therefore, if she had already begun eating the priestly portion through the original husband, she continues to eat it through the brother.
This is an important disagreement concerning the case of twelve full months. The Mishnah itself does not state that case. It states the case of twelve months less one day, even though stating the case of twelve full months would have produced a significant additional teaching according to Tosafot. That is one indication of the disagreement between Rashi and Tosafot.
The Gemara then reviews the earlier and later versions of the law. According to the original law, after the passage of twelve months from the engagement, she begins eating the priestly portion. That was the first enactment. The later enactment changed the law and said that she does not begin eating the priestly portion after twelve months alone. She must first enter the marriage canopy.
The Gemara asks why the Rabbis made this later enactment. The concern was a defect that might lead to the annulment of the marriage. The husband might discover a physical defect and retroactively annul the marriage. If she began eating the priestly portion after twelve months but before entering the marriage canopy, and he later discovered a defect and annulled the betrothal, it would turn out that she had eaten the priestly portion unlawfully. Because of this concern, the Rabbis required her to wait until she entered the marriage canopy.
Ulla explains the logic of the two enactments. The reason for the first enactment was that while she was engaged she still returned to her father's home. The Rabbis were concerned that she might take the priestly portion there and feed it to her siblings, who were not permitted to eat it. They therefore established that she must wait twelve months. After twelve months, the husband was expected to provide her with her own residence and support her there, rather than have her continue returning to her father's home.
The reason for the second enactment was the concern about a defect that might lead to annulment. Although waiting twelve months solved the problem of her returning to her father's home, it did not solve the possibility that the husband might discover a defect before the marriage canopy and retroactively annul the marriage. The Rabbis therefore required her to wait until the marriage canopy, where the husband would be able to see her himself.
The Gemara challenges this explanation. Perhaps both enactments were made for the same reason, namely, the concern about a defect and annulment. If that was already the concern of the first enactment, what changed? Why did the Rabbis add another enactment and postpone her eligibility from twelve months until the marriage canopy?
The Gemara explains that the practical difference concerns an examination performed outside the presence of the husband. Under the first enactment, the Rabbis relied on an examination conducted by the husband's relatives. After twelve months, he could send his relatives to inspect her and determine whether she had any defects. If they reported that she was free of defects, he could rely on their report and begin supporting her with the priestly portion.
The later enactment did not rely on the relatives' examination. The husband himself had to see her and determine whether there was any defect. The concern was that his relatives might report that she was fine, while he himself, upon seeing her, might discover a defect and annul the marriage. She would then have eaten the priestly portion retroactively without authorization. Therefore, the Rabbis postponed her eligibility until the marriage canopy.
We now begin the next Mishnah. To understand it, we first need to clarify the rules governing a wife's earnings in earlier times. Even today, a husband is obligated to provide his wife with support. This support includes food and other monetary needs and is called her maintenance.
In addition, a wife has what is called the produce of her hands, meaning the money she earns through her work. The Gemara will analyze the precise nature of the enactment that gives the wife maintenance while transferring the produce of her hands to the husband.
One approach is that the original enactment was made for the woman's benefit. The Rabbis first established that she receives maintenance. Once they established that obligation, they also established that the produce of her hands goes to the husband, so that there would not be constant conflict. The husband could say, “I am supporting you, while you keep all your earnings for yourself.” Thus, the transfer of her earnings to him was a consequence of the original enactment requiring him to support her.
Another approach is the reverse. The original enactment was that the produce of her hands goes to the husband. As a result, he supports her. The Gemara will identify practical differences between these two approaches.
One practical difference is whether the wife may waive her maintenance. If the original enactment was made for her benefit because the Rabbis wanted to ensure that she would be supported, she may say, “Do not support me. I do not want this benefit. I prefer to keep my own earnings.” She can forgo the maintenance and retain the produce of her hands.
But if the original enactment was that the produce of her hands belongs to the husband, then she cannot simply say that she wants to keep it. The Rabbis transferred the earnings to the husband at the outset, and her maintenance comes as a consequence. That would be one practical difference between the two approaches.
There is another practical difference: who owns the produce of her hands when the husband attempts to consecrate it. Suppose the husband says that he is consecrating his wife's earnings. If the earnings intrinsically belong to the wife and were transferred to the husband only as part of the arrangement connected to her maintenance, perhaps the husband does not have the right to consecrate them. But if the Rabbis originally established that the produce of her hands belongs to the husband, then perhaps he owns it and can consecrate it.
The produce of her hands is also not unlimited. If she earns a very large amount, the husband does not automatically receive every penny as part of the ordinary produce of her hands. The Sages established a standard amount of work, represented by a certain quantity of thread or yarn. The earnings produced by that amount of work are considered the produce of her hands. Anything beyond that is called the surplus.
For example, if the ordinary produce of her hands is worth one hundred dollars but she earns three hundred dollars, the additional two hundred dollars is the surplus. The enactment established that the husband receives both the ordinary produce and the surplus. There is a condition, however: in return for receiving the surplus, the husband must give her an allowance of one dinar per week. By accepting that allowance, he acquires the surplus in addition to the ordinary produce of her hands.
With these principles in mind, we can understand the next Mishnah. It discusses a husband who consecrates the produce of his wife's hands. The first case is that he consecrates the ordinary produce of her hands. The Mishnah says that she continues working and continues to benefit from her earnings. The consecration does not take effect, indicating that the husband does not own the produce of her hands in a way that would allow him to consecrate it.
The second case concerns the surplus. The husband consecrates the money that she earns beyond the standard amount. Here there is a disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yohanan HaSandlar. Rabbi Meir says that the consecration takes effect, which seems to indicate that the surplus is under the husband's control. Rabbi Yohanan HaSandlar says that the surplus remains ordinary property, just like the regular produce of her hands.
Tosafot understands the Mishnah differently. According to Tosafot, the Mishnah may be discussing one broad case in which the husband consecrated everything. The Mishnah then distinguishes between the ordinary produce of her hands and the surplus, explaining the law that applies to each. Rashi, however, understands it as two separate cases: in the first, he consecrated the regular produce of her hands; in the second, he consecrated the surplus.
The Gemara presents a statement that supports the view that maintenance was the original enactment. A wife may tell her husband, “I do not want maintenance, and I will keep the produce of my hands.” If the original enactment was intended for her benefit, she may waive that benefit. She can tell him not to do her any favors: he should retain the money he would have spent on her support, while she retains her earnings.
Rav Huna, in the name of Rav, therefore understands that when the Rabbis established the wife's maintenance, that was the primary enactment. The transfer of the produce of her hands to the husband was secondary and was established so that the husband would not object to supporting her while receiving nothing in return. Since the earnings intrinsically belong to her, she may waive the maintenance and retain her earnings.
The Gemara then raises a difficulty from our Mishnah. If the husband consecrates the produce of his wife's hands, the Mishnah says that she continues working and benefiting from it. This seems to show that the produce of her hands remains in her possession. If it intrinsically belonged to the husband, he should be able to consecrate it.
The Gemara first considers whether the Mishnah is referring to a case in which the husband is in a position to provide her maintenance. He has sufficient resources to support her, but he has not actually done so. In that case, perhaps the produce of her hands remains hers, and the Mishnah is proof that the original enactment was for her benefit.
The Gemara rejects this as a definitive proof. Perhaps the Mishnah is referring to a husband who is not in a position to support his wife. If he cannot provide her maintenance, then certainly the produce of her hands remains hers. The fact that he cannot consecrate it would not prove that the original enactment was for her benefit; it would simply reflect the fact that he is not supporting her.
The Gemara responds that this interpretation creates another problem. If the husband is not providing her maintenance, what is the novelty of the Mishnah's first case? Why would we need to be told that he cannot consecrate her earnings? Of course the poor woman retains her earnings if she is receiving no maintenance. It would be unreasonable to say that he neither supports her nor allows her to keep the money she earns.
Even in the case of a Hebrew servant, the law is that the master cannot take the servant's work while refusing to provide the servant's basic support. A wife certainly cannot be treated worse than a Hebrew servant. The husband cannot say, “I will take your work, but I will not feed you.” Therefore, if he is not supporting her, her produce of the hands unquestionably remains hers.
The Gemara answers that the first part of the Mishnah may indeed have no independent novelty. It is included as the introduction to the second part, where the real novelty appears. The significant case is the surplus, which Rabbi Meir says the husband can consecrate.
Why does the surplus belong to the husband? Because he pays for it. The standard produce of her hands is transferred to him as part of the arrangement connected to maintenance, but the surplus is acquired by him in exchange for giving her the weekly allowance of one dinar. Thus, the novelty of the Mishnah is that the surplus belongs to the husband and can be consecrated, even in the case under discussion where he is not currently providing her support.
This produces an apparent difficulty. If the husband is not supporting her, the regular produce of her hands belongs to her. How, then, can the surplus belong to him and be consecrated?
The explanation is that Rabbi Meir may be teaching that the husband can consecrate the surplus even though he does not yet possess it. Since the surplus will ultimately come into his possession through inheritance if she dies, his consecration can take effect in the future. The husband is consecrating something that will eventually belong to him.
This raises a general question: can a person consecrate an object that does not yet exist in the world? Normally, consecration applies to something present before us. Here, however, the woman has not yet died, and the surplus has not yet come into the husband's possession. It is a future asset.
The Gemara explains that this is the understanding of Rav Huna in the name of Rav. According to that approach, the regular produce of her hands and the surplus intrinsically belong to the wife, because the original enactment was the enactment of maintenance for her benefit. Since the husband is not supporting her in this case, they remain hers. Rabbi Meir's novelty would therefore be that his consecration is effective for the future, once the surplus comes into his possession through inheritance.
Resh Lakish challenges this understanding. He says that we should not explain Rabbi Meir as consecrating an asset that does not yet exist. Instead, Resh Lakish understands that the produce of her hands belongs to the husband from the outset. The husband can force her to give him the produce of her hands. Since it is already legally his, he can consecrate it even though the actual earnings have not yet been produced.
According to Resh Lakish, the husband is not consecrating a future sum of money. He is consecrating the work of her hands, which already exist. He is saying, in effect, “Whatever your hands produce belongs to me.” Her hands are present in the world, and the earnings generated by them are subject to his legal claim. Therefore, the produce can be consecrated even before it has been produced.
The Gemara raises an objection to Resh Lakish's reading. The husband did not say, “Your hands are consecrated.” The Mishnah says that he consecrated the surplus. It appears that he was speaking about the money itself, not about the hands that would produce it. The money is not yet present, so it remains a future object.
Resh Lakish's answer is based on the principle that a person's words should not be treated as meaningless. When a person says something that would otherwise have no legal effect, we interpret his words in a way that gives them significance, provided that interpretation is consistent with what he intended. Thus, when the husband says that the surplus is consecrated, we understand him as saying that the work of her hands, and whatever those hands produce, is consecrated.
There is a similar example in the laws of valuations. A person can say, “I give the value of this individual to the Temple.” The Torah assigns a value according to the person's age, beginning at one month old. A child younger than one month has no prescribed valuation. Nevertheless, if such a child is sitting before the person and he says that he is giving the child's value, Rabbi Meir does not say that the statement is entirely meaningless and that the person owes nothing.
Rather, Rabbi Meir interprets the statement as meaning that the person is donating to the Temple the amount that the child would be worth if he were sold as a servant. The person knows that the Torah does not assign a formal valuation to a child under one month. Therefore, his words must be understood as referring to the child's monetary worth, so that the statement has a legal consequence.
The same principle applies here. If we interpreted the husband's words literally as referring to money that does not yet exist, his statement would have no effect. Since Rabbi Meir does not speak meaningless words, we interpret him as having consecrated the work of her hands and whatever that work will produce.
The Gemara brings another source demonstrating that Rabbi Meir allows a person to create a legal effect concerning something that has not yet come into the world. A man can say to a woman, “You will be betrothed to me after I convert,” even though he has not yet converted; “after I am freed,” even though he is still enslaved; “after your husband dies,” even though her husband is still alive; “after your sister dies,” even though he is currently married to her sister; or “after you perform the release ceremony,” even though she is still bound in the levirate relationship.
Rabbi Meir says that the betrothal takes effect in those cases. These events have not yet occurred, yet the statement creates a legal possibility for the future. This demonstrates that, according to Rabbi Meir, a person can establish a legal status concerning something that has not yet come into the world.
The Gemara answers that this is true, but the case of the betrothal does not necessarily prove that this is the explanation of our Mishnah. The Mishnah can still be understood according to Resh Lakish, who says that the husband is not consecrating future money. He is consecrating the work of the woman's hands, which already exists, and the earnings produced by that work.
According to Rav Huna in the name of Rav, the produce of her hands intrinsically belongs to her, and the husband receives it only because of the arrangement connected to her maintenance. Therefore, since he is not supporting her, he cannot consecrate it, and Rabbi Meir must be speaking about a future acquisition that will come to him through inheritance.
According to Resh Lakish, however, the original enactment was that the produce of her hands belongs to the husband. Since he can compel her to give it to him, it is already legally under his control. The fact that the actual money has not yet been earned does not make it an object that does not exist. The husband is claiming the work of hands that are already present, and that claim gives him the right to consecrate what they produce.
Thus, the entire discussion returns to the original question: what was the primary enactment of the Rabbis? Was it that the wife receives maintenance, with the produce of her hands transferred to the husband as a consequence? Or was it that the produce of her hands belongs to the husband from the outset, with his obligation to provide maintenance following from that arrangement?
According to the first approach, she can waive her maintenance and retain her earnings, and the husband cannot consecrate them when they remain hers. According to the second approach, the husband owns the produce of her hands and can demand it from her. Resh Lakish therefore explains the Mishnah without requiring us to say that the husband is consecrating an asset that has not yet come into the world.
Rabbi Meir's position, however, establishes that a person's words are interpreted to preserve their legal significance. Even when the husband's statement appears to concern future earnings, we understand it as referring to the legal source of those earnings—the work of her hands—which is already present. In that way, the surplus can be consecrated according to Rabbi Meir's opinion.
May the study of these laws bring blessing and understanding. Amen.