The Eri B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli’s daily daf has been dedicated by Mr. Uri Nidam in honor of all the members of the minyan, all the members of the Daf Yomi, and in honor of the rabbi. May he continue to succeed. Amen. It is dedicated for the soul and for the body. And say: Amen.
We begin today’s daf on page 82b, with the Mishnah.
If a person says, “Konam that I will sleep,” “Konam that I will speak,” or “Konam that I will walk,” he has made a vow. Konam is a term that functions as an expression of a vow. Similarly, if he says to his wife, “Konam that I will have marital relations with you,” the vow takes effect, and if he violates it, he transgresses the prohibition of profaning one’s word, which is the prohibition against violating a vow. The Gemara will elaborate on these vows.
The Gemara begins with a case in which a person says, “My eyes are prohibited from sleep today if I sleep tomorrow.” In other words, if he sleeps tomorrow, then sleeping today becomes prohibited retroactively. To simplify matters, he would have to avoid sleeping on both days.
Rabbi Yehuda says that he should not sleep on the first day, because we are concerned that he might sleep on the following day, in which case he will have violated his vow. Rabbi Nachman, however, says: Let him sleep today, but he must be careful not to sleep tomorrow. If he does not sleep the following day, he has not violated his vow.
The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Nachman is therefore whether we allow him to sleep on the first day. Rabbi Yehuda says that he should not sleep, while Rabbi Nachman says that he may sleep on the first day, provided that he is careful on the second day. We will see the basis of this disagreement.
The Mishnah then discusses the reverse case: “I prohibit tomorrow’s sleep if I sleep today.” Here, the prohibition applies on the following day, while sleeping today is the condition. The ruling is that he may sleep today. Why? The Gemara explains: A person is careful on the day of the prohibition, but he is not as careful on the day of the condition.
Rabbi Yehuda’s principle is as follows: A person takes care on the day when the prohibition itself applies, but he is not necessarily careful on the day of the condition. In this second case, the condition applies on the first day: “If I sleep today, tomorrow will be prohibited.” The prohibition itself applies on the second day. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda says that he may sleep on the first day, because when the second day arrives—the day of the prohibition—he will be careful not to sleep.
This is the meaning of the Gemara’s statement that a person is not careful on the day of the condition, but he is careful on the day of the prohibition. In the first case, however, the person says, “If I do not sleep tomorrow, then sleeping today is prohibited.” In that case, the condition applies on the second day. Since a person is not careful on the day of the condition, we are concerned that he will sleep tomorrow. If he does so, the prohibition on today’s sleep will take effect retroactively. Therefore, he must not sleep today.
That is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda: A person is not careful on the day of the condition, but he is careful on the day of the prohibition.
The Ran explains that although the prohibition is ultimately dependent on the condition, the person will be careful on the day when the prohibition actually applies, so that he will not make a mistake. This is the rationale for Rabbi Yehuda’s distinction between the case in which today’s prohibition depends on tomorrow’s action and the case in which tomorrow’s prohibition depends on today’s action.
For the rest of the page, the Gemara challenges this rationale of Rabbi Yehuda.
The Mishnah says that if a person vows regarding sleep, speech, or walking, the vow takes effect, and if he violates it, he transgresses the prohibition of profaning his word. The Gemara asks: What is the case? If the Mishnah means literally that he prohibited sleep, how can such a vow take effect? We learn elsewhere that an oath can apply to something tangible as well as to something intangible. A person can swear, “I will not sleep for a certain number of hours,” even though sleep is not tangible, because an oath is imposed upon the person.
Vows, however, apply only to objects. How, then, can the Mishnah say that a person prohibited sleep upon himself? Sleep is not an object, and therefore the vow should not take effect.
The case in the Mishnah must therefore be that he said, “My eyes are prohibited from sleep.” The eyes are tangible, and a vow can apply to them.
The Gemara then asks: If he did not specify a time limit, how long is he prohibiting his eyes from sleeping? Do we allow him to remain in this situation until he violates the vow?
The Ran explains the Gemara’s question. If a person makes such a vow without specifying a time limit, the vow cannot take effect, because a person cannot go without sleep indefinitely. Rabbi Yochanan says that if a person swears, “I will not sleep for three days,” he is given lashes immediately. Such an oath is an oath in vain, because it is impossible for a person to go three days without sleeping.
In that case, he is allowed to sleep immediately. He does not have to remain awake for as long as he can until he is forced to sleep. The oath is not an oath, and because he uttered an oath in vain, he receives lashes immediately.
With vows, however, he would not receive lashes. If he says, “Sleep is prohibited to my eyes indefinitely,” it is not a valid vow. It is an oath in vain in the case of an oath, and in the case of a vow, the vow does not take effect at all. Therefore, he will never come to violate the prohibition of profaning his word, because there was no valid vow from the outset.
We therefore return to the Gemara’s question: What is the case in the Mishnah when it says that he violates the prohibition of profaning his word? If he did not specify a time limit, the vow should not take effect at all.
The Gemara answers that the case must be one in which he says, “My eyes are prohibited from sleep today if I sleep tomorrow.” The prohibition applies today, and the condition applies tomorrow. The Mishnah says that in this case he will violate the prohibition of profaning his word.
But the Gemara asks: Did you not say that, according to Rabbi Yehuda, a person is careful on the day of the prohibition? If so, even if he sleeps today, he should not come to violate his vow, because he will be careful tomorrow, on the day of the prohibition. How, then, can the Mishnah say that he may violate the vow?
The Gemara says that the case must be redefined. Perhaps the person said, “My eyes are prohibited from sleep today if I sleep tomorrow.” If he does not sleep today, then when he sleeps tomorrow, there is no violation of the vow. Therefore, the only way he could violate the vow is if he slept today, on the day of the prohibition.
The Gemara concludes that this must be the case of the Mishnah: He slept on the day of the prohibition. This indicates that a person is not necessarily careful even on the day of the prohibition. But that contradicts Rabbi Yehuda, who said that a person is careful on the day of the prohibition.
The Gemara answers that the Mishnah is not saying that he should sleep on the first day. Rather, it is warning him: Do not sleep on the first day, because if you do, you may sleep on the second day as well, and then you will violate the vow. The Mishnah is teaching practical advice, not permitting him to sleep on the first day.
The Ran states: “When the Mishnah says that if he slept, he violates the vow, it is coming to teach Rabbi Yehuda’s position.” The Mishnah is telling him to be careful not to sleep on the first day of the condition, because if he sleeps then, he is likely to sleep on the second day as well. Since a person is not careful on the day of the condition, he may sleep on the second day and thereby violate the vow.
Thus, the Mishnah is actually consistent with Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda says that a person is careful on the day of the prohibition, but not on the day of the condition. Therefore, the Mishnah warns him not to sleep on the first day, because the first day is the condition, and he may not be careful on the following day.
Let us follow the Gemara’s discussion as explained by the Ran. The Gemara says: Why establish the Mishnah as referring to the case in which he says, “Tomorrow’s sleep is prohibited to me if I sleep today”? Why not establish it in the simpler case: “My eyes are prohibited from sleep today if I sleep tomorrow”? That is certainly a valid vow.
The Gemara answers that the Mishnah is teaching us to be careful not to sleep on the first day of the condition, so that he will not come to violate the vow. The Mishnah is not saying that sleep on the first day is itself prohibited. Rather, it is warning him that if he sleeps on the first day, he is placing himself in a situation where he may violate the vow on the second day.
The Gemara then asks: I thought you had told me that a person is careful on the day of the prohibition. If so, why warn him not to sleep on the first day? Let him sleep on the first day. What difference does it make? Tomorrow is the day of the prohibition, and he will be careful then.
Therefore, the Gemara says that we cannot establish the Mishnah in that manner. The case must be something else. The Gemara returns to the case in which he says, “My eyes are prohibited from sleep today if I sleep tomorrow.” The prohibition applies today. The Mishnah says that if he slept, he violates the vow.
The only way to understand this is that he slept on the day of the prohibition. But what does that mean? Rabbi Yehuda said that a person is careful on the day of the prohibition. The Gemara answers that the Mishnah is not teaching that he should sleep on that day. Its novelty is that it is permissible for him to place himself in a situation in which there is a possibility that he will violate the vow.
In other words, if a person asks, “May I sleep on the first day?” the answer is not that the sleep itself is forbidden. He may sleep, but he must understand that by sleeping on the first day, he is placing himself in a position in which he may sleep on the second day and then violate the vow.
The Gemara therefore asks again: How can the Mishnah be understood in this way? Rabbi Yehuda said that on the day of the prohibition the person is careful. The Gemara answers that the Mishnah is really coming to teach Rabbi Yehuda’s position. It is advising the person not to sleep on the first day, because the second day is the day of the condition, and people are not careful on the day of the condition. If he sleeps on the first day, he may sleep on the second day as well and violate the vow.
Thus, the Mishnah is consistent with Rabbi Yehuda. It is not saying that he should sleep on the first day; it is warning him not to do so.
The Gemara then gives another answer: Do not bring a proof from this Mishnah to the dispute with Rabbi Yehuda. The Mishnah may be teaching a different novelty altogether.
Until now, we assumed that when the Mishnah says, “Konam that I will sleep,” it means that he prohibited his eyes from sleeping. We asked how the vow could take effect when it was not attached to a tangible object. The Gemara now answers that even when a person makes a vow without attaching it to an object, there can nevertheless be a prohibition by rabbinic enactment.
The novelty of the Mishnah is that there is a prohibition even though he did not say explicitly, “My eyes are prohibited from sleep.” Until now, we thought that such a vow had no effect because it was not imposed on an object. The Gemara says that there can be a rabbinic violation of the prohibition against profaning one’s word even in such a case.
Is there really such a concept—that a person can violate a biblical verse because the rabbis imposed a rabbinic prohibition? The Gemara answers that there is.
We find a similar idea in a case involving people who adopt an extra stringency upon themselves. A practice may be permissible according to the basic law, but a person may nevertheless choose to be stringent. Once he has accepted that stringency, one is not permitted to act leniently in his presence.
The Gemara derives this from the verse, “He shall not profane his word.” The literal meaning is that a person must not violate his word. The Sages, however, also interpret the word “his word” as referring to an object. If a person has imposed a stringency upon an object, one should not come in front of him and treat that object leniently. This is a rabbinic interpretation of the verse, not its plain meaning. Nevertheless, it shows that the rabbis can apply the concept of profaning one’s word in a rabbinic context.
In the same way, even when a person makes a vow that is not attached to a tangible object, the rabbis can impose a prohibition against violating it.
Let us clarify the case brought in the Beraita. Suppose a person wants to be stringent and place a fence around himself. He has not formally accepted the practice as a vow. He simply refrained from something because he wanted to be stringent. Later, he comes to a rabbi and says, “I want to be released from this.”
He cannot simply release himself from the practice. He requires the appropriate legal process of release, including the necessary declaration and procedure for annulment. Whatever the precise laws of that procedure may be, the point is that he requires it even though he never explicitly accepted a biblical prohibition as a vow.
Why? Because he accepted this practice upon himself, and the rabbis said that he may not release himself from it without the appropriate procedure. This demonstrates that there is a rabbinic application of the prohibition against profaning one’s word even when the person did not verbally impose a standard vow upon himself.
Let us review where we stand. We began with the position of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda distinguishes between the day of the condition and the day of the prohibition. On the day of the prohibition, a person is careful not to make a mistake. On the day of the condition, he is not as careful.
We brought an apparent question from our Mishnah. The Mishnah says, “Konam that I will sleep,” but such a vow should not take effect because it is not imposed on a tangible object. Therefore, it must refer to the person’s eyes: “Konam that my eyes will sleep.” But if no time limit was specified, the vow should still not take effect, because a person cannot go without sleep for three days.
We therefore established the case as follows: “My eyes are prohibited from sleep today if I sleep tomorrow.” The Mishnah says that he violates the prohibition against profaning his word. This means that the Mishnah warns him on the first day: Do not sleep, because if you sleep today, you may sleep tomorrow as well and violate the vow.
At first, we understood the novelty of the Mishnah to be that even though he is placing himself in a situation where he might violate the vow, it is nevertheless permissible for him to sleep on the first day. That would appear to contradict Rabbi Yehuda, who says that a person is careful on the day of the prohibition.
The Gemara answered that we had misunderstood the Mishnah. The Mishnah is giving him advice: Do not sleep on the first day. Why? Because the following day is the day of the condition, and people are not careful on the day of the condition. If he sleeps on the first day, he may sleep on the second day as well and violate the prohibition against profaning his word. Thus, the Mishnah is consistent with Rabbi Yehuda.
The Gemara then offered another answer: Do not use this Mishnah as a proof in either direction. The Mishnah may be teaching a different novelty—that even when a person says, “Konam that I will sleep,” without explicitly mentioning his eyes, there is still a rabbinic prohibition against violating the vow. We see a similar principle regarding a person who adopts a stringency and requires a formal release from it.
The Gemara now brings another question against Rabbi Yehuda from the Mishnah concerning a husband and wife. A man says to his wife before Pesach, “You are prohibited from benefiting from me until Pesach if you go to your father’s house by Sukkot.” The prohibition is in effect until Pesach, while the condition remains open until Sukkot.
If she goes to her father’s house before Pesach, she is prohibited from benefiting from her husband until Pesach. She violated the condition, and therefore the prohibition applies.
But if she did not go to her father’s house before Pesach, she is not prohibited from benefiting from him. The Mishnah does not say that we should prohibit her from benefiting from him because perhaps she will still go to her father’s house later. The Gemara asks: Why not? According to Rabbi Yehuda, a person is not careful on the day of the condition. Since the condition remains open, perhaps she will eventually go to her father’s house, and the prohibition should then apply retroactively.
Rabbi Abba answers that one should not analyze the wording of the Mishnah so precisely. If she went before Pesach, she is prohibited from benefiting from him and receives lashes if she benefited from him. If she did not go before Pesach, the benefit is still prohibited, but she does not receive lashes because she has not yet violated the vow. The matter remains pending until the condition is resolved. This is consistent with Rabbi Yehuda’s position.
The Ran points out an interesting detail: The wife receives the lashes, not the husband. The husband made the vow, but he did not perform any prohibited act. He merely imposed the vow. The assets became prohibited through his vow, but she was the one who benefited from them after violating the condition.
The Ran explains: “She is prohibited from benefiting and receives lashes, but he does not receive lashes, because he did not perform any prohibited act; he merely made the vow.” The prohibition is resting upon her. The husband imposed the prohibition, but the violation occurs when she benefits from what has become prohibited.
The Rambam understands this matter differently, and the Ran disputes his approach. For our purposes, however, the point is that the prohibition and the lashes are directed toward the wife, because the prohibition is being violated through her benefit.
Let us review this question. We thought to challenge Rabbi Yehuda from the Mishnah: If the wife goes to her father’s house before Pesach, she becomes prohibited from benefiting from her husband. If she does not go before Pesach, she remains permitted. Why do we not prohibit her from benefiting before Pesach, since she may still go to her father’s house, and according to Rabbi Yehuda a person is not careful on the day of the condition?
The Gemara answers that she is in fact prohibited from benefiting even when she has not yet gone, although she does not receive lashes because she has not yet violated the vow. Thus, the ruling is consistent with Rabbi Yehuda’s position.
The Gemara then raises another question from the later part of the same Mishnah. If she goes to her father’s house after Pesach, she has violated the vow. The only way she could have violated the prohibition against profaning her word is if she benefited from her husband before Pesach, because the prohibition itself applied until Pesach.
The Gemara asks: Did you not say that a person is careful on the day of the prohibition? Here, however, the Mishnah indicates that she was not careful during the period of the prohibition.
The Gemara answers that the Mishnah is not telling her to benefit from him during that period. Rather, it is warning her not to benefit. If she benefits before Pesach and then eventually goes to her father’s house, she will violate the vow. Therefore, she should not benefit before Pesach. This is entirely consistent with Rabbi Yehuda: A person is not careful on the day of the condition, so she must avoid benefiting during the period of the prohibition, lest she later fulfill the condition and violate the vow.
The Ran explains that if she does benefit before Pesach and then goes to her father’s house afterward, she will come to violate the prohibition against profaning her word. Therefore, the Mishnah is advising her not to benefit.
The Gemara raises another question from the same Mishnah, now in the reverse arrangement. Suppose the prohibition against benefiting from the husband applies from Pesach until Sukkot, while the condition—going to her father’s house—applies only until Pesach.
If she went to her father’s house before Pesach, it is obvious that she becomes prohibited from benefiting from her husband. But the Mishnah also teaches that she may go to her father’s house after Pesach. Why does it need to tell us this? The Ran explains that there is a novelty here.
One might have thought that she should not be permitted to go to her father’s house after Pesach. If she is allowed to go, she may think that she did nothing wrong and that she is still permitted to benefit from her husband. Perhaps the rabbis should prohibit her from going to her father’s house so that she will remember that she violated the condition and will realize that she may not benefit from him.
The Ran explains that the Mishnah teaches that we do not make such an enactment. She is prohibited from benefiting from her husband, but she may go to her father’s house after Pesach. We are not concerned that allowing her to go will cause her to think that everything is permitted. She may go, but she remains prohibited from benefiting.
The Gemara then examines another inference from the Mishnah. It appears that only if she went to her father’s house before Pesach does she become prohibited from benefiting. If she did not go before Pesach, she remains permitted. This seems to indicate that we do not prohibit her from benefiting before the condition is fulfilled merely because she might eventually fulfill it.
That appears to contradict Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda says that while the condition remains open, one must be concerned that the person will violate it, because people are not careful on the day of the condition. Why, then, does the Mishnah not prohibit her from benefiting before Pesach, since she may still go to her father’s house?
The Gemara answers that the Mishnah is discussing the situation in which she went before Pesach. Obviously, she may not benefit afterward, because she has violated the condition. When it says that she may go to her father’s house after Pesach, it is teaching a different point: We do not make a further rabbinic decree preventing her from going to her father’s house simply because she might misunderstand the consequences.
The Gemara returns to the earlier question and explains that even if she has not yet gone to her father’s house, she is prohibited from benefiting; she simply does not receive lashes because she has not yet violated the vow. The first part of the Mishnah teaches that once she has gone and violated the condition, she is prohibited and receives lashes if she benefits. The other case teaches that before the condition is resolved, the benefit is prohibited, but there are no lashes yet.
The Gemara now brings a new case: A person says, “This loaf is prohibited to me today if I go tomorrow to a particular place.” The prohibition applies today, and going to that place tomorrow is the condition.
The ruling states: If he ate the loaf, he violates the prohibition against going the next day. The Gemara initially understands this to mean that he may eat the loaf today, provided that he is careful not to go to that place tomorrow.
But how can that be? Rabbi Yehuda said that a person is careful on the day of the prohibition. If the prohibition applies today, we should not allow him to eat the loaf today. He should be careful on the day of the prohibition itself.
The Gemara answers that the wording does not say, “He may eat.” It says, “If he ate.” This is referring to a post facto situation. If he already ate, then he must be careful not to go to the place the next day, because tomorrow is the day of the condition, and he may not be careful then.
Therefore, the Mishnah is not permitting him to eat the loaf initially. On the contrary, it is warning him not to eat it. If he did eat it, he has placed himself in a situation where he may violate the vow tomorrow. The Mishnah uses the past tense—“if he ate”—to teach that if this has already happened, he must be careful.
The Gemara raises a further question. The Mishnah is presenting cases of prohibitions. If eating the loaf is also prohibited initially, why does the Mishnah not state that explicitly? Perhaps the wording “if he ate” means that he may eat it initially, because the Mishnah is listing all the cases in which a prohibition applies.
The Gemara answers that the wording should indeed be understood as referring to someone who ate after the fact. Initially, he may not eat. The Mishnah is saying: If he ate today, he must know that he may be in trouble tomorrow if he goes to that place, because tomorrow is the day of the condition and people are not careful on that day.
The Gemara then raises one final question from the end of the Beraita. It says that if he went to that place the following day, he violates the prohibition against profaning his word. The wording is “he went,” not “he may go.” According to Rabbi Yehuda, the only way he can violate the vow is if he ate on the first day. That would indicate that he was not careful on the day of the prohibition. How, then, can the Beraita be consistent with Rabbi Yehuda?
If the Beraita had said, “He may go,” the wording would be understandable. He did not eat on the first day, so there is no problem with his going on the second day. But the Beraita says, “He went, and he violates his vow,” which implies that he ate on the first day and then went on the second day.
The Gemara answers that, on a superficial level, the Beraita could indeed have used the wording “he may go.” Since the person did not eat on the first day, he may go on the second day. However, the Beraita maintains consistent wording. In the first part, it says, “If he ate,” and therefore, in the second part, it says, “If he went.” The two clauses are being presented as parallel cases.
The Ran explains the exchange. According to Rabbi Yehuda, on the day of the prohibition the person is careful. Therefore, if he did not eat on the first day, he should be able to go on the second day without any problem. The Beraita should have introduced a new case and said, “He may go,” since there is no prohibition remaining.
The answer is that the Beraita is deliberately keeping the cases parallel. Since the first case says, “If he ate,” it says in the second case, “If he went.” Otherwise, we might think that the two cases involve different circumstances, perhaps distinguishing between someone who ate intentionally and someone who ate inadvertently.
If the Beraita had said “he may go” in the second case, one might have understood that the first case involved a person who ate intentionally, and that therefore he was placed in the danger of violating the vow. The Beraita maintains the same grammatical structure to teach that the cases are connected.
The Ran explains further that the person should not eat on the first day, because the first day is the day of the prohibition. If he eats, he may not go on the second day, because the condition applies then and he may not be careful. Nevertheless, the Beraita uses the language “he went” because it is following the language of the first case.
Even if he ate on the first day inadvertently, the Beraita maintains the same wording for consistency. Although, according to Rabbi Yehuda, there would technically be no concern about his going on the second day if he had not eaten on the first day, the Beraita avoids the term “he may go” so that the two parts will not be misunderstood as separate categories.
The Gemara accepts this explanation and resolves the question according to Rabbi Yehuda.
As for the practical ruling, the Ran says that the law follows Rabbi Yehuda. We have a general principle that when the Gemara repeatedly discusses and resolves questions according to one particular position, the law generally follows that position. Otherwise, the Gemara would not have invested so much effort in answering the challenges against it.
Accordingly, the ruling is that a person is careful on the day of the prohibition, but is not careful on the day of the condition.
The Gemara now returns to another statement of the Mishnah: If a man says to his wife, “Konam that I will have marital relations with you,” he violates the prohibition against profaning his word.
The Gemara asks how this can work. A husband is obligated to provide his wife with marital relations. The Torah states that he must provide her with food, clothing, and marital relations. Marital relations are therefore an obligation that he owes her. How can he prohibit his own body from her? His body is not entirely his to prohibit, because he has an obligation toward his wife.
It is similar to asking whether a person can prohibit someone else’s fruit to that person. Certainly not. In the same way, how can a husband say that his body is prohibited to his wife when he is obligated to her?
The Gemara answers that he is not prohibiting his body. Rather, he is prohibiting himself from receiving benefit from her. He can prohibit himself from having this benefit. The obligation to provide marital relations remains, but he is declaring that he will not derive benefit from the act.
How do we know that a person can make such a vow? Rav Kahana brings a case in which the wife says to her husband, “My benefit is prohibited to you through marital relations.” She has an obligation to provide marital relations to her husband, just as he has an obligation toward her. Nevertheless, she can prohibit herself from receiving benefit from him through marital relations.
Once she has prohibited herself from that benefit, the husband cannot force her to have marital relations, because she has made it prohibited to herself. In the same way, the husband can prohibit himself from receiving benefit from her. The vow is therefore understood not as a prohibition of his body, which is subject to his obligation toward her, but as a prohibition upon himself from deriving benefit from the marital relationship.
That is the case in the Mishnah. He is not prohibiting his body in a way that would cancel his obligation. He is prohibiting himself from the benefit, and a person is permitted to prohibit himself from receiving something that would otherwise be available to him. Since he has prohibited that benefit to himself, he cannot be forced to receive it.