The R.E.B. Sitt edition and audio series of the Talmud Bavli, Masechet Gittin, has been sponsored by our good friend and loyal student of Daf Yomi, Mr. Haim Midana, and his dear wife, may God preserve them. He has dedicated this tractate according to the following principle: Our Rabbis tell us that when one studies something, that study can avert the occurrence of the matter being studied. Therefore, we would like to study Gittin so that it will remain in the realm of Torah learning and never come to fruition in reality. May he, his dear wife, and all Israel be blessed with peace in the home and success and prosperity in all the work of their hands. Amen.
The Daf is being studied in memory of my grandfather, Yosef ben Sarav; my grandmother, Yafat bat Sarav; and Abraham ben Ester. May their souls rest in the Garden of Eden. Amen.
The Daf is also being studied in memory of Moshe ben Dina, Sira Ruhama bat Rahel, and Sira bat Rahel. May they receive healing of the soul and healing of the body, and may their souls be bound in the bond of life. Amen.
We begin on page 82b, the last chapter of the ninth chapter of Gittin, the chapter called The Divorcee. The Mishnah begins: If a man divorces his wife and says to her, “Behold, you are permitted to every man except so-and-so,” what is the status of that divorce?
Normally, a bill of divorce makes the woman permitted to everyone. Here, however, the husband inserts a qualification: she is permitted to everyone except one particular man. We must examine precisely what that qualification means. The Mishnah does not use the straightforward language “except for so-and-so.” It uses a different expression, and the Gemara will analyze that terminology. Nevertheless, the basic meaning is clear: the husband is withholding one man from the divorce; she is permitted to everyone except him.
Rabbi Eliezer permits the divorce. Rabbi Eliezer says that the bill of divorce is valid. The Sages, however, say that it is not a valid divorce. What must he do if the divorce is invalid? He must take the bill of divorce back from her, return, and give it to her a second time. This time, he must say to her that she is being divorced without any qualification.
Usually, when a man gives a bill of divorce, he does not have to make such a declaration. In this case, however, he made a mistake the first time by withholding one man. Therefore, when he gives it a second time, he must ensure that he is giving a completely unrestricted divorce.
Furthermore, if that qualification was written into the bill of divorce itself, it is not enough merely to erase the words. Since the bill was originally written in an invalid form, it must be rewritten in its entirety. A bill of divorce must be written as a valid, unrestricted bill of divorce. Once it was written in an invalid form, one cannot simply erase the problematic words and use the remainder. That is the final law stated in the Mishnah.
The Ritva explains that this final part of the Mishnah follows only the view of the Sages. According to Rabbi Eliezer, it is not a problem. Since Rabbi Eliezer permits a husband to make such a qualification, even if the qualification was written into the bill of divorce, it would not invalidate it.
We now begin the Gemara’s analysis of the case. The Mishnah used the word “except.” How should that word be understood? There are two possibilities. It could mean a straightforward exclusion: “You are permitted to everyone except this man.” Alternatively, it could be understood as a condition: “I am giving you this bill of divorce on condition that you will be permitted to everyone except this man.”
What practical difference would there be between these two interpretations? If the language means “except,” then the husband has excluded one man from the bill of divorce itself. The bill of divorce is not fully effective with respect to that man. The Torah requires a divorce that completely releases the woman, without strings attached. Here, the husband held something back: the bill of divorce is effective toward 99.9 percent of the world, but it does not make her permitted to that one man. That is why the Sages say the divorce is invalid.
If, however, the language means “on condition,” then the qualification is no different from any other condition attached to a bill of divorce. The bill itself is completely valid and, in principle, releases her from the marriage with respect to everyone. The husband is not withholding anything from the divorce. Rather, after giving her the divorce, he adds a condition: if she wants the divorce to take effect, she may not marry that particular man.
According to that understanding, he has given her a fully effective bill of divorce and attached a condition to it. The Sages would argue only when the language means “except,” because then the husband held back part of the divorce. When the language means “on condition,” however, even the Sages would agree that the divorce is valid, because a person may attach conditions to a bill of divorce.
Alternatively, the Gemara suggests that perhaps the Mishnah is speaking specifically about a condition. Perhaps when the Mishnah says, “except for so-and-so,” it means, “on condition that she not marry so-and-so,” and the disagreement between Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages concerns even that case.
In that version, Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages would agree that when the language is plainly one of exclusion, the divorce is invalid. Even Rabbi Eliezer would agree that the woman must have the divorce taken back and then be given a new, unrestricted bill of divorce. Their disagreement would concern the conditional formulation: Rabbi Eliezer would permit it, while the Sages would invalidate it.
We therefore want to determine the extent of the disagreement. Is the dispute about the word “except,” meaning that Rabbi Eliezer permits even a case in which the husband literally held back one man, while the Sages invalidate it? Or is the dispute about the conditional formulation, with both sides agreeing that a literal exclusion invalidates the divorce?
The Gemara brings a proof from the laws of skin afflictions in houses: “All houses are susceptible to the laws of the affliction of houses, except for the houses of idolaters.” Why is this relevant? We have found another statement using the same type of terminology, and we can examine the context in which the word “except” is used.
The straightforward interpretation is that all houses are susceptible to the laws of house afflictions except the houses of idolaters. But if the word is understood as a condition, what would the statement mean? It would mean that Jewish houses are susceptible on the condition that the houses of idolaters are not susceptible. That makes no sense. Why should the status of Jewish houses depend on the status of the houses of idolaters?
There is a second difficulty. We know that the houses of idolaters are not subject to these afflictions. The verse says that the affliction applies to “the land of your possession.” The land in which the Jewish people dwell is susceptible to these afflictions, but the property of idolaters is not. Therefore, the statement cannot be understood as a condition relating the status of Jewish houses to the status of non-Jewish houses. It must mean a literal exclusion.
The Gemara concludes: Learn from this that the word means “except.” This establishes that the Mishnah is speaking about a case in which the husband literally excluded one man from the divorce. Rabbi Eliezer considers the bill of divorce valid despite the fact that it is not fully effective with respect to that man, while the Sages say that it is invalid. If the formulation were a condition, everyone would agree that it is valid, because a person is permitted to attach a condition to a divorce.
The Gemara then says that the way we have understood the Mishnah does not agree with the following Tanna. A Baraita teaches that in the case of a husband who says, “You are permitted to everyone except so-and-so,” everyone agrees that she is not divorced, including Rabbi Eliezer. Since he held back part of the divorce, the bill of divorce is invalid.
According to that Baraita, the dispute must concern the conditional formulation. When the husband says, “You are permitted to everyone on condition that you not marry so-and-so,” Rabbi Eliezer permits the divorce. He understands the bill of divorce as completely valid, with the husband’s statement serving as an ordinary condition. The condition must be fulfilled, but it does not diminish the force of the divorce itself.
This is a new position. According to this version, Rabbi Eliezer permits the case of a condition, while everyone agrees that the literal language of exclusion invalidates the divorce.
We must now return to the first version. According to the first version, Rabbi Eliezer is even more lenient. He permits the divorce even when the husband says “except,” meaning that he actually held back one person from the force of the bill of divorce. How can Rabbi Eliezer permit a bill of divorce that is effective toward only 99 percent of the world?
According to the first version, when the husband says “on condition,” even the Sages agree that the bill of divorce is valid. In that case, he did not withhold anything from the divorce. The bill of divorce is fully effective, and the condition exists outside the bill of divorce, just as with other conditions: “You are divorced on condition that you do not go to your father’s house for thirty days,” or a similar stipulation.
When the husband says “except,” however, the stipulation is part of the bill of divorce itself. He did not give her the full force of a divorce and then add a separate condition. He wrote or stated that the divorce would not be effective with respect to one particular man. According to the Sages, that is not a valid divorce, because the bill itself is deficient.
Rabbi Eliezer nevertheless permits it. This is the great novelty of his position: even when the husband says, “You are permitted to everyone except so-and-so,” and literally holds back one person from the divorce, Rabbi Eliezer considers the bill valid.
The Gemara then offers another explanation. The verse says, “She shall leave his house, and she shall go and marry another man.” This could imply that a bill of divorce does not have to make her permitted to the entire world. It is sufficient that it make her permitted to at least one other man. Once the husband gives her a divorce that permits her to marry someone else, it is a valid divorce.
If so, the verse would support Rabbi Eliezer. The bill of divorce need not release her with respect to every man. It is enough that she be permitted to marry another man. Even if the husband says, “You are permitted to everyone except so-and-so,” she is still permitted to marry other men, and the divorce should therefore be valid.
The Sages respond that the verse should not be read so narrowly. When it says that she may go and marry another man, it means any man whom she chooses, not merely one particular man. The divorce must grant her general freedom to marry. Since the husband excluded one man from the force of the bill of divorce, the Sages say that it is invalid.
The Gemara brings another source. A woman who was divorced from her husband may not marry a priest. The verse says that a priest may not marry a woman who is divorced from a man. The Gemara emphasizes the wording: even if she was divorced only from her husband, and not prohibited from marrying anyone else, she is still considered a divorcee and is forbidden to a priest.
What is the case? The husband says to her, “Behold, you are divorced from me, but you are not permitted to anyone else.” This woman has only been divorced from this particular man. Nevertheless, the fact that she has been divorced is sufficient to disqualify her from marrying a priest. This is the concept known as the “scent of a bill of divorce”: even a limited divorce can affect her status with respect to the priesthood.
At first glance, this source appears to support Rabbi Eliezer. The woman is considered divorced for purposes of the priesthood even though the divorce did not make her permitted to everyone else. If so, in our case as well, when the husband says, “You are permitted to everyone except this man,” the bill of divorce should be valid. The woman need not be fully permitted to the entire world.
The Sages respond that the laws governing a priest are different. With respect to the priesthood, we adopt a stricter standard. Since a priest is forbidden to marry a divorced woman, even this limited form of divorce is sufficient to disqualify her from marrying a priest. But that does not establish that the bill of divorce is valid for all other purposes.
In an ordinary case, where the issue is simply whether the woman has received a valid divorce, the Sages may still say that this is not a divorce at all. The special rule concerning the priesthood is an additional stringency. The “scent of a bill of divorce” is enough to disqualify her from the priesthood, but it does not necessarily mean that the bill of divorce is valid in every other respect.
Rav Ashi explains that the priesthood is treated stringently because the laws applying to priests contain additional stringencies. Therefore, the source concerning the prohibition against a divorced woman marrying a priest cannot serve as a general proof that a partially qualified bill of divorce is valid.
Rabbi Abba then raises a question concerning betrothal. Let us consider the reverse situation. Divorce takes a woman out of a marriage; betrothal brings her into a marriage. What would happen if a man said to a woman, “Behold, you are betrothed to me, but you are forbidden to the entire world except for so-and-so”? In other words, he makes a qualification in the betrothal itself.
Ordinarily, betrothal means that the woman becomes sanctified to the man who betroths her, while becoming forbidden to the rest of the world. The question is whether the man can say, “You are betrothed to me, but you remain permitted to everyone except this other man.” He has held something back within the betrothal itself.
We can ask the question according to both opinions. Perhaps the same principle that applies to divorce applies to betrothal. The Torah juxtaposes the concepts of leaving a marriage and entering a marriage. We have repeatedly learned this comparison: just as a person can go out of a marriage through a particular formulation, he can enter a marriage through a parallel formulation.
Accordingly, one might argue that just as a husband can make a qualification in a bill of divorce, perhaps a man can make a qualification in betrothal. Alternatively, perhaps the requirement of complete severance applies specifically to divorce, because the Torah uses the concept of cutting off the marriage completely. Betrothal may be different, because the man has still performed an act of acquisition even if the woman remains permitted to others.
On the other hand, the principle of comparison may teach that the two laws must be treated alike. If we are stringent in the case of divorce and say that the husband cannot withhold one man from the bill of divorce, then perhaps we must also be stringent in the case of betrothal and say that a man cannot create a betrothal that leaves the woman permitted to a particular other man.
This is Rabbi Abba’s question: What is the status of a man who says, “You are betrothed to me, but you are forbidden to the entire world except for so-and-so”? Is the betrothal valid or not?
The Gemara answers that whichever position a person takes regarding divorce, he will apply the same position to betrothal. According to Rabbi Eliezer, who permits the qualified divorce, the betrothal is also valid. When the man says, “You are betrothed to me,” and adds that she is forbidden to the world except for a particular man, Rabbi Eliezer considers the betrothal effective.
According to Rabbi Eliezer, the formula would mean that she is betrothed to him and forbidden to everyone else except for that man. Rabbi Eliezer says that this is valid betrothal. Just as he is lenient regarding the partially qualified divorce, he is lenient regarding the partially qualified betrothal.
The same principle applies according to the Sages. Since the Sages are stringent concerning the qualified divorce, they are also stringent concerning the qualified betrothal. The comparison between leaving and entering the marriage applies in both directions. Thus, the answer to Rabbi Abba’s question follows the respective opinions of Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages.
The Gemara then points out that Rabbi Eliezer’s position produces an unusual result. If one concludes that Rabbi Eliezer is lenient in the case of betrothal as well, then he is being lenient even with betrothal. We must understand how such a betrothal can work when the woman is still permitted to marry the particular man who was not included in the betrothal.
To understand this, the Gemara introduces a case from the laws of levirate marriage. We already know the basic situation: if a man dies without children, his widow becomes subject to the obligation of levirate marriage with the deceased husband’s brother. However, a woman becomes subject to that obligation because of one deceased brother; she does not become subject to two separate deceased brothers.
How could she ever become connected to two brothers? The Gemara discusses a case involving three brothers. Rachel was married to Reuven. Reuven died without children, leaving Rachel subject to levirate marriage with the surviving brothers, Shimon and Levi. Either Shimon or Levi could perform the levirate marriage.
Shimon then performed an act called maamar. Maamar is a form of betrothal performed by the surviving brother before the completion of the levirate marriage. It creates a rabbinic marital connection and effectively reserves the woman for Shimon.
Now suppose Shimon also dies. Rachel appears to be connected to two deceased husbands: she is connected to Reuven through the original marriage, and she is connected to Shimon through the maamar. If Rachel is regarded as the wife of two deceased brothers, Levi cannot perform levirate marriage, because the Torah’s obligation applies when there is one deceased brother, not when the woman is the wife of two deceased brothers. In that case, she requires the alternative procedure rather than levirate marriage.
The Gemara examines whether this principle can be applied to the case before us. Suppose Reuven betrothed Rachel but said, “You are forbidden to the entire world except Shimon.” Reuven has made Rachel forbidden to everyone except Shimon. Then Shimon performs betrothal and says, “You are forbidden to the entire world except Reuven.” Now both men have performed betrothal, and both have excluded the other.
If both betrothals are valid, then Rachel is technically connected to both Reuven and Shimon. If both men subsequently die, she should be considered the wife of two deceased brothers and should not perform levirate marriage with Levi.
The Gemara asks why this should not be classified as the case of a wife connected to two deceased husbands. Why should Rachel not be subject to the restriction against levirate marriage?
The answer is that Reuven’s betrothal was effective, but Shimon’s betrothal did not accomplish anything. Reuven made Rachel forbidden to the entire world except Shimon. When Shimon then betrothed her, what did he add? She was already forbidden to everyone else as a result of Reuven’s betrothal, while she was permitted to Shimon. Shimon’s act did not make her forbidden to anyone who had previously been permitted to her.
For a betrothal to be effective in this context, it must create a new prohibition—something that was permitted before and becomes forbidden through the betrothal. Reuven’s betrothal accomplished that: it made her forbidden to the entire world. Shimon’s betrothal accomplished nothing, because he left her in the same status. He did not prohibit her to anyone who had been permitted to her beforehand.
Therefore, Shimon’s betrothal is not considered a betrothal. Rachel is considered married only to Reuven. When both Reuven and Shimon die, she is falling to Levi because of only one deceased husband, and Levi may perform levirate marriage.
Let us review the case. There were three brothers. One brother died, leaving his wife subject to levirate marriage. The second brother performed maamar, creating a rabbinic connection with her, and then he died as well. Ordinarily, one might think that she is now connected to two deceased brothers and cannot perform levirate marriage.
But if the first brother had already betrothed her while excluding the second brother, and the second brother then betrothed her while excluding the first, the second betrothal added nothing. The first betrothal had already made her forbidden to everyone except the second brother. When the second brother betrothed her, he did not impose any new prohibition. Consequently, only the first betrothal is recognized, and she is not considered the wife of two deceased brothers.
This case helps us understand Rabbi Eliezer’s position. A betrothal must create a new status of prohibition. If the man says that the woman is forbidden to the entire world except a particular person, he has not necessarily created a valid betrothal with respect to that particular person, because he has not made her forbidden to anyone who was previously permitted. The question raised by Rabbi Abba concerns precisely whether such a qualified betrothal is effective, and the answer follows the same disagreement as the case of a qualified divorce.
According to Rabbi Eliezer, the qualified betrothal is effective. According to the Sages, it is not. The distinction remains between an act that creates the complete legal status and a qualification that does not add a new prohibition. When the qualification is part of the act itself, the dispute concerns whether the act can be valid despite the limitation. When it is an external condition, the act may be fully effective, with the condition evaluated separately.
Thus, in the case of divorce, the central question is whether the bill of divorce must release the woman from the husband in a completely unrestricted manner, or whether it is sufficient for the bill to permit her to marry at least some other man. In the case of betrothal, the question is whether the act of betrothal can take effect when the woman remains permitted to a particular other man. The Gemara connects the two cases through the comparison between leaving a marriage and entering one, while preserving the distinction between the force of the act itself and an external condition.