The Eddie D Sit edition presents an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, focusing on Avodah Zarah, Daf 15. Today’s Daf is sponsored for the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Esther, may his soul be at peace in Gan Eden, and for the complete healing of Mimi bat Jamie and Eliyahu ben Sophie, may the Almighty grant them healing of body and spirit. We begin today’s Daf on Yud-Dalet Amud Bet, starting from the Mishnah: “In a place where it is customary to sell small animals to idolaters, they may be sold; in a place where it is not customary to sell, they may not be sold.”
This Mishnah emphasizes the importance of local customs, or minhagim, in determining the permissibility of selling small animals, such as sheep, to non-Jews. If the local custom permits it, one may sell; if it does not, one may not. The question arises: what is the concern regarding selling animals to a non-Jew? Rashi explains that the concern is due to the possibility that the non-Jew may engage in improper relations with the animal, which constitutes a violation of the prohibition of lifnei iver lo titein michshol (do not place a stumbling block before the blind). A non-Jew is not permitted to have relations with an animal, and selling an animal to him could lead to such a transgression.
However, this ruling is contingent upon the local custom. In places where the custom is to sell, people were not worried about such issues. Conversely, in places where the custom is to refrain from selling, the prohibition is upheld. Tosafot reinforces this point, stating that the reason for not selling is due to the concern of improper relations and the violation of lifnei iver.
One might wonder: what if the non-Jew already owns an animal? Could it be that even in places where it is customary not to sell, one could sell if the non-Jew has another animal? Tosafot argues that since the Mishnah does not differentiate between whether the non-Jew has another animal or not, it implies that even if he does have another animal, it remains prohibited to sell him another one. The reasoning is that a non-Jew is inherently drawn to different animals, and the desire for additional animals still poses a risk of improper relations.
Tosafot raises another question regarding the prohibition of selling animals in places where it is customary not to sell. One might ask why we assume the non-Jew is buying the animal for improper relations instead of for slaughtering. The Gemara will later discuss a case where Rav Huna sold an animal to a non-Jew for slaughter. It implies that if the non-Jew is buying the animal for slaughter, there should be no concern. Tosafot suggests that small animals are typically kept alive for their products, such as milk or wool, which heightens the concern for potential improper relations.
The Mishnah continues, stating that in all places, one may not sell large animals to a non-Jew. Large animals, such as working animals, raise a different concern. The Gemara explains that selling a large animal could lead to renting or lending the animal, which in turn could result in the animal working on Shabbat. Since one’s own animal is not allowed to work on Shabbat, the Rabbis instituted a prohibition against selling large animals to non-Jews to prevent any potential violations.
Even broken animals, which may not be suitable for work, are included in this prohibition. Rashi explains that the Rabbis were concerned that even a broken animal could eventually be exchanged for a sound one, which would lead to a violation of Shabbat. Thus, the prohibition against selling large animals is comprehensive, encompassing both sound and broken animals.
Tosafot questions why, in the case of broken animals, we cannot assume that the non-Jew is buying the animal for slaughter. The reasoning is that broken animals are not typically slaughtered; they are kept for their products, which raises the concern of improper relations. The Gemara continues, stating that Rabbi Yehuda permits the sale of broken animals, while Ben Beterah permits the sale of horses, arguing that horses do not work in a way that would violate Shabbat.
Horses, according to Rashi, are ridden rather than worked. The prohibition against riding a horse on Shabbat is only a Rabbinic prohibition, as a person carries himself. Therefore, the Rabbis did not impose a prohibition against selling horses to non-Jews. However, Tosafot disagrees, suggesting that the discussion may involve horses used for carrying chickens, creating a debate over whether the rule of a person carrying himself applies.
The Gemara continues to clarify that in places where it is permitted to sell small animals, it is also permissible to leave them alone with a non-Jew. Conversely, in places where it is prohibited to leave animals alone with a non-Jew, it is also prohibited to sell them. This relationship between selling and the prohibition of yichud highlights the importance of local customs in determining the halachic outcome.
Rabbi and Rabbi Elazar state that even in places where yichud is prohibited, selling is still permissible. The rationale is that non-Jews care for their animals and would not want to risk them becoming sterile. Therefore, it is acceptable to sell to them, as they are less likely to engage in improper relations.
The Gemara recounts a story of Rav Huna, who sold a cow to a non-Jew, prompting questions about the propriety of the sale. The discussion reveals that even if the concern for improper relations exists, one can assume that the non-Jew is purchasing the animal for slaughter rather than for work. This assumption allows for leniency in certain cases.
Ultimately, the Gemara concludes that the prohibition against leaving a non-Jew alone with an animal stems from the concern of improper relations and the prohibition of lifnei iver. The selling of animals is contingent upon local customs, and while there are concerns regarding large animals, small animals are treated with more leniency based on established practices.
In summary, the intricate relationship between local customs, the nature of the animal, and the potential for improper relations underscores the complexity of halachic rulings in these matters. The discussions among the Rabbis highlight the importance of context and custom in determining permissible actions, ultimately guiding the community in their practices.