The Gemara, on tractate Nedarim, raises a series of questions concerning the laws of vows. The first question, posed by Rava, asks: Is there a reversal for a confirmation, or is there no reversal for a confirmation?
To clarify, the Ran explains the scenario: A man, such as a father or husband, makes a vow and then confirms it. On the very same day, he wishes to perform a reversal, meaning he wants to absolve himself from the confirmation. The question is whether he can first make a request for annulment on the confirmation and then, on the same day, make an annulment of the vow itself. The question is specifically about the same day, because if he remains silent for one full day after the confirmation, it automatically becomes a binding confirmation. The core of the question is whether one can reverse a confirmation to return to a neutral state, and then proceed to annul the vow.
If we say that a reversal for a confirmation is possible, meaning one can effectively return to a "zero" state from a positive confirmation, the Gemara then asks a subsequent question: Is there a reversal for an annulment, or is there no reversal for an annulment? This means, if a person has already annulled a vow, thereby starting in "negative" territory, can they make a request for annulment on that annulment, effectively bringing it back to a neutral state?
The Ran notes that an annulment is not subject to a request for annulment. A confirmation, however, is likened to the vow itself; just as one can make a request for annulment on a vow, one can make a request for annulment on a confirmation. But what would one be making a request for annulment on if the vow has already been annulled and taken away? The Gemara suggests that perhaps there is a request for annulment on an annulment because confirmation and annulment are juxtaposed in certain halachic rulings. Therefore, it's possible that whatever applies to a request for annulment on a confirmation might also apply to an annulment, due to their textual juxtaposition in the Torah. However, this comparison might only apply to aspects that are plausible for both, not to those that are inherently different.
Reiterating Rava's initial question: Can a husband, having confirmed a vow, reverse that confirmation through a request for annulment on the same day, to then perform an annulment? If so, can one make a request for annulment on an annulment? The logic for allowing a request for annulment on an annulment would stem from the comparison between confirmation and annulment. If a request for annulment can be made on a confirmation, perhaps it can also be made on an annulment. Conversely, it might be argued that it is illogical to make a request for annulment on an annulment, as nothing remains to be reversed. A confirmation is a positive act upon which a request for annulment can be made, but an annulment is a removal, leaving nothing to be reversed.
The Gemara provides a straightforward answer: One can make a request for annulment on a confirmation, but one cannot make a request for annulment on an annulment. Once an annulment is made, it cannot be reversed, whereas a confirmation can be reversed.
Rava poses a second question: What if a husband confirms a vow twice, saying "I confirm this vow, I confirm this vow," and then seeks to absolve himself from the first confirmation through a request for annulment? Does the second confirmation then automatically take effect?
The Ran explains the two sides of the question. One perspective is that when the second confirmation was uttered, it could not take effect because the first confirmation was already in place, blocking it. It was "pending." Once the first confirmation is removed, the second one "clicks in," and a new request for annulment would be required for it. The other perspective is that since the second confirmation did not take effect at the moment it was uttered, it simply disappears and never becomes effective. The Gemara answers this by citing Rav Huna: If the first is annulled, the second takes effect. Thus, if a person makes two confirmations, they are considered two distinct confirmations, and if the first is annulled, the second becomes binding, requiring a separate request for annulment.
Rava then poses a third question, involving a man who simultaneously declares both a confirmation and an annulment of a vow, with a stipulation. He says to his betrothed, "I want a confirmation here, and I want an annulment here, but I do not want the confirmation to take effect unless the annulment takes effect." The question is, what is the halachic outcome?
The Ran elaborates on the intricacies of this question. It is certain that the confirmation does not take effect. This is because of the man's condition: if the annulment takes effect, the confirmation does not (as they are mutually exclusive), and if the annulment does not take effect, then, by his condition, the confirmation also does not take effect. Therefore, the question is not about the confirmation, as it is clear it will not take effect. The real question is whether the annulment takes effect.
The uncertainty regarding the annulment stems from two possible interpretations of the man's statement. One interpretation is that by saying "I confirm for you" followed by "I annul for you," he intended a specific order. Since he explicitly conditioned the confirmation on the annulment, perhaps it is implicitly understood that he also wanted the annulment to be contingent on the confirmation. This would mean that if the confirmation cannot take effect (which we established it cannot), then the annulment also cannot take effect, leaving both null and void.
The other interpretation is that while he said "I confirm for you" before "I annul for you," this sequence was merely due to the impossibility of speaking both simultaneously. He did not intend for the annulment to be contingent on the confirmation. His explicit condition was only on the confirmation: "I don't want the confirmation to take effect unless the annulment takes effect." He did not make a reciprocal condition on the annulment. Therefore, his primary intention was for the annulment to take effect, and his restriction on the confirmation highlights this preference. In this case, the annulment would take effect, even if the confirmation does not.
The Gemara seeks to resolve this by citing a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose regarding the laws of Temurah (exchange of consecrated offerings). The Mishnah states that if a person declares concerning an animal, "This is an exchange for an elevation-offering, this is an exchange for a peace-offering," Rabbi Meir holds that the animal becomes an exchange for the elevation-offering, following the first statement. Rabbi Yose holds that one asks the person what they intended, and if they meant both, the animal becomes an exchange for both, with its value divided between the two types of offerings.
The Ran clarifies that everyone agrees that if a person explicitly states, "Let this take effect first, and then let this take effect," only the first takes effect. Similarly, if a person explicitly states, "I don't want this to take effect unless the second item also takes effect," everyone agrees that both take effect. The dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose arises when the person simply states two things consecutively, like "exchange for an elevation-offering, exchange for a peace-offering," without explicit conditions or sequential instructions. Rabbi Meir interprets this as a sequential declaration, giving precedence to the first. Rabbi Yose interprets it as an attempt to declare both simultaneously, and since that's impossible to say, he probes the intent.
Applying this to our case of vows: According to Rabbi Yose, when the man said "confirmation for you, annulment for you," he intended them to take effect simultaneously. Since they cannot take effect simultaneously (being mutually exclusive), and he explicitly conditioned the confirmation on the annulment, but not vice versa, his preference leans towards the annulment. Therefore, the annulment takes effect. Even Rabbi Meir would agree in our case of vows. Rabbi Meir's ruling in Temurah, where he prioritizes the first statement, applies only when no explicit condition is made. In our vow case, the man explicitly restricted the confirmation, demonstrating a clear preference for the annulment. Therefore, according to all opinions, the annulment takes effect, and the confirmation does not.
Finally, Rava asks a fourth question: What if a man declares "confirmation for you and annulment for you" simultaneously, without any conditions? What is the halachic outcome?
This question is analogous to a case in tractate Kiddushin, where a man attempts to marry two sisters simultaneously. Since marrying two sisters consecutively is forbidden (the second marriage would be invalid), the Gemara rules that attempting to marry them simultaneously also results in neither marriage taking effect. Nothing is accomplished. Similarly, in our case, confirmation and annulment are mutually exclusive and cannot take effect consecutively. Therefore, if declared simultaneously, neither takes effect. The man is left in a "zero" state, meaning he can still proceed to annul the vow if he wishes, as neither the confirmation nor the annulment he attempted has taken effect.
The Gemara concludes by citing Rava: "Any matter that cannot be done sequentially, cannot be done simultaneously." This principle means that if an action is invalid when performed one after the other, it is also invalid when attempted at the same time. Thus, in the case of the two sisters, neither is married. In the case of simultaneous confirmation and annulment, neither takes effect, leaving the vow in its original state, subject to a proper annulment.