The Eri B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, Tractate Gittin, has been sponsored by our good friend and loyal student of Daf Yomi, Mr. Haim Idana, and his dear wife. May God protect them and grant them life. He has dedicated this tractate according to the principle taught by our rabbis: when a person studies something, that study can avert the matter from occurring. We therefore wish to study Tractate Gittin so that divorce will remain within the realm of study and never come to fruition in actuality. May Mr. Idana, his dear wife, and all of Israel be blessed with peace in the home and success and prosperity in all the work of their hands. Amen.
Let us review two interesting disputes between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish. The first concerned a man who approached ten people and told all of them, “Write a divorce document for me.” According to Rabbi Yohanan, what he meant was that two of them should serve as witnesses, while the other eight should sign merely in order to fulfill his condition that everyone sign. Reish Lakish said that all ten actually had to serve as witnesses. Thus, according to him, there were ten witnesses.
We also saw another dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, in the opinion of Rabbi Shimon in the Mishnah. Rabbi Shimon held that there was no problem with a predated divorce document. The potential concern with such a document is the produce of the property: whether the husband was legally entitled to consume the produce during the period between the date written in the document and the date on which it was actually written. Rabbi Shimon held that the husband loses the right to the produce as soon as he decides to divorce his wife, from the time the document is written. Therefore, the date appearing in the document does not affect that issue.
Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagreed about the scope of this ruling. Reish Lakish said that there was still a ten-day limit. A document could be predated by up to ten days, but after ten days it would be invalid, because perhaps the husband had reconciled with his wife during that period. If he was intimate with her after the document had been written, the document would be considered an old divorce document and would be invalid. Rabbi Yohanan said that it did not matter by how many days the document had been predated, because we do not suspect that the couple reconciled. If they had reconciled, the neighbors would know, since they would have heard the couple shouting and arguing. If there had been abuse or a reconciliation, the neighbors would have been aware of it. Therefore, regardless of how far back the document was dated, it would remain valid.
With these two disputes in mind, we can understand the next discussion. A man told ten people, “Write a divorce document for my wife.” Two of them signed the document on one day, and the other eight signed it ten days later. The question was whether the document was valid.
They came before Rabbi Joshua ben Levi, who told them that they could rely on Rabbi Shimon’s opinion in a time of need. Although this was a predated document, the two witnesses had signed on one day and the other eight had signed later. Rabbi Joshua ben Levi said that they could rely on Rabbi Shimon, who considered such a document valid.
The Gemara asks: What does this mean? Reish Lakish explained Rabbi Shimon as allowing only a document that had been predated within ten days. In this case, however, the remaining signatures were added only after ten days. Even Rabbi Shimon, according to Reish Lakish, was lenient only with an immediately predated document, not with one dated more than ten days earlier.
The Gemara answers that Rabbi Joshua ben Levi was following Rabbi Shimon as understood by Rabbi Yohanan. According to Rabbi Yohanan, it does not matter how many days the document was predated. Therefore, even after ten days, the divorce document is valid.
The Gemara then asks: If Rabbi Joshua ben Levi was relying on Rabbi Yohanan’s understanding of Rabbi Shimon, why was there any need to discuss the dispute concerning the ten-day limit? According to Rabbi Yohanan’s other position, when the husband says, “All of you write for me,” only two of the ten people are witnesses. The other eight sign only because the husband required everyone to sign. In that case, the document is not predated at all. The two witnesses signed on the relevant day, and the remaining eight are not signing as witnesses, so it does not matter when they sign.
The answer is that the ruling combines the two positions. Regarding the question of whether all ten people are witnesses or only two are witnesses, the ruling follows Reish Lakish: all ten are considered witnesses. Regarding Rabbi Shimon’s ruling and the question of how long a document may be predated, the ruling follows Rabbi Yohanan: there is no limit to the number of days by which the document may be predated. Thus, in this case, the divorce document was accepted as valid.
We now turn to the ink that may be used to write a divorce document. One rule is that the document must be written with indelible ink, ink that cannot be erased. The Mishnah gives several examples: ordinary ink, paint, red dye, lead-based ink, shoemaker’s blackening, and any other substance that leaves a permanent mark.
One may not write the document with liquids, fruit juices, or anything else that does not leave a permanent mark. The Mishnah then discusses the surfaces on which a divorce document may be written. It may be written on an olive leaf, on the horn of a cow, in which case the entire cow is given to the woman, or on the hand of a servant, in which case the servant is given to her. Rabbi Yose says that one may not write on something that is alive, nor may one write on food. The Gemara will explain each of these cases. For the moment, we note that the Mishnah is discussing something detached from the ground.
The Gemara returns to the various types of ink. What is ordinary ink? It is the standard black ink used for a Torah scroll, phylacteries, and a mezuzah. What is the paint mentioned by the Mishnah? Rashi gives the French term for orpiment, a yellow pigment. What is the red dye? Rabbi Abba bar Hana identifies it as a red dye. The term for the shoemaker’s blackening refers to the material used by shoemakers to color or polish leather.
The Mishnah concludes by saying that any substance that leaves a permanent mark may be used. What additional cases does that statement include, after the Mishnah has already listed several examples? The Gemara discusses a substance called taraya. Some explain that it is rainwater that has acquired color from something through which it dripped, perhaps from a roof or another surface. Others explain that it is water in which a particular fruit, such as walnuts, was soaked. This is a dispute about the meaning of the term.
The Gemara also mentions gallnut ink. A gallnut is associated with a certain type of tree. A wasp lays its eggs between the bark and the body of the tree, and material is taken from that area and used to make ink. In any event, it is a type of permanent ink. The Gemara will return to explain the term more fully.
Rabbi Hiya taught that one may write with lead that has been placed in water, making the water black. One may also write with charcoal or with the shoemaker’s blackening. All of these are valid because they leave a permanent mark.
A related statement concerns the laws of Shabbat. If a person has letters written in red ink and writes black ink over them on Shabbat, he is liable for two categories of labor: writing and erasing. The black ink is more prominent than the red ink. By writing the black letters over the red ones, he erases the lower letters. This erasure is performed in order to write new letters, and therefore it is an erasure performed with the intention of writing. At the same time, he is liable for writing the black letters. He is therefore liable for both writing and erasing.
Rashi explains that the case involves two red letters over which two black letters are written on Shabbat. The lower red letters are erased in order to write the black letters above them.
What is the law if black ink is written over black ink, or red ink over red ink? In those cases, nothing significant has been written and nothing has been erased. The black remains black and the red remains red. We are not saying that it is permitted to perform such an act on Shabbat; we are saying only that it does not constitute the principal categories of writing and erasing.
The Gemara then discusses the case of red ink written over black ink. One might reason that the person is liable, because the black ink underneath is being erased. Writing red over black is an act of destruction with respect to the black letters, since black is more prominent. On the other hand, the Gemara asks why he should be liable for erasing when the act is destructive.
The answer is that this is not complete destruction, because the black letters can still be seen beneath the red. The red does not completely blot out the black. It is therefore an act of erasure, but it is not entirely destructive.
Thus, everyone agrees about black written over red: the person is liable for both writing and erasing. Everyone also agrees about black over black and red over red: there is no liability for writing or erasing. The dispute concerns red written over black. One position says that he is liable for erasing, because he did erase the lower black letters, even though the red writing is not considered the more prominent writing. It is not complete destruction, since the black letters remain visible. The other position says that writing red over black is destructive. He took good, prominent black writing and covered it with less prominent red writing, and therefore he is not liable for erasing.
The commentators explain why erasing normally requires the intention to write. Erasing is generally a destructive act. A person who erases two letters on Shabbat has destroyed what was on the surface and has not produced anything constructive. Therefore, he is liable only when the erasure is performed in order to write. In this case, however, the erasure is achieved through writing, and the result is not entirely destructive. Red letters are now visible on the surface. Since there are still two noticeable letters, it cannot be called complete destruction. That is why one opinion holds that he is liable even without the usual intention to write.
We now return to divorce documents and witnesses who do not know how to sign their names. The Gemara asks whether one may have another person write the witnesses’ names in red ink and then have the witnesses write over those red letters in black ink. The answer is that this is not acceptable.
Earlier, concerning Shabbat, we said that when a person writes black over red, he is liable for writing. Why, then, should a second signature written in black over a red outline be considered a valid signature on a divorce document?
The answer is: just because we draw an analogy based on a possibility discussed concerning Shabbat does not mean that we should act upon it in practice. In the discussion of Shabbat, the reasoning was analyzed through different possibilities, and we were not certain that the act was considered writing in every respect. We were stringent concerning Shabbat because of the possibility that it might be writing. That does not justify relying on the same uncertain reasoning to validate a divorce document and allow the woman to marry.
Rashi explains that even if this question had arisen concerning Shabbat, he would not necessarily have instructed the person to bring a sacrifice. Perhaps the person had performed the prohibited labor and perhaps he had not. If he brought a sacrifice when it was not required, it would be a non-sacred animal brought into the Temple courtyard. Since there is uncertainty, one may not be lenient with a divorce document.
The Gemara then cites another teaching concerning witnesses who do not know how to sign. Rav suggests that one should make an outline for them on the document, and they should fill in the outline with ink. The term used can mean that one takes a sharp instrument and engraves the shape of the letters on the parchment. The witnesses then fill in those letters with ink.
There is a difficulty with this method. If the letters are fully engraved, the engraving itself is a permanent form of writing. When the witnesses fill in the engraving with ink, they are not truly adding the writing, because the letters were already present.
One answer is that the outline should not be completed. The person making the outline leaves gaps in it, like a dotted line. Since the outline by itself does not form complete letters, it is not considered writing. The witnesses then complete the letters with ink, and the actual writing is performed by the witnesses.
Tosafot offers a different explanation. According to Tosafot, one prepares a separate sheet as a stencil, cutting out the shapes of the letters in the witnesses’ names. The stencil is placed over the document, and the witnesses fill in the spaces. The difficulty with both explanations is that a signature on a divorce document must be capable of being verified. In these cases, whether one follows Rashi or Tosafot, the visible signature may not appear to be the witnesses’ actual handwriting. It may appear to be the handwriting of the person who made the engraving or the stencil.
Tosafot therefore explains that the signature still has to retain its individual character. When the stencil is placed over the document, the witnesses are instructed not to fill the entire space. They leave a margin between the edge of the stencil and the ink. In this way, their individual handwriting remains recognizable. The stencil may be wider than the writing, while the witnesses write only within part of the space, allowing their signatures to retain a distinctive form.
In any event, the Gemara says that this is one method for assisting witnesses who do not know how to sign. Shmuel suggested another method: the first people could write the signatures in lead, and the witnesses could write over them. The Gemara asks how this could work, since lead was previously described as leaving a permanent mark. If the lead writing is permanent, the signatures have already been written, and the witnesses cannot write over them.
The Gemara answers that there are two kinds of lead. Writing with the lead itself is erasable, so the witnesses can write over it and their writing is considered actual writing. The lead that becomes indelible is lead placed in water, where the water absorbs the pigment. Thus, when Shmuel suggested using lead, he meant the lead itself, which can be erased, not the water into which the lead was placed.
The Gemara offers another possibility. The first group of people can write the signatures with water in which gallnuts have been crushed. This leaves an impression, and the witnesses can write over it. The discussion is addressing a practical problem: what can be done when witnesses do not know how to sign their names?
Rabbi Hanina taught that if a document is written with the substance called taraya or with gallnut ink, it is valid. But we had understood taraya to refer to water containing gallnuts, which leaves a permanent mark. How, then, can the witnesses write over it?
The Gemara answers that it depends on how the parchment was prepared. Sometimes the parchment itself was treated with gallnuts, and sometimes it was not. If the parchment had already been treated with gallnuts, then writing with gallnut water over it does not create a noticeable new inscription. It is gallnut writing over gallnut writing, and the first layer is not considered a complete, visible signature. The witnesses may therefore write over it. If the parchment was not treated with gallnuts, however, writing with gallnut water produces a permanent mark, and the witnesses cannot write over it.
Rashi explains that when the parchment has been treated with gallnuts, the writing blends into the parchment and is not readily noticeable. Therefore, a signature made with gallnut water can still be placed over it.
Another interpretation suggests using saliva. One makes an impression of the witnesses’ names with saliva and then allows the witnesses to write over the impression. This method is mentioned in the context of divorce documents because the law is treated leniently when there is a concern that the woman may become an abandoned wife.
In this situation, the husband is present, but if the matter is delayed until witnesses who know how to sign can be found, he may leave for a distant country or die there. The woman could then face additional difficulties, including the possibility of requiring a levirate marriage. Therefore, in the case of a divorce document, the Sages permitted these methods of assisting witnesses who could not sign.
With ordinary documents, however, one must wait until witnesses who know how to sign are available. The Gemara relates that there was once a case involving another type of document in which people who did not know how to sign were assisted in this way, and the authorities became angry with them and administered lashes. They had been lenient where they were not permitted to be lenient.
A teaching supports Rav’s method of making an outline or stencil. If witnesses do not know how to sign, one may prepare the letters for them, either by engraving or by creating a stencil, and the witnesses fill in the spaces with ink.
According to the first opinion in that teaching, there is no distinction between divorce documents and other documents. The teaching gives a general rule for witnesses who do not know how to sign. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, however, says that this leniency applies only to divorce documents. In the case of loan documents, sales documents, and other documents, the witnesses must know how to read and sign.
The Gemara asks about the requirement to read. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel introduced the idea that the witnesses must be able to read, even though the earlier opinion had discussed only whether they knew how to sign. The Gemara explains that the earlier teaching is incomplete and must be read as follows: witnesses who do not know how to read may have the document read to them, and they may then sign it. If they do not know how to sign either, an outline or stencil may be prepared for them, and they may complete the signatures.
According to the first opinion, this leniency applies even when the witnesses are entirely illiterate. The document may be read to them, and they may sign using the method described. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel limits the broader leniency to divorce documents, because of the concern that the woman may become an abandoned wife. With other documents, the witnesses must know how to read and write.
Rabbi Elazar asks what the reason is for Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s leniency with divorce documents. The answer is that the Sages did not wish to increase the number of abandoned wives. If the witnesses cannot sign, one would have to wait until suitable witnesses could be found. Meanwhile, the husband might leave the country or die, and the woman might then fall into a levirate situation. The Sages therefore permitted the process to proceed in the case of a divorce document.
The Gemara then asks whose opinion is followed in practice. It says that the ruling does not follow Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. The only remaining possibility would be that it follows the first opinion, who allowed the method even with other documents. But this creates a difficulty. Rav Kahana once found someone who used this method with another type of document, and Rav Kahana administered lashes to him. If the law follows the first opinion, why was he punished?
The Gemara answers that the ruling follows the first opinion only partially. Regarding the ability to read, the first opinion is followed: if the witnesses know how to sign but do not know how to read, the document may be read to them, and they may then sign. Regarding the signature itself, however, the leniency does not apply to ordinary documents. If the witnesses do not know how to sign, they may not sign with the assistance of an outline or stencil. That explains why Rav Kahana punished the person who used the method for another document.
Thus, in the case of a divorce document, everyone agrees that even witnesses who cannot read or write may be assisted: the document may be read to them, and they may sign using the outlined letters. With other documents, the witnesses must know how to sign. The disagreement concerns witnesses who know how to sign but cannot read. In that case, the document may be read to them, and they may sign it.
The Gemara relates that Rav Yehuda would trouble himself to read a document before signing it. He was elderly and his eyesight was failing, but when he needed to sign as a witness or judge, he insisted on reading the document himself. Rav Oda told him that this was unnecessary. Rabbi Elazar, the leading authority in the Land of Israel, would have the document read to him and would then sign it. This demonstrates that with regard to reading, one may rely on another person to read the document.
Rav Nahman likewise had documents read to him by the scribes of the court. The Gemara discusses the fact that these were the court scribes. Ordinarily, two people would be needed to read a document, because one person might misrepresent what was written. In Rav Nahman’s case, however, the scribes were afraid of him and would not lie. Therefore, even one of them could read the document to him. This applied specifically to a scribe serving under Rav Nahman, where the relationship between the scribe and the judge created that level of trust.
Rashi explains that these scribes were appointed by the court and were subordinate to Rav Nahman. Since they feared him, they could be trusted. With other scribes, the ordinary requirement would remain: two people should read the document.
The Gemara then discusses a document written in Persian in the courts of the non-Jewish authorities, with non-Jewish signatures. We previously learned that a document issued by the official courts of the country may be accepted because the law of the land is binding. Rav Nahman would have two non-Jews read such a document to him, but he would not have them read it together. He would also avoid explaining to them why he wanted the document read. If they understood the legal consequences, they might coordinate with one another or attempt to deceive him.
After they read the document, Rav Nahman would validate it, and it could be used even to collect from property that had been sold to other people. Earlier, we learned that when a person has no document, he can generally collect only from movable property. With a valid document, however, he can collect even from property that the debtor sold, because the document establishes a lien.
This does not contradict the earlier rule that certain documents issued by non-Jews are invalid. The earlier rule concerned documents issued by informal individuals who were not official judges and were not accountable to the government. In this case, the document came from the official courts, with government-appointed judges. Once Rav Nahman had the document read to him by two people, separately and without revealing the reason, he could rely on it.
The Gemara brings another case involving a document written in Persian with Jewish signatures. Although the document was in Persian, it could be used to collect from property. How could Jewish witnesses sign a Persian document if they did not know how to read Persian?
The answer is that the document was written on a type of parchment that could not easily be forged. When it was erased, the erasure became noticeable. The Gemara asks how the Persians knew how to prepare this parchment. It answers that the parchment was treated with gallnuts. The gallnut treatment made the document difficult to forge, and therefore the document was acceptable.
We previously learned that the practice was to repeat the essential conditions of a document at the end, immediately before the signatures. This was done so that no blank space would remain between the end of the document and the signatures. If a blank space remained, someone could later add additional conditions. Therefore, the conditions were repeated at the end of the document.
The novelty in this case is that a document may be written in Persian, even in a place where Persian is not the language ordinarily spoken. We already know that a divorce document may be written in one language and signed in another. The question here is whether the same leniency applies to other documents. One might have thought that the leniency is limited to divorce documents because of the concern for an abandoned wife, whereas other documents must be written in the language spoken in that country.
The Gemara clarifies that the question is not whether a document must be written in Hebrew. The question is whether it must be written in the language understood in the place where it is issued. The case teaches that even if a document is written in a foreign language that is not understood locally, it may still be valid.
Shmuel teaches another interesting law. A man gave a woman a blank sheet of parchment while two witnesses stood at a distance and watched the transfer. Because they were far away, they could not see whether anything was written on it. The man said, “This is your divorce document.” The law is that she is considered divorced.
How can she be divorced if the parchment appeared to be blank? Perhaps the document had been written with gallnut water on parchment that had been treated in such a way that the writing was not visible. It was like invisible ink: the writing was present but could not be seen.
The Gemara challenges this ruling with another case. A husband gave a woman a divorce document, and she immediately took it and threw it into the sea, or into a fire, or into something else that destroyed it. The witnesses saw that she received it. The husband then claimed, “It was not a divorce document. It was a document of appeasement.”
What is a document of appeasement? A person may wish a bank to think that he is wealthy, so a friend writes a document stating that he owes him a large sum of money. The document makes it appear that people owe him money and that he has credit. It is not a genuine debt; it is written merely to create an appearance of wealth.
The Gemara also discusses a document of trust. A person may authorize a lender to write a loan document before the loan has actually been given, trusting the lender not to use it until the money is lent. The document states that the borrower owes the money, but it takes effect only once the loan is actually given.
In the case under discussion, the husband claimed that the document he had given the woman was one of these documents, not a divorce document. Nevertheless, she is considered divorced. The husband cannot now retract his statement. The witnesses saw that he gave her a document and declared that it was a divorce document. Although they did not read it, they saw that there was writing on it and heard him identify it as a divorce document. He is therefore believed to have given her a divorce document, and he cannot later claim otherwise.
The Gemara indicates that this ruling depends on the fact that there was writing on the document. If the parchment was genuinely blank, and the husband later claimed that it had been a divorce document, we would not accept that claim. The reason for accepting the divorce is that there had been writing and the husband himself identified the document as a divorce document.
The Gemara returns to the original case in which the document appeared blank. If a blank document is sufficient to divorce the woman, why was it necessary to teach a case in which there had been writing? That would be a greater novelty: even when there was no visible writing, she should be considered divorced.
The Gemara answers that the document was tested. The parchment was treated with a certain substance, and the letters appeared. This demonstrated that writing had been placed on it in a manner that was not initially visible.
The Gemara challenges this answer: even if the letters appeared after the test, what does that prove? At the time the document was given, the writing was not visible. A divorce document requires writing that is present and recognizable at the time it is given.
The response is that we do not know the condition of the document at the moment it was given. Perhaps the writing was already present and legible then, and it was erased afterward. Alternatively, perhaps the writing was not sufficiently absorbed into the parchment, and when the substance was applied, the letters became visible again. Since we do not know what the document looked like at the time of delivery, we must be stringent.
Shmuel’s ruling therefore does not mean that the woman is certainly divorced. It means that we must suspect that she may have been divorced. If the husband dies, she may not marry a priest, because perhaps she is divorced and a divorcee may not marry a priest. She also may not enter into a levirate marriage, because perhaps she was divorced and therefore is not subject to that obligation. She would require the appropriate release instead.
The bottom line is that even if the writing becomes visible only after a chemical or other substance is applied to the parchment, the document may have contained valid writing at the time it was delivered. Shmuel’s ruling is therefore a matter of uncertainty. We treat the woman as possibly divorced, but not as certainly divorced. May God be praised.