The study of Masechet Gittin for this session has been dedicated to Mr. Haim Midana and his dear wife. Our Sages teach that learning about a particular subject can avert its actual occurrence. By studying Masechet Gittin, we pray that its topics remain theoretical, never manifesting in reality, and that the Midana family and all of Israel be blessed with peace in their homes and abundant success in all their endeavors. Amen.
Today's discussion begins several lines from the bottom of the page, with the words "Let's just review." We are in the midst of a discussion concerning damage that is not noticeable, known as hezek she'eino nikar. We previously encountered a significant dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda.
According to Rabbi Meir, if a person intentionally causes damage that is not noticeable, such as making a friend's room ritually impure (mitame'a) – the room still looks the same but is now damaged – that person is liable. While technically, according to Torah law, damage that is not noticeable does not incur liability, the Sages instituted a penalty (kenas) for intentional acts. This was to prevent people from intentionally making property impure and thinking they could escape responsibility. The novel aspect of Rabbi Meir's view is that he extended this penalty to accidental acts (shogeg) as a protective measure against intentional ones (gezeirat shogeg atu mezid). Thus, whether one acted accidentally or intentionally, the liability would be the same.
Rabbi Yehuda, however, held that only intentional acts would incur liability, and he did not extend the penalty to accidental acts. We explained that since this entire subject of damage that is not noticeable is a rabbinic enactment, Rabbi Meir's logic was that rabbinic ordinances require reinforcement, hence the need for a protective measure even for accidental cases. In contrast, when it came to Torah laws, such as cooking on Shabbat, Rabbi Meir maintained that if one cooked accidentally, the food could be eaten, but if done intentionally, it was forbidden. This shows that for Torah laws, Rabbi Meir believed people understood their stringency, so there was no need to extend the prohibition from intentional to accidental acts.
Rabbi Yehuda, on the other hand, held the reverse position. He believed that for rabbinic matters like damage that is not noticeable, there was no need for a protective measure extending to accidental acts. However, for Shabbat, which is a Torah law and a strict matter, he ruled that even if one cooked accidentally, the food was forbidden, just as if it were done intentionally.
The Gemara now challenges Rabbi Meir's consistency. You told me, it asks, that for Torah laws, such as cooking on Shabbat, Rabbi Meir does not extend the prohibition from accidental to intentional acts because Torah laws are strict and people are aware of them. Yet, a teaching (Tanya) states: "One who plants on Shabbat accidentally, may leave the tree; intentionally, must uproot it." This part supports Rabbi Meir's stance. But the teaching continues: "One who plants during the Sabbatical year (Shemitah), whether accidentally or intentionally, must uproot it." This is a Torah prohibition. Here, Rabbi Meir is stringent, extending the prohibition to accidental acts, contradicting his principle that for Torah laws, such a protective measure is unnecessary.
The Gemara then raises a similar challenge to Rabbi Yehuda. When it came to Shabbat, a Torah law, Rabbi Yehuda was stringent, extending the prohibition to accidental acts. However, regarding Shemitah, also a Torah law, he is not stringent. The teaching states that for planting on Shabbat, whether accidentally or intentionally, one must uproot the tree. But for planting during Shemitah, if done accidentally, one may leave it; if intentionally, one must uproot it. This presents a contradiction within Rabbi Yehuda's own rulings on Torah laws.
The Gemara pauses the challenge on Rabbi Yehuda to first address a self-contradiction within his own statement. For Shabbat, a Torah law, he says if one plants accidentally, it's permissible to leave it, but if intentionally, it must be uprooted. Yet for Shemitah, also a Torah law, he says whether accidentally or intentionally, one must uproot it. Why the inconsistency? Why is Rabbi Yehuda so stringent regarding Shemitah, requiring uprooting even for accidental planting, but lenient regarding Shabbat, allowing an accidentally planted tree to remain?
Rabbi Meir himself provides an explanation for this distinction: "We are more concerned about Shemitah than we are about Shabbat." Why? Because people count the years of a tree in relation to Shemitah, but not in relation to Shabbat. For instance, the first three years of a tree's fruit are forbidden (orlah). The fourth year's fruit is holy (netah reva'i) and must be brought to Jerusalem. When people see someone eating fruit from a tree in its fourth year, they will often trace it back to the Shemitah cycle, saying, "Four years ago was Shemitah, so this tree must have been planted during Shemitah." Since people use Shemitah as a gauge for a tree's age, we must be more stringent in Shemitah. If we were to permit even accidental planting, it would lead to people intentionally planting during Shemitah (gezeirat shogeg atu mezid). On Shabbat, however, people do not track the exact day a tree was planted, so there is less concern that an accidental planting would become known or lead to intentional transgressions.
The Gemara offers another reason why people are more suspicious regarding Shemitah than Shabbat. It explains that there's a rule that if a tree is planted 30 days before Rosh Hashanah, it is considered to have been planted in the previous year. This rule applies to the Orlah years and also to Shemitah. So, if a tree is planted 30 days before Shemitah begins, it's considered planted in the sixth year, allowing its fruit to be eaten in the seventh. The Gemara then challenges the idea that people don't calculate for Shabbat. What if someone planted a tree and, due to the 30-day rule, people might calculate back and realize it must have been planted on Shabbat? This could lead to a similar concern as with Shemitah, suggesting that a protective measure should apply to Shabbat as well.
The Gemara responds that while such a calculation is possible, people are not suspected of being so lax regarding Shabbat that they would intentionally plant on it, even if they could use the 30-day rule to justify it. The concern is too remote. However, regarding Shemitah, people are more prone to leniency, and since the years are counted back to it, greater caution is required, even for accidental acts. Therefore, Rabbi Meir's consistency is maintained: he is stringent on Shemitah due to the public's calculation of tree years, but not on Shabbat, where such calculation is less common and the concern for intentional transgression is lower.
Now, to address the contradiction within Rabbi Yehuda's own statements regarding Shemitah and Shabbat. The Gemara answers: "In Rabbi Yehuda's place, people were very stringent on Shemitah." This means that Shemitah was treated with such extreme severity in his community that he didn't need to be stringent with a protective measure for accidental acts. People were already so careful that there was no concern that accidental leniency would lead to intentional transgression. As proof, the Gemara relates an incident where one person sought to insult another by calling him "the son of a convert." The other retorted, "At least I don't eat Shemitah produce like you do!" This implies that eating Shemitah produce was considered a grave offense in that community, demonstrating their extreme stringency. Thus, Rabbi Yehuda was consistent: normally, for Torah laws, he would extend the prohibition to accidental acts, but for Shemitah, the existing communal stringency rendered such an extension unnecessary.
The Gemara now introduces a new halachic principle. If a person damages a friend's consecrated produce, such as terumah (a priestly offering), and must pay restitution, the ordinary produce (chulin) used for payment transforms into terumah itself. This is derived from Scriptural verses. The Gemara presents a case: If someone ate a friend's ritually impure terumah (terumah temei'ah), they must pay back pure ordinary produce (chulin tehorim). This pure ordinary produce then becomes pure terumah (terumah tehorah), which is a better payment than what was eaten. But what if they paid back impure ordinary produce (chulin temei'im)? This would then become impure terumah (terumah temei'ah), which is what they ate. The Gemara asks, what is the ruling?
Sumchus, in the name of Rabbi Meir, states: If one paid back impure ordinary produce accidentally, the payment is valid. But if done intentionally, the payment is not valid. The Sages, however, say that in either case, the payment is valid, but one must pay again with pure ordinary produce. The Gemara finds Rabbi Meir's ruling puzzling. If someone ate impure terumah, which the owner could not eat, and paid back impure ordinary produce, which the owner technically could eat (before it transforms into impure terumah), why would Rabbi Meir invalidate the payment if done intentionally? The payer's intention was good: to return something edible for something inedible. One does not punish someone whose intention was good.
The Gemara clarifies that the case under discussion is actually one where someone ate pure terumah (terumah tehorah). If they pay back pure ordinary produce, which becomes pure terumah, that's fine. But if they pay back impure ordinary produce, which becomes impure terumah, that's a problem. The owner ate something he could use (pure terumah) but received something he cannot use (impure terumah). In this scenario, Sumchus (in Rabbi Meir's name) says: if done accidentally, the payment is valid; if done intentionally, it's not. The Sages say the payment is always valid, but one must pay again with pure ordinary produce.
The Gemara then points out a contradiction in Rabbi Meir's view. The entire discussion of restitution here is on a rabbinic level, as Torah law only requires paying back the measure of what was eaten, without concern for purity status. So, on a rabbinic level, Rabbi Meir rules that if one intentionally pays back impure ordinary produce for pure terumah, the payment is invalid. But if done accidentally, it's valid. This means he is not extending the penalty from intentional to accidental acts (not making a gezeirat shogeg atu mezid). This contradicts his stance on damage that is not noticeable, where he *did* extend the penalty to accidental acts for rabbinic ordinances.
The Gemara resolves this by distinguishing between the intentions. In the case of paying restitution, the payer's intention, even if they paid back impure produce, might have been good. They might not have known the law that ordinary produce transforms into terumah, thinking they were returning edible for edible. Since their intention was pure, even if mistaken, Rabbi Meir is lenient and does not apply a penalty for accidental acts. However, in the case of damage that is not noticeable, where one makes a friend's property impure, the act itself is inherently damaging, and the intention is not "good" in the same way. Therefore, Rabbi Meir is more stringent there.
The Gemara then presents another case: If the blood of a sacrifice became ritually impure (dam she'nitma) and a Kohen (priest) sprinkles it, the sacrifice is still valid according to Torah law, as the High Priest's service atones for impure blood. However, the Sages instituted a prohibition against sprinkling impure blood. If a Kohen sprinkles such blood accidentally, the sacrifice is valid; if intentionally, it is invalid. Again, Rabbi Meir is not extending the prohibition to accidental acts for this rabbinic ordinance. The Gemara explains that here, too, the Kohen's intention is positive – to bring atonement – so no penalty is applied for accidental acts.
Next, the Gemara discusses taking tithes (ma'aser) from fruit on Shabbat. This is forbidden by rabbinic decree because it appears as if one is "fixing" the fruit. If one takes tithes accidentally on Shabbat, the fruit may be eaten; if intentionally, it may not. Similarly, immersing a vessel in a ritual bath (mikveh) on Shabbat is forbidden by rabbinic decree because it appears as if one is "fixing" a broken vessel. If one immerses a vessel accidentally, it may be used; if intentionally, it may not. In both these rabbinic cases, Rabbi Meir is not extending the prohibition to accidental acts. The Gemara explains that in these cases, the person's intention is positive – to prepare fruit or fix a vessel – so Rabbi Meir is lenient and does not apply a protective measure for accidental acts.
The Gemara then presents a case involving Orlah fruit. If a valuable nut (egoz perech) from an Orlah tree (forbidden for three years) falls into a pile of other nuts and gets crushed, it loses its "valuable" status. The rule is that if a valuable item is mixed with non-forbidden items, it is never nullified, even in a ratio of 1:1000. However, if it's crushed, it's no longer considered valuable. The Gemara states that if such an Orlah nut fell into a pile and was then crushed, whether accidentally or intentionally, it is not nullified, meaning the entire pile remains forbidden. This ruling is attributed to Rabbi Meir (or Rabbi Yehuda, as the Gemara states most rabbis concur). The Gemara challenges this stringency: If it was crushed accidentally, why is it not nullified? It's a rabbinic decree (the rule of 1:200 for Orlah, or the "valuable item" rule), and Rabbi Meir should be lenient for accidental acts.
The Gemara answers that in this case, the Sages were concerned that if accidental crushing allowed for nullification, people would intentionally crush the valuable Orlah nut and claim it was an accident. Therefore, a protective measure was instituted to prevent such deception, making it forbidden even if crushed accidentally. This is a case where the potential for trickery justifies stringency, even for accidental acts, on a rabbinic level.
The Gemara then discusses Rabbi Yosef's view on the egoz perech case. Rabbi Yosef said that if the valuable Orlah nut was crushed accidentally, it is nullified (meaning the pile becomes permissible in a 1:200 ratio), but if crushed intentionally, it is not nullified. This shows Rabbi Yosef is lenient for accidental acts. However, the Gemara challenges Rabbi Yosef with two cases: 1) A person has an Orlah tree mixed among other permissible trees, and they forgot which one is the Orlah tree. 2) A person has grapes mixed with forbidden plants (kil'ayim), and they don't know which grapes are forbidden. In both cases, one is forbidden from gathering the fruits to create a ratio for nullification. But if one did gather them, and there was a ratio of 1:200, the fruits are permissible. Rabbi Yosef states that even if one intentionally gathered the fruits to create the nullification ratio, it is permissible. This contradicts his earlier ruling on the egoz perech, where he was stringent for intentional acts.
The Gemara resolves this by quoting Rabbah in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: "It is not common for a person to mix his vineyard with a single sapling." This means that the case of an Orlah tree mixed among other trees without a distinguishing mark is very uncommon. Since it's a far-fetched scenario, the Sages were lenient and allowed one to intentionally gather the fruits to nullify the forbidden one, even though normally one cannot intentionally nullify a forbidden item. In contrast, a valuable nut falling into a pile is a common occurrence, making it more prone to trickery, hence the stringency there. Thus, Rabbi Yosef's rulings are consistent based on the likelihood of the situation and the potential for intentional circumvention.
The Mishnah then discusses Kohanim who had an improper intention (pigul) during their service in the Temple. If they had an intentional improper thought while sprinkling the blood of a sacrifice (e.g., to eat the meat after its permitted time or outside its permitted place), they are liable. This is another case of damage that is not noticeable, as the animal appears unchanged. The Gemara then presents a related law: If a person is working for a friend with pure items (taharot) or sacrifices (zevachim), and tells the friend, "The pure items I was dealing with became impure," or "The sacrifices I was dealing with became pigul," he is believed if he says it immediately. However, if he says, "The pure items I dealt with *on a certain day* became impure," or "The sacrifices I dealt with *on a certain day* became pigul," he is not believed, as he is giving a historical account.
Rava explains this distinction: If the person still has the ability to make the items impure or pigul at that moment, he is believed. For example, if he is still holding the pure items, he could make them impure right then. If he is still performing the sacrificial service, he could have the pigul thought right then. But if the act is already complete and he no longer has the ability to affect it, he is not believed to retroactively claim it became impure or pigul. Rava, however, argues that this rule of "ability to do it now" is incorrect. He says that the person is believed even if it happened two days ago, provided he states it the first time he sees the owner. The reason he is not believed in the latter case is if he saw the owner, didn't say anything, and then only later mentioned it. This implies that if he had told him the first time he saw him, even days later, he would be believed.
A new scenario is presented: A person tells a Rabbi, "The pure items I dealt with for my friend *on a certain day* became impure." The Rabbi is asked if this person is believed. The Rabbi replies that according to the strict law, he is not believed. The Gemara challenges this: Why is he not believed? The Torah believes a person to say that he made items impure even after the fact. As proof, the Gemara brings the case of the Kohen Gadol (High Priest) on Yom Kippur. When he emerges from the Holy of Holies after performing the service, if he declares, "I made pigul," he is believed. There are no witnesses in the Holy of Holies, and the act is complete. So, if the Kohen Gadol is believed, why is this ordinary person not believed?
The Gemara suggests that perhaps the Kohen Gadol was heard or seen by someone. Perhaps someone had their ear to the Holy of Holies and heard him express the pigul thought, or saw him performing the act with a bad intention. The Gemara refutes this: merely hearing him would not be enough, as he might have expressed the thought after the critical moment for pigul (slaughtering or sprinkling the blood). Therefore, it must be that he is believed on his own word. The Gemara concludes that the only way to reconcile this is if someone saw him through a keyhole, observing both his action and his thought. This leaves the initial challenge unresolved, as it still implies that without a witness, a person might not be believed after the fact.
Finally, another story is presented: A scribe came before a Rabbi and confessed, "The Sefer Torah (Torah scroll) I wrote for so-and-so, I did not write the Divine Names (Shemot) with the proper intention (L'shem Kiddushat Hashem)." The Rabbi asked, "Where is the Sefer Torah now?" The scribe replied, "The buyer already has it." The Rabbi told him, "You are believed to forfeit your fee, but not for the sin." This means the scribe must return his payment, but his confession does not invalidate the Sefer Torah itself, as it is no longer in his possession. The Gemara asks: Why should he forfeit his entire fee? If the Divine Names were not written properly, the Sefer Torah is not worthless; one can simply write over the names. This implies the Rabbi's ruling aligns with the Sages who say one cannot write over the names, rather than Rabbi Yehuda who permits it.
The Gemara explains that even Rabbi Yehuda, who generally permits writing over a single Divine Name, would agree in this case. If the scribe ruined all the Divine Names in the entire Sefer Torah, it would be considered like "leopard spots" if one were to write over every single one. In such a situation, even Rabbi Yehuda would deem the Sefer Torah invalid. Therefore, the Rabbi correctly ruled that the scribe's admission forfeited his fee, as the Sefer Torah was rendered worthless due to the widespread improper writing of the Divine Names.