The Eddie D. Sitt edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, Masechet Zevachim, has been dedicated by our good friend and student of the Shiur Daf Yomi, Binyamin HaKohen, also known as Benny Cohen or Benny C. He has dedicated this Masechet, and, with God’s help, may he have success and prosperity. As he is a Kohen, may he serve in the Beit HaMikdash alongside the other Kohanim when the Moshiach comes, in the merit of this Masechet, which discusses the Avodah of the Kohanim in the Beit HaMikdash regarding the Korbanot. Today, we will study in memory of Avraham ben Esther, may the Ruach Hashem grant him peace in Gan Eden, and for a complete recovery for Mickey ben Jamie, and for the success of Binyamin Mordechai ben Esther.
We begin today's Daf, Mem Tet Amud Bet. We are at the siman, five lines before they get wide. The Gemara presents us with a siman: Hekkesh, Gezerah Shavah, Kal Vachomer, Binyan Av, and siman. These are all different methods we use to interpret the Torah. We learned on yesterday's Daf that something derived through a Hekkesh—where two items in a pasuk are compared—cannot be used to derive a new Hekkesh afterward. Once a concept is established through a Hekkesh, we cannot create another Hekkesh from that derivation. The principle is clear: one cannot learn three from two if two was derived from one, thus prohibiting a Hekkesh after a Hekkesh.
The Gemara states: Davar halamed behekesh ein chozer u'melamed behekesh. We have two proofs for this concept. The first is a derashah from Rava regarding the Kohen Mashiach. It states that the kelayot and chelev are placed on the mizbe'ach, just as done with the Shelamim. The question arises: why must it be stated as similar to the Shelamim? It is explicitly mentioned concerning the Kohen Mashiach. The answer is that this additional wording indicates that if it is not relevant to the Kohen Mashiach, we can apply it to the par he'elam davar shel tzibbur to indicate that the chelev and kelayot also go on the mizbe'ach. Once it is stated for the par he'elam davar shel tzibbur, it allows for a Hekkesh to the se'ir avodah zarah, which also requires that the chelev and kelayot go on the mizbe'ach.
We cannot derive from one item to another without a clear connection, as this would create a Hekkesh to a Hekkesh. Thus, explicit mention of the par he'elam davar shel tzibbur is necessary to establish a direct learning path to the se'ir avodah zarah. The second proof comes from Ravina concerning the asham and the asham metzora, reinforcing the principle that one cannot learn one Hekkesh from another Hekkesh.
The Gemara continues with further configurations, questioning whether one can learn from a Hekkesh to a Gezerah Shavah. The inquiry arises: if one learned an item through a Hekkesh, can they then use that derived item in a Gezerah Shavah? The Gemara invites us to consider this: Davar halamed behekesh mahu sheyelamed begezerah shavah? The response is sought through examples such as the tzara'at on clothing. If the tzara'at spreads entirely over the garment, it is deemed tahor. The Gemara cites the pasuk that describes the tzara'at on the garment, establishing a connection to the tzara'at on a person.
The Gemara asserts that just as the tzara'at on a person that is fully white is tahor, so too should the same apply to garments. The Gemara poses a challenge: how do we know that a person is tahor when the tzara'at covers the entirety of their flesh? The Torah does not explicitly state this for the karachat and gabachat of a person, yet it mentions it in relation to the flesh, thus establishing a Hekkesh between the head and the feet. The Gemara concludes that the tzara'at on the head being fully white renders the individual tahor.
As we navigate these intricate layers of halachic reasoning, we see the Gemara asserting that while one cannot learn a Hekkesh from another Hekkesh, one can indeed learn a Gezerah Shavah after a Hekkesh. This principle emphasizes the strength of Kal Vachomer reasoning, allowing us to draw conclusions based on established relationships within the Torah.
In examining the distinctions between these methods of interpretation, we recognize that the Gemara is not merely a collection of legal rulings but a dynamic conversation that weaves together multiple threads of reasoning. Each principle, whether it be Hekkesh, Gezerah Shavah, or Kal Vachomer, serves a critical role in the broader tapestry of halachic discourse, guiding us toward a deeper understanding of the Torah and its applications.

