The Gemara asks a fundamental question: Can a deaf person annul a vow (hafarat neder) made by his wife? The initial thought is that if he can speak, he should be able to perform the annulment, even if he cannot hear. The Gemara clarifies that the question hinges on whether the husband must actually hear the vow, or if the potential ability to hear is sufficient.
The Gemara suggests linking this to a previous unresolved question: What if a husband has the ability to hear but simply did not hear his wife's vow? Can he still perform hafarat neder? If we conclude that a husband with the potential to hear can annul a vow even if he didn't actually hear it, then a deaf person (cheresh), who lacks even the potential to hear, would fall under a different ruling. This distinction is based on the principle articulated by Rabbi Zeira: "Anything that is fit for mixing, its mixing is not an impediment; but that which is not fit for mixing, its mixing is an impediment."
This principle, derived from the laws of meal offerings (menachot), states that if ingredients are suitable for mixing, the actual mixing is not strictly indispensable for the offering's validity. However, if the ingredients are unsuitable (e.g., too many, preventing proper mixing), then the mixing becomes an impediment. Applying this analogy, if a person can hear but did not hear the vow, he is "fit for mixing" (ra'uy le-bilah), and the lack of actual hearing is not an impediment. But a cheresh, who cannot hear at all, is "not fit for mixing" (she-ein ra'uy le-bilah), implying that the inability to hear would be an impediment to annulment.
Alternatively, the Gemara considers a different approach based on a verse: "And her husband will hear." This verse could be interpreted as excluding the wife of a cheresh, meaning that if the husband is deaf, he cannot annul her vows. This interpretation would conclusively answer that a cheresh cannot perform hafarat neder. However, it leaves open the question of a hearing husband who simply did not hear the vow. If the verse excludes only a cheresh, it implies that a hearing person who did not hear might still be able to annul, as he possesses the potential to hear.
Rabbah, citing the verse "and her husband will hear," concludes that it comes to exclude the wife of a cheresh. Thus, a deaf husband cannot annul his wife's vows. This definitively answers the question regarding the cheresh. Regarding a husband who can hear but did not hear, the Gemara, following the principle of Rabbi Zeira and the interpretation of the verse, concludes that since he is "fit for mixing" (i.e., has the potential to hear), his annulment would be valid. This is the ruling of the Ramban.
The Rambam agrees with this conclusion. He acknowledges that while earlier discussions might have presented seemingly strong rejections to proofs for this leniency, those rejections were ultimately considered forced. Therefore, the Rambam rules that a deaf man cannot annul vows, but a man who did not hear a vow but has the ability to hear, can annul it.
The discussion moves to a new case: Can a husband annul vows for two wives simultaneously? For example, if he says, "Your vows are annulled for both of you." The question arises from the verse "he will annul it," using the singular "it" (otah). Does this imply that he can only annul one vow at a time, or is the singular merely descriptive of the typical case where a husband has one wife and one vow?
Ravinah brings a proof from the laws of the suspected wife (sotah) in the Beit HaMikdash. The law states that two sotot cannot be given the bitter waters to drink simultaneously. The reason given by the Tanna Kamma (the first opinion in a Mishnah or Baraita) is a concern that if one woman is innocent and drinks confidently, the guilty one might be emboldened to drink as well, leading to the erasing of God's name in vain. This reason suggests that the prohibition against simultaneous drinking is not derived from the singular word "it" (otah) in the verse "he shall give her (otah) to drink," but from a separate logical concern.
Rabbi Yehuda, however, interprets the dot in the letter ה (heh) of "ve-hishkah" (he shall give to drink) as an indication that the word "otah" (her) is meant restrictively, implying "only her," meaning one at a time. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the singular "otah" is indeed restrictive. But the Tanna Kamma, who represents the majority opinion, does not derive this restriction from "otah," but from the concern about one woman emboldening the other. Therefore, if the Tanna Kamma does not interpret "otah" as restrictive in the case of sotah, then by extension, the singular "otah" in the context of vows should also not be restrictive. This would mean a husband could annul vows for two wives simultaneously. The Halakha follows the Tanna Kamma. This interpretation is supported by a Tosefta which explicitly states that a husband can annul the vows of two wives (or a father, two daughters) simultaneously.
However, the Ramban interprets the discussion differently. He argues that the Tanna Kamma in the sotah discussion, who is Rabbi Shimon, is known for "deriving reasons from verses" (doresh ta'amei de-kra). According to the Ramban, Rabbi Shimon also agrees that "otah" is restrictive and means one at a time; he simply provides the underlying reason for that restriction. Thus, both the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Yehuda agree that "otah" is restrictive, meaning only one at a time. Consequently, the Ramban concludes that the Tosefta allowing simultaneous annulment is erroneous (shibush), and one cannot annul vows for two wives at the same time. The Ran notes this fundamental disagreement among the Rishonim.
The Gemara then turns to a Mishnah concerning a bogeret (a mature girl, 12 years and 6 months old) or an almanah (widow) who waited a certain period after engagement. The Mishnah states that once the husband is obligated to support her, he gains the right to annul her vows. This is a novel concept, as generally, a husband's right to annul vows begins only upon marriage (nissu'in) and a father's right ends when his daughter becomes a bogeret.
Rabbi Eliezer's opinion in the Mishnah is that the obligation to support, which can kick in after 12 months for a na'arah (young girl) or 30 days for an almanah, grants the fiancé the right to annul vows, even before actual marriage. This contrasts with the opinion of the Hachamim (Sages), who hold that the right to annul vows only begins with actual marriage. The Hachamim do not link support obligations with the right of annulment.
Rabbah connects Rabbi Eliezer's view to an earlier Mishnah in Tractate Ketubot. That Mishnah states that a betrothed girl (betulah) is given 12 months to prepare for her wedding, after which her fiancé becomes obligated to support her, and she is permitted to eat terumah (priestly tithes) from his household. Normally, an engaged girl cannot eat terumah due to two rabbinic decrees: concern she might take it home to her non-Kohen brothers, and concern that a hidden blemish (mum) might retroactively invalidate the engagement. However, after 12 months, these concerns are mitigated: she typically moves into her own dwelling, and the fiancé is presumed to have checked for blemishes. The Mishnah in Ketubot, which permits her to eat terumah after 12 months, is attributed by Rabbah to Rabbi Eliezer of our Mishnah.
The linkage is as follows: The Sages would typically maintain their decrees even when the initial reasons are no longer fully applicable. The fact that they permit eating terumah after 12 months suggests that they found another Torah-level leniency that treats the couple as if they are already married. This leniency, Rabbah argues, is the right of the fiancé to annul vows, as stated by Rabbi Eliezer. If the fiancé has the right to annul vows (a Torah-level right that usually applies only to a married husband), then it makes sense that the Sages would also be lenient regarding terumah, setting aside their rabbinic decrees.
The Gemara challenges this linkage. It argues that the leniency regarding terumah, which is a rabbinic decree, might not be dependent on a Torah-level leniency like annulment of vows. Perhaps the Sages were lenient about terumah after 12 months simply because the reasons for their decree no longer applied, without needing a parallel leniency in annulment. Conversely, perhaps Rabbi Eliezer's leniency regarding annulment is based on a different logic, such as the principle that "any woman who vows, vows with her husband's consent" (kol ha-noderet al da'at ba'alah noderet), and this "consent" kicks in once the husband begins supporting her. This logic for annulment does not necessarily imply leniency regarding terumah, where rabbinic decrees might still be maintained due to remaining potential concerns (e.g., imperfect checking for blemishes, or not always having a separate apartment). Therefore, the Gemara concludes that these two topics cannot be definitively linked to the same author.
The Ran then discusses a novel interpretation by some Rishonim who, based on the principle of "any woman who vows, vows with her husband's consent," extended this concept. They suggested that if a person makes a vow "with the consent of my friend," then that friend should be able to annul the vow, just as a husband annuls his wife's vow without needing a Sage (Hacham). The Ran vehemently rejects this, calling it a mistake (shegagah). He explains that the principle "any woman who vows, vows with her husband's consent" is not a general rule that can be applied to any friend. Rather, it is an explanation for why the Torah specifically granted a husband the unique right to annul his wife's vows. The Torah did not grant such a right to a friend or any other third party. Therefore, only a husband or father can annul vows without a Sage; otherwise, one must approach a Sage for annulment.