In the Eri B. Sitt Edition, we are beginning three, four, five, and six lines from the bottom. A person should not say to his wife on Shabbat the same words that he uses during the week. Although we concluded that one may annul a vow on Shabbat, he should use a different expression.
What should he say? “Take it and eat,” “take it and drink,” or “let her use these utensils.” Suppose she made a vow related to Shabbat—for example, that she would not eat. He should simply say, “Take it and eat.” If she vowed not to drink, he should say, “Take it and drink.” In this way, he is annulling the vow.
Rabbi Hanan says that he must also nullify the vow in his heart. Even though he is using this indirect expression, he must have the intention in his heart to nullify the vow. The combination of the words he says and the nullification in his heart creates the annulment.
Let us look at the Ran. The Ran begins four lines after the wide lines with the question: What is the reason that we require him to change his language? Do not think that we require the husband to change his language because of a rabbinic decree. What would that decree be? Perhaps, if we allowed the husband to annul vows, she might mistakenly go to a sage to have her vow released.
That cannot be the reason. We learned on the previous page that with regard to vows connected to Shabbat, one is permitted to go to a sage. Here, too, the vow she made concerns Shabbat: she is not eating or drinking. Therefore, the reason we require a change of language is not a decree intended to prevent her from going to a sage, because in this case she may in fact go to a sage. Rather, the reason is simply that since he can change his wording, we prefer that he do so. Even with this wording, the vow will be nullified.
Returning to the Gemara, we have a teaching: On Shabbat, it is sufficient for him to nullify the vow in his heart, whereas during the week he must express it verbally. This is referring to the case we mentioned earlier, where he says, “Take it and eat.” Beit Shammai says that on Shabbat he must nullify it in his heart, while during the week he must verbalize it.
The point is not that during the week he must specifically say, “It is annulled for you.” We have just learned that he may say, “Take it and eat,” and that is sufficient. The meaning is that whatever language he normally uses during the week, he should change on Shabbat. The language he uses during the week is already an effective expression; on Shabbat, however, he should use another expression and supplement it with the intention in his heart.
We can summarize three points. First, one may annul a vow on Shabbat. Second, one should change from his usual wording. Third, whatever wording he uses must be an effective expression. If he uses a strong expression of annulment during the week, that expression works. On Shabbat, however, he should use a different expression.
Rabbi Yohanan says: If a sage uses the language of a husband, or if a husband uses the language of a sage, he has said nothing. There is a specific expression that the husband uses when he annuls vows: “It is annulled for you.” The sage, when releasing a vow, uses the expression, “It is permitted for you.” The rule is that the sage must use the language of permission, while the husband must use the language of annulment.
The Ran explains that when the sage says, “It is annulled for you,” he is using the husband’s language, and when the husband says, “It is permitted for you,” he is using the sage’s language. Neither has accomplished anything.
Why is this so? The word “annulled” is written in the Torah in connection with the husband. The verse says that he may not make his words ineffective, whereas another person may do so. The sage can take something that was forbidden and make it permitted. In other words, he can transform what was prohibited into something ordinary and permitted. That is why the Yerushalmi explains that when the sage says, “It is permitted for you,” he is saying that there is no longer a vow and no longer an oath.
The husband, however, does not make the vow permitted in that way. He annuls it. As we say today, the husband is annulling the vow from that point onward, whereas the sage is releasing it and making it permitted. Therefore, the sage must use the language of permission, and the husband must use the language of annulment. Each one has to use the expression assigned to his authority.
This distinction is derived from a teaching. The verse says, “This is the matter.” From here we learn that the sage releases a vow, whereas the husband does not release it. The Gemara asks: Perhaps the opposite should also be true. If a sage, who does not annul vows, has the authority to release them, then a husband, who does annul vows, should certainly have the authority to release them as well.
The answer is that the verse comes to limit their respective powers. The sage releases vows but does not annul them. The husband annuls vows but does not release them. Each one acts only within the authority granted to him.
Another teaching states the matter in the opposite direction: The husband annuls, but the sage does not annul. One might have thought that if a husband, who cannot release a vow, can annul it, then a sage, who can release a vow, should certainly be able to annul it. The verse “This is the matter” teaches that the two authorities remain distinct: the husband annuls, and the sage releases.
The Gemara then asks why the verse says, “This is the matter.” In the portion of vows, in Bamidbar, chapter 30, verse 2, the portion begins with these words. Later, in Vayikra, chapter 17, the laws of slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard also contain the expression, “This is the matter.” Those laws concern an animal that is brought as an offering. It must be slaughtered inside the Temple courtyard; if someone slaughters it outside, he violates the prohibition of slaughtering outside. The two passages concern entirely different laws, but both contain the phrase “This is the matter.” Perhaps the two passages can be linked.
The teaching therefore says: The expression appears here, and it appears there. Just as the laws of slaughtering outside apply to Aaron, his sons, and all the Jewish people, so too the law of releasing vows applies to all of them. The verse there says that Moses spoke to Aaron, to his sons, and to all the Jewish people. This teaches that everyone is included in the law.
What does that mean? It means that anyone is qualified to release another person’s vows—not only Aaron, his descendants, or scholars, but even an ordinary Israelite. An ordinary person is able to release someone else’s vow. We will still have to determine how many people are required, but the individuals themselves need not be scholars.
The Gemara asks: The passage concerning vows says, “The heads of the tribes.” If the verse mentions the leaders, perhaps some special level of authority is required. Why should the parallel passage teach that ordinary people are qualified?
Rabbah bar Yaakov answers that the verse comes to qualify three ordinary people. Three ordinary people are sufficient; one does not need three scholars.
Now we must clarify what is meant by “ordinary people.” It does not mean people who understand nothing. If one explains the matter to them and they understand what is being explained, they may serve in this capacity. They may not be able to derive the law independently or teach it to others, but they can understand the procedure once it is explained to them.
The Ran points out that the comparison between the two passages is not exact in every respect. With regard to slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard, even a completely ignorant person is liable if he slaughters an offering outside. In that area, the law applies to everyone without regard to his level of understanding. Therefore, when we establish a comparison between the passages, we cannot say that any person whatsoever may release vows. The ordinary people involved in releasing vows must at least be capable of understanding what is explained to them.
Thus, the analogy remains valid, but each area follows its own rules. The comparison teaches that ordinary people may be involved in releasing vows, but it does not mean that someone who cannot understand the procedure may do so. The ordinary person in the laws of vows is someone who can understand when the matter is explained to him.
The Gemara then asks: The verse says that Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes. That sounds as though intelligent and learned people are required. How can the Gemara say that three ordinary people are sufficient?
Rav Chisda answers that there are two different possibilities. If one wants to use three people, they may be ordinary people who understand the matter once it is explained to them. If one wants to use only one person, that individual must be an expert. The phrase “the heads of the tribes” teaches the law of one expert, while the comparison to the other passage teaches that three ordinary people are also acceptable.
The Ran explains that the wording “the heads of the tribes” implies that one ordinary person is not sufficient. However, one expert is sufficient. Since the comparison between the passages broadens the law and allows ordinary people to serve, three ordinary people may be used. The two teachings coexist in this way: three ordinary people are sufficient, while a single person must be an expert.
One might ask why two people are not sufficient. Once we know that one person is not enough unless he is an expert, there is no source for using two people. The next number that makes sense is three, since three is the ordinary number associated with a court. This does not necessarily mean that the release of vows is a formal court, because we learned that it may be done at night, and other aspects of the procedure also differ from an ordinary court. Nevertheless, three is the logical number established by this reasoning.
At this point, we have proved that three ordinary people may release a vow, provided that they understand the matter once it is explained to them. We derived the number three through reasoning: one person must be an expert, and since two has no independent source, the next number is three.
The Gemara then derives another point from the same comparison. If one can ask a sage to release a vow, can one also ask a sage to release something that was consecrated? Suppose a person consecrated an animal and later regretted doing so. Could he go to a sage and have the consecration revoked retroactively?
If so, consider a person who consecrated an animal and then mistakenly slaughtered it outside the Temple courtyard. Ordinarily, he would be liable for slaughtering outside. But perhaps he could go to a sage, have the consecration revoked retroactively, and say that the animal was never consecrated. If it was not consecrated, perhaps slaughtering it outside would not be subject to that prohibition.
This is one of the applications of the phrase “the heads of the tribes.” It teaches that one expert may be used, and that expert may be needed in the laws of consecrated property in order to revoke the consecration.
The Gemara discusses the principle that a person can ask about an act of consecration and have it undone retroactively. It then considers the position of Beit Shammai. Beit Shammai holds that one cannot ask for the release of a consecration. The question is: What does Beit Shammai do with the comparison between the phrase “This is the matter” in the portion of vows and the same phrase in the laws of slaughtering outside?
Beit Shammai does not accept that comparison. Therefore, Beit Shammai is not required to use the parallel passage to establish the law concerning consecration. But another question remains: If Beit Shammai does not use the comparison, what does the phrase “This is the matter” teach in the portion of vows?
The answer is the principle we learned earlier. The phrase limits each authority to its own function. The sage releases a vow but does not annul it, while the husband annuls a vow but does not release it. The husband uses the language of annulment, and the sage uses the language of permission. Beit Shammai derives that distinction from the phrase “This is the matter,” even though he does not derive the law of releasing consecrated property from a comparison to the other passage.
The other sages use the phrase for both purposes. They derive the distinction between annulment and release from it, and they also use the comparison between the two passages to establish that three ordinary people may release vows. That comparison is significant because the source in the laws of slaughtering outside explicitly includes Aaron, his sons, and all the Jewish people. From there we learn that the law of releasing vows is not restricted to scholars.
Beit Shammai must therefore explain the phrase in the other passage differently. He uses it to limit the law of slaughtering outside to animals that are slaughtered in the ordinary manner. This excludes certain birds that were brought to the Temple and slaughtered with a fingernail or thumb rather than with a conventional slaughtering procedure. Although this act is comparable to slaughtering, it is not included in the laws of slaughtering outside because the verse says, “This is the matter.”
The other sages respond that the verse already contains the word “slaughtering,” so the additional phrase is not needed for that exclusion. They can therefore use it for the comparison between the passages.
The Gemara then asks how we know the number of people required for the release of vows. The discussion refers to another passage in which Moses speaks to the Jewish people about the appointed festivals. Some versions identify that passage differently, but the point is that the festivals are discussed in the section concerning the appointed times. That passage includes the festivals but does not present Shabbat in precisely the same way, and it does not include the laws of vows as part of that subject.
Rav Asi ben Nathan was troubled by this teaching. He went to Nehardea to find Rav Sheshet, but Rav Sheshet was not there. He then went to Mehoza, where he found Rav Sheshet, and asked him what the teaching meant when it said that the appointed times are mentioned, but that the original Shabbat is not mentioned with them.
Rav Sheshet answered that Shabbat is in fact written in the relevant passage. In Vayikra, chapter 23, the passage concerning the appointed times also mentions Shabbat. Furthermore, the passage concerning vows is written immediately afterward, in the portion of Matot. Therefore, it cannot mean literally that Shabbat or vows are absent from the surrounding passage.
Rather, the meaning is that Shabbat and the appointed times differ with regard to their sanctification. The sanctity of the appointed times depends on a court. The court sanctifies the month, and through the sanctification of the month, the appointed times are sanctified. As the teaching in Rosh Hashanah explains, the verse says, “They”—read as “you,” referring to the court. The court sanctifies the month and thereby sanctifies the festivals. This is reflected in the blessing, “Who sanctifies Israel and the appointed times”: first Israel is sanctified through the court, and then the appointed times are sanctified.
Shabbat is different. Its sanctity does not depend on a court. No court is needed to declare the seventh day holy. Shabbat becomes holy automatically. That is why the blessing says, “Who sanctifies Shabbat,” rather than “Who sanctifies Israel and Shabbat.”
Thus, when the teaching says that Shabbat is not mentioned with the appointed times, it does not mean that Shabbat is absent from the passage. It means that Shabbat is not mentioned there for the purpose of teaching that its sanctity depends on a court. Shabbat is written in the passage, but its sanctification follows a different law.
The same distinction applies to vows. The laws of vows are written near the laws of the appointed times, but they do not share the same requirements. The appointed times require expert authorities to sanctify the month and establish the festivals. Vows, however, may be released by three ordinary people who understand the matter when it is explained to them.
The passage concerning the appointed times requires authorities of the caliber of Moses and Aaron—experts, and according to the discussion, authorities with a received chain of ordination extending back to Moses. The laws of vows do not require that level of authority. Three ordinary people are sufficient, or one expert may be used.
The Ran returns to the question of how we know that three ordinary people are sufficient. According to Beit Hillel, the comparison with the laws of slaughtering outside provides the answer. Beit Shammai does not accept that comparison. The teaching says that the original Shabbat is not mentioned together with the appointed times, and we initially understood that to mean that it is not written in the same passage. The Gemara then demonstrates that it is written there, and explains that the intended meaning is that Shabbat has a different law of sanctification.
Similarly, the laws of vows are written adjacent to the laws of the appointed times, but they are not included in the same legal category. The appointed times require sanctification by a court, whereas Shabbat is sanctified automatically and vows may be released by three ordinary people.
The Ran explains that the word “these” in the passage concerning the appointed times serves to exclude Shabbat and vows from that specific requirement. “These” refers to the appointed times and teaches that their sanctification requires experts. Shabbat does not require a court, and vows do not require experts when three qualified ordinary people are used.
The Gemara then asks: What do we do with the expression “the heads of the tribes”? We have just said that three ordinary people are sufficient, but this expression appears to indicate a higher level of authority. The answer is that the two sources refer to two different arrangements. If three people are used, they may be ordinary people who understand the matter. If only one person is used, he must be an expert.
The Ran initially suggests that perhaps the single expert must have the same level as the experts required for sanctifying the appointed times. Since the appointed times require authorities with a chain of ordination, perhaps one person releasing a vow would also need to be formally ordained in that manner.
However, the Ran explains that this is not necessary. The wording “the heads of the tribes” does not necessarily imply a formally ordained authority of the same level as those who sanctify the appointed times. It implies a person who is an expert—someone who can study and understand the matter independently. He does not have to possess the same status as the authorities required for the sanctification of the appointed times.
This resolves the apparent contradiction. Three people who understand the procedure once it is explained to them are sufficient. If one person acts alone, he must be an expert who can understand the matter independently. The single expert does not need to be formally ordained through an unbroken chain reaching back to Moses.
The Ran notes that the requirement is relative to the generation. A person need not be an expert by an absolute standard applicable to every generation. He must possess recognized standing and expertise in his own generation. If he is accepted as a distinguished and established authority, he is considered qualified to release vows.
Accordingly, the discussion does not mean that only scholars with ancient ordination can release vows. It means that when one person acts alone, he must be a recognized expert. When three people act together, they may be ordinary people, provided that they can understand the matter when it is explained to them.
We can now summarize the entire discussion. Beit Shammai derives the law of three ordinary people from the contrast between the appointed times and the laws of vows. The word “these” teaches that the appointed times require experts, while the vows mentioned nearby do not. The phrase “the heads of the tribes” teaches that one person may also release a vow, but that person must be an expert.
Therefore, there are two possible arrangements. Three ordinary people who understand the matter may release a vow. Alternatively, one recognized expert may do so alone. The three people do not need to be experts, and the single expert does not need the special level of formal ordination required for sanctifying the appointed times.