The Eri B. Sitt Edition, an audio series on the Talmud Bavli. We are beginning several lines down, with the statement: “Rabbi Hanina said.”
We already know the law that if a husband hears his wife’s vow during the day and says nothing, and nightfall arrives, his silence is considered ratification. Therefore, the vow takes effect. We now discuss a husband who remained silent, but not with the intention of ratifying the vow. He remained silent out of spite, in order to needle his wife.
In other words, he wants to give his wife the impression that she cannot intimidate him. She is making a big issue of the vow, and he responds by saying nothing, as though to convey, “If you want to make such a fuss, that is fine.” In his mind, however, he does not want the vow to take effect; he is merely trying to provoke her. The day passes, and the question is whether this kind of silence is considered ratification.
The Gemara states: “Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he remained silent in order to needle his wife, intending eventually to annul the vow, his silence is not ratification.” He wants her to think that he is going to ratify the vow, but he intends to annul it later. The clock does not stop, and he may still annul the vow even ten days later. Since his silence was not ordinary silence but silence with a specific intention behind it, the passing of the day does not matter.
Rava challenges this. Are you telling me that not all silence is the same? Is there one kind of silence that ratifies the vow and another kind that does not?
The Gemara raises a teaching concerning the transfer of authority from the husband to the father. We have learned many times that when a young woman is betrothed, both her father and her husband have authority over her vows. If the husband dies, that authority can return to the father, but only in certain circumstances.
When does the authority return to the father? When the husband did not hear the vow; when he heard it and remained silent but died that same day, so that his silence never became effective ratification; or when he heard the vow and annulled it, leaving only the father’s annulment to be performed. In all of those cases, the husband’s authority did not become final.
However, if the husband heard the vow and ratified it, or if he heard it, remained silent, and died the following day, the law is that the ratification is effective because he lived through the entire day. Once the husband’s ratification takes effect, the father can no longer annul the vow.
Rava asks: When you told me that a husband who heard the vow, remained silent, and died the following day had ratified it, you did not distinguish between different types of silence. Even if he remained silent in order to needle his wife, you are still saying that his silence is considered ratification when he dies the next day. Therefore, the authority should not return to the father.
The Gemara answers that the case is one in which he remained silent with the intention of needling his wife. Since he intended eventually to annul the vow, one might have thought that his silence should not count as ratification. Nevertheless, because he died the following day, his ratification takes effect, and the authority does not return to the father.
But the Gemara objects: We already have a case in which the husband heard the vow and ratified it. If the phrase “he heard and remained silent” refers to ordinary silence, then it is the same case as “he heard and ratified.” It must therefore refer to a new situation: he heard the vow and remained silent in order to needle his wife. Yet even in that case, you say that if he dies the following day, his silence is considered ratification.
Rava’s challenge is therefore that the teaching appears to establish that silence intended merely to provoke one’s wife is nevertheless effective ratification.
The Gemara answers: The case is one of ordinary, unqualified silence. The husband did not intend either to ratify or to annul the vow; he simply remained silent without any particular intention. The novelty of the teaching is that ordinary silence is also considered ratification once the husband dies the following day.
Thus, we have an explicit case of a husband who ratifies the vow immediately, and another case in which he remains silent without deciding anything. The novelty is that the second case is also considered ratification after the day has passed. But with regard to silence intended to needle his wife, there is no proof from this teaching. On the contrary, when the husband remains silent in order to provoke her, the clock remains open, and he can still annul the vow later.
The Ran explains that we originally thought the phrase “he heard, remained silent, and died the following day” referred even to a husband who remained silent in order to needle his wife. The wording seems broad: if he heard the vow, remained silent, and died that day, he could not annul it because the day had ended. This would imply that every type of silence, even silence intended to needle, becomes ratification.
But if the phrase “he heard and remained silent” refers to a husband who remained silent with the intention of ratifying the vow, then that is essentially the same as “he heard and ratified.” A person does not have to wait until the end of the day to ratify a vow. If, at two o’clock in the afternoon, he hears the vow and decides in his heart to ratify it, the ratification takes effect immediately.
Therefore, the Ran explains that the phrase “he heard and remained silent” must refer to a husband who remained silent in order to needle his wife. This would seem to show that such silence is also ratification.
The Gemara rejects this and returns to the earlier answer: the case is one of ordinary silence. He remained silent without intending either to ratify the vow or to needle his wife. He simply did not decide what to do, and then he died the next day. The novelty is that ordinary silence becomes ratification once the day has passed. There is still no proof concerning silence intended to provoke one’s wife.
We now turn to another teaching: “There is a stringency associated with ratification over annulment, and a stringency associated with annulment over ratification.” Each side has a feature that is more stringent than the other.
Ratification is more stringent in that silence is enough to ratify a vow, whereas silence is not enough to annul it. If a husband remains silent, even while intending in his heart to annul the vow, the vow is not annulled. To annul it, he must actually express the annulment.
Ratification in one’s heart is also effective. If a husband decides in his heart that the vow is ratified, the ratification takes effect. Annulment in one’s heart, however, is not effective. A husband cannot merely think that the vow is annulled and thereby annul it.
There is an important qualification. This applies when he says nothing at all. As we learned on the previous page, if a wife says, “I will not eat,” and the husband says to her, “Take food and eat,” that statement can constitute annulment if he intends it as annulment. The words may be indirect or somewhat vague, but the intention in his heart can combine with the spoken words to make the annulment effective.
Thus, annulment in the heart alone is ineffective, but a spoken statement, even an indirect one, can combine with the intention in his heart and make the annulment valid.
The Ran asks how we know that annulment cannot be performed solely in one’s heart and must be expressed verbally. He answers that we derive this from the law of silence. If a husband remains silent throughout the day, until sunset, the vow becomes ratified. Why is he given the entire day? The verse says, “On the day that he hears it.” Since the day passed and he did not annul the vow, it becomes clear that he wants the vow to remain in effect.
This teaches that merely wanting the vow to remain in effect in one’s heart is not enough to create immediate ratification. The husband is given the entire day because he may still change his mind. Perhaps he is going back and forth, considering whether to annul the vow. Once nightfall arrives and he has said nothing, his silence demonstrates that he wants the vow to remain in effect.
There are therefore two ways in which ratification can take effect. A husband may allow the clock to run until the end of the day. In that case, the vow becomes effective only at sunset, because the passing of the day demonstrates that he did not intend to annul it. Alternatively, he may ratify the vow in his heart during the day, in which case the ratification takes effect immediately. He has, so to speak, moved the clock forward by making his intention clear.
That is how we know that ratification can take effect through intention in the heart. Annulment, by contrast, requires either an explicit statement or words that, together with his intention, clearly constitute annulment.
Another distinction is that once a person ratifies a vow, he cannot change his mind. He cannot say afterward, “I now want to annul it.” Once the vow has been ratified, it is locked in. The Ran points out that in this respect the two sides are parallel: once a person commits himself to one of the two options, the matter is settled.
The Gemara returns to the original issue. We were told that silence produces ratification. What kind of silence is being discussed? Perhaps it refers even to silence intended to needle one’s wife. If so, this would prove that such silence is ratification.
The Gemara answers that the case is one in which the husband remained silent with the intention of ratifying the vow. The Gemara then asks: What is new about that? That is simply the rule of ratification in one’s heart. If he remained silent because he had already decided in his heart to ratify the vow, then the ratification is effective immediately.
Therefore, the Gemara returns to the earlier answer: one case is ordinary silence, and the other case is a husband who decided in his heart to ratify the vow. The two cases are needed because one teaches that ordinary silence becomes ratification after the day passes, while the other teaches that ratification in one’s heart is effective immediately.
The Gemara then asks where we find the opposite stringency—where annulment is more stringent than ratification. Rabbi Ḥanan explains that after a person annuls a vow, he cannot ask a Torah scholar to reverse that annulment. The vow is gone, and there is nothing left to submit for reconsideration.
By contrast, if a person ratifies a vow, he cannot reverse it on his own, but he can ask a Torah scholar to release him from the ratification. This is a stringency of annulment over ratification: annulment is final, whereas ratification can be released through the procedure of asking a Torah scholar.
The Gemara continues to challenge the position that silence intended to needle one’s wife does not count as ratification. A verse states that if the husband remains silent on the day that he hears the vow, the vow is ratified. The verse repeats the idea of silence several times. One reference teaches that if he remains silent until the end of the day, he loses the ability to annul the vow. What does the other reference teach?
Perhaps it teaches that even silence intended to needle his wife results in ratification. If the husband remains silent with the intention of pretending that he will ratify the vow, and sunset arrives, perhaps the verse teaches that the vow nevertheless takes effect.
The Gemara answers that the repeated wording may instead be referring to ordinary silence. One reference teaches that silence without a specific intention becomes ratification at the end of the day, while another teaches a different form of silence. The Gemara ultimately points out that there are three expressions of silence in the verse, allowing the three cases to be distinguished: silence with the intention of ratifying, ordinary silence, and silence intended to needle one’s wife.
The Ran makes an important observation. Whenever the Gemara uses the expression “he ratified in his heart,” there are two possible meanings, depending on the context. It may mean that he decided immediately, during the day, that he wanted the vow to remain in effect. Alternatively, it may refer to a husband who remained silent until sunset, at which point his silence demonstrated his intention.
In this verse, the expression refers to the second situation, because the verse is teaching that the husband has the entire day to annul the vow. If he had decided in his heart to ratify it immediately, the vow would already have been ratified, and there would be no reason to wait until sunset. The verse is therefore discussing a husband who has not yet expressed himself and whose silence becomes ratification only when the day ends.
The conclusion is that if a woman makes a vow and her husband says, “I am going to trick my wife a little,” remaining silent so that she will think the vow has taken effect, then once the next day arrives, the vow is ratified. The husband has lost his right to annul it. This conclusion is supported by a verse.
Ordinarily, once the Gemara reaches a conclusive refutation, the discussion would end. Here, however, the Gemara presents another conclusive refutation. The reason, as explained, is that even if someone were to find an answer to the first refutation, the second one would remain. The Gemara is therefore giving a double refutation.
Rava then raises another challenge from a Mishnah that we learned a few days ago. The Mishnah discusses a vow made at twilight, close to the end of the day. The husband must annul it before nightfall. If he does not annul it before nightfall, he has missed the opportunity.
Why must the husband annul the vow before nightfall? The case should not be worse than that of a husband who remains silent in order to needle his wife. If such a husband still has ten days in which to annul the vow, then a husband who remains silent at twilight should also retain the ability to annul it later.
The Mishnah teaches that even if the vow is unrelated to Shabbat, the husband may annul it on Shabbat when the time is about to expire. Normally, one would not annul on Shabbat a vow that has no relevance to Shabbat. For example, if the woman makes a vow not to eat something or not to use cosmetics, that has nothing to do with Shabbat. Nevertheless, since the husband will lose the ability to annul the vow if he waits until nightfall, he is permitted to annul it on Shabbat.
The Gemara asks why this special permission is necessary. Let the husband simply remain silent because the rabbis do not permit him to annul such a vow on Shabbat. His silence should not be worse than the silence of a husband who remains silent in order to needle his wife. He does not want to ratify the vow; he is silent only because he has no choice.
The fact that the rabbis permit him to annul the vow on Shabbat indicates that ordinary silence, for whatever reason, becomes ratification once the day ends. Since the husband would otherwise be forced to remain silent and lose the vow, the rabbis grant him permission to annul it on Shabbat. This supports the conclusion that silence intended to needle one’s wife also becomes ratification.
The Gemara accepts this challenge as another conclusive refutation.
Rav Ashi raises a further challenge. Suppose a husband knows that his wife has made vows, but he does not know that the law gives him the ability to annul them. He knows about the vows but has never learned the laws of annulment. In that case, the day on which he hears the vow does not begin the clock. The clock begins only on the day that he learns that he has the ability to annul the vow.
For example, a year later he attends a class and learns that a husband has the right to annul his wife’s vows. At that point, the day begins, and he has until sunset to annul the vows.
There is another case. The husband knows the law of annulment and knows that his wife made a vow, but he does not know that this particular vow qualifies for annulment. Not every vow made by a wife can be annulled by her husband. Rabbi Meir says that he may no longer annul it, whereas the Sages say that he may still annul it.
The Gemara asks: Why should the Sages allow him to annul the vow? He should not be worse than a husband who remained silent in order to needle his wife. If the latter’s vow remains open, then this husband’s vow should also remain open. He was silent because he did not know that the vow could be annulled. He certainly did not intend to ratify it.
The Gemara begins from the principle that the day of hearing does not begin until the husband knows the laws of annulment. In the second case, however, he knew the laws of annulment and knew that his wife had made a vow. He simply did not know that this particular vow belonged to the category that could be annulled.
Rabbi Meir says that he cannot annul it because the day of hearing began when he knew that he had the power to annul his wife’s vows. The Sages say that he can still annul it because, until he knew that this particular vow qualified, it is as though he had not yet properly heard it.
The Gemara applies this to the case of silence intended to needle one’s wife. If such silence leaves the vow open, why does Rabbi Meir say that the husband cannot annul the vow? The husband remained silent only because he did not know that he had the ability to annul it. His silence should not be worse than that of a husband who remained silent in order to needle his wife.
The Gemara answers that the question applies not only to Rabbi Meir but even to the Sages. The Sages disagree with Rabbi Meir only about whether the day of hearing began. They maintain that since the husband did not know that this particular vow was subject to annulment, the day of hearing had not yet begun. But they agree that once a person has properly heard a vow and remains silent, his silence is ratification.
This is the third conclusive refutation concerning silence intended to needle one’s wife. The Ran therefore concludes that the established law is that ordinary silence is ratification, and the husband can annul the vow only during the day on which he hears it. If he remains silent with the intention of ratifying the vow, the ratification takes effect immediately, and he can no longer annul it.
We now begin the eleventh and final chapter of Massechet Nedarim: “These are the vows that he may annul.” We will now discuss which types of vows a husband may annul for his wife. Not every vow is subject to annulment. The Mishnah identifies the categories of vows that are subject to it.
The first category consists of vows that cause her personal suffering. The Gemara will explain what this includes. For example, if she vows not to eat or not to drink, and the vow causes her pain, it is subject to annulment.
The Ran adds that private matters affecting the relationship between husband and wife are also subject to annulment. The Mishnah then discusses the husband’s authority regarding his daughter and explains that vows that do not involve personal suffering may also be annulled in certain circumstances, whether they concern the daughter herself or other people. We will see in the Gemara what those distinctions mean.
By contrast, when the vow involves a matter between the husband and wife, the husband’s right of annulment is limited. The Gemara will clarify exactly what that limitation is.
The Rambam has an important position on this matter. He maintains that a father can annul all of his daughter’s vows. He does not distinguish between vows involving personal suffering and vows that do not. According to the Rambam, every vow made by a daughter is subject to the father’s annulment.
The Rambam was asked how he could rule this way in light of the Sifrei. The Sifrei states that just as a husband’s power to annul his wife’s vows is limited to vows involving personal suffering, the father’s power to annul his daughter’s vows is also limited to that category.
The Rambam answers that the Babylonian Talmud does not cite that teaching of the Sifrei. Since the Babylonian Talmud omits it, the Rambam understands that it disagrees with the Sifrei. He therefore rules against the other authorities and maintains that a father may annul all of his daughter’s vows. He agrees, however, that with respect to a wife, the husband may annul only vows involving personal suffering and matters between the husband and wife.
The Mishnah gives examples such as a woman saying, “If I wash, or if I do not wash,” or “If I apply cosmetics, or if I do not apply cosmetics.” The Ran explains that the reference to cosmetics is to cosmetics applied to the face. The Sages consider a vow not to apply such cosmetics to be a vow involving personal suffering, since it causes her distress.
There is another type of beautification, involving the removal of hair from below the face. That is considered a matter between the husband and wife rather than personal suffering. The husband may annul it because it affects the relationship between them, not because the vow itself causes her personal suffering.
Rabbi Yosef says that the vows mentioned in the Mishnah are not necessarily vows involving personal suffering. Rather, they are matters between the husband and wife. The vows involving personal suffering are a separate category.
For example, if a woman declares that she is forbidding herself from eating all fruit in the world, that is a vow involving personal suffering, and her husband can annul it. There is no practical way for her to live her entire life without eating any kind of fruit.
However, if she says that she will not eat fruit from a particular country, the husband cannot annul the vow. He can bring her fruit from another country. Since she can obtain fruit elsewhere, this is not considered personal suffering.
Similarly, if she says that she will not eat fruit purchased from a particular shopkeeper, the husband cannot annul the vow, because she can obtain fruit from another shopkeeper. But if that is the only shopkeeper who gives the husband credit, then he cannot obtain fruit elsewhere. In that case, her vow not to use that shopkeeper causes personal suffering, and the husband may annul it.
The Gemara asks why Rabbi Yosef’s name appears both at the beginning and at the end of the Mishnah. It also asks about the case involving fruit from a particular country. It cannot be referring to the country in which the couple lives, because if she vows not to eat fruit in the country where they live, that would cause personal suffering. The husband would not be expected to obtain fruit from another country.
The Ran therefore explains that she must be referring to fruit from another country. The husband can obtain fruit from the country in which they live, so the vow does not cause personal suffering.
The Gemara now begins: “Only vows involving personal suffering may he annul.” This implies that vows that do not involve personal suffering may not be annulled. But we learned that the phrase “between a man and his wife” teaches that a husband may annul vows involving matters between him and his wife, even when they do not involve personal suffering.
The Gemara answers that both categories may be annulled. Vows involving personal suffering may be annulled permanently. Even after the couple divorces, the annulment remains effective.
Vows involving matters between the husband and wife, however, are annulled only for the duration of the marriage. Once they divorce, the matter is no longer between husband and wife, and the vow can return to its original status.
This creates an important distinction. A vow involving personal suffering is annulled permanently, whether she returns to the original husband or marries someone else. A vow involving matters between husband and wife is annulled only as long as the relationship remains relevant.
Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri teaches a related law. A man should annul his wife’s vows even when, while they are married, those vows have no practical effect because she is obligated to provide certain services to him. For example, if she vows that she will not serve him, the Sages might say that there is no need for annulment because she is already obligated to serve him.
Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri disagrees and says that the husband should annul such a vow. The reason is that they may later divorce, and she might then become prohibited to him if they wished to remarry. Once they divorce, the obligation that prevented the vow from taking effect while they were married no longer applies. If the husband had not annulled the vow, it could then take effect and prevent him from remarrying her.
The Gemara initially infers from this teaching that when the husband annuls a vow involving matters between husband and wife, the annulment took effect from the beginning and does not return after divorce. This would imply that even matters between husband and wife remain annulled after the divorce, contrary to the earlier distinction.
The Gemara rejects that inference. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri’s instruction may mean that when the husband divorces his wife, the annulment he performed earlier becomes fully effective from the beginning. The vow does not return. Thus, both categories may be permanently annulled, but the nature of the annulment differs.
With vows involving personal suffering, the annulment is permanently effective whether she returns to the original husband or marries someone else. The annulment does not depend on the husband’s continued relationship with her.
With matters between husband and wife, the annulment is relevant as long as there remains a possibility that they could return to one another. Even after divorce, if she has not remarried, the first husband could still potentially remarry her, so the matter remains connected to their relationship. Once she marries someone else, however, the first husband can no longer take her back. At that point, the matter is no longer between them, and the vow could return.
The Gemara ultimately explains the Mishnah accordingly: “These are the vows that he may annul, whether for himself or for others”—namely, vows involving personal suffering. Those vows are permanently annulled, whether she remains available to return to him or has married someone else.
The Ran explains that when the Mishnah says, “These are the vows that he may annul,” the simple meaning is that the annulment is permanent. It remains effective both for the husband himself and for others, meaning even if the woman later marries someone else. This is the essential distinction between vows involving personal suffering and vows involving matters between husband and wife.
Baruch Adonai.