In the Talmud Bavli edition and audio series, we are learning the sugya concerning the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Shmuel. The case involves a woman who makes vows concerning two different loaves of bread, declaring that she will not eat them. One loaf is edible white bread made from fine flour, while the other is black bread and not particularly appetizing. Thus, one vow seemingly causes her anguish, while the other does not.
According to Shmuel, the Torah says that a husband must annul an entire vow; he cannot annul only part of a vow. Since she made one vow concerning both loaves, the husband can obviously annul the portion that causes her anguish. However, because he cannot annul only part of a vow, he must also annul the portion concerning the bread that does not cause her anguish. We know that a husband may annul only vows that cause his wife a certain degree of anguish. Shmuel’s understanding is that one vow can be absorbed into the other: once the husband is annulling one part, he must annul the other as well because he must annul the complete package.
Rabbi Yohanan disagrees. The complete vow that the Torah requires him to annul means the entire vow over which the Torah grants him authority to annul. The Torah grants him authority over vows that cause anguish. Therefore, when he annuls a vow that causes anguish, he must annul that entire vow, but he has no authority to annul the portion concerning the black bread, which does not cause anguish.
This creates a difficulty for Rabbi Yohanan. According to him, the husband should annul only the vow that causes anguish. The Gemara raises a challenge from the following teaching: A woman accepts Nazirite status and violates it. She drinks wine, which is prohibited to a Nazirite, and becomes ritually impure through contact with the dead, which is also prohibited. She therefore receives the forty lashes for violating her Nazirite status. There is nothing novel about that ruling. The novelty appears in the next case: If her husband heard her vow of Nazirite status and annulled it, but she did not hear or realize that he had annulled it, and she nevertheless continued to act as a Nazirite, she does not receive lashes.
Obviously, there is no longer a vow, whether or not she knew that her husband had annulled it. The Gemara asks: If you are correct that a husband may annul only the portion that causes anguish but may not annul the portion that does not, perhaps when he annulled her Nazirite status, he annulled only the wine prohibition, since refraining from wine causes anguish. The other elements of Nazirite status, however, would remain in force. In addition to abstaining from wine, Nazirite status includes restrictions involving the grape seeds, skins, and other parts of the grape. There is no anguish in accepting a vow concerning those elements alone.
According to Rabbi Yohanan, which part of the Nazirite vow does the husband have authority to annul? Perhaps he annulled only the wine, which causes anguish, while the other prohibitions remained. If she then consumed the wine, the grape seeds, and the other prohibited elements, she should receive lashes for the portions that remained in force. What do we see from here? That the entire Nazirite status was annulled, even though only the wine prohibition causes anguish. This would seem to show that one cannot annul only the portion that causes anguish; one must annul everything.
Rav Yosef responds that Nazirite status is a special case. Nazirite status cannot be divided into portions. There is no such thing as half of a Nazirite status. In the case of an ordinary vow, I can say that one loaf is permitted while the other remains prohibited. But when it comes to Nazirite status, one cannot say, “I am permitting the wine, while the grape seeds and skins remain prohibited.” Nazirite status is not subject to division. As Rashi explains, when Rav Yosef says that Nazirite status cannot be divided, this means that if a woman accepted only the Nazirite prohibitions involving the grape seeds and skins, without accepting the prohibition against wine, her Nazirite status would not take effect. A person must accept the entire package.
When the Torah says that the husband shall annul the vow, it means the entire Nazirite status, including the wine, the grape seeds, and the skins. Therefore, one cannot bring a proof from Nazirite status to the case of two loaves of bread. In the case of the loaves, perhaps the husband annuls the loaf that causes anguish while the other loaf remains prohibited. Nazirite status is different because it cannot be divided.
Abaye then asks: If you are establishing the rule that Nazirite status cannot be divided, what about the offerings associated with Nazirite status? A person who completes the thirty-day period of Nazirite status brings three offerings. A person whose Nazirite status is interrupted by ritual impurity also brings offerings as atonement. Can the offering associated with Nazirite status be divided, even though the Nazirite status itself cannot?
The wording of the Gemara is also significant. It says that Nazirite status cannot be divided. This implies that Nazirite status itself cannot be divided, but perhaps the offering associated with it can be divided.
The Ran explains Abaye’s question. If the Gemara had said, “There is no Nazirite status that is partial,” that would imply that there is no partial Nazirite status and no offering for partial Nazirite status. But the Gemara says, “Nazirite status cannot be divided,” which suggests that the Nazirite status itself cannot be divided, while an offering associated with Nazirite status might nevertheless be brought for a partial period.
What would be the case? Suppose a woman counted fifteen days of her Nazirite status, and then her husband annulled it. The husband’s annulment takes effect from that point forward; it cuts off the remaining days but does not retroactively undo the days already counted. The question is whether she must bring the offerings that a person brings upon completing the thirty-day period, even though she counted only fifteen days.
Would she bring offerings for those fifteen days, as though she had completed the full period? Can we say that if a person counted half the period and then the husband annulled the remainder, she brings offerings for a partial count? The Gemara says that neither Nazirite status nor the offering associated with Nazirite status can be divided.
The Ran discusses a further case. Suppose the woman counted fifteen days, became ritually impure, and designated an animal for her offerings. Then, before she brought the offerings, her husband annulled her Nazirite status. Ordinarily, when a Nazirite becomes ritually impure, she must bring offerings. She brings three offerings: a sin offering, a burnt offering, and a guilt offering. In this case, however, the Ran says that she brings only the bird sin offering; she does not bring the bird burnt offering, nor does she bring the other offerings.
We must understand the distinction. When an ordinary Nazirite becomes ritually impure in the middle of the period, that does not end the Nazirite status. She must bring offerings for the impurity, become pure, and then begin counting again. Here, however, once the husband annuls the Nazirite status, there is no further Nazirite status. She does not have to continue counting. It therefore seems to be a partial Nazirite status, and yet the ruling says that she brings one of the offerings.
What does this mean? If there is no such thing as partial Nazirite status, and there is no offering for partial Nazirite status, she should bring nothing. If there is an offering for partial Nazirite status, she should bring all three offerings. Why does she bring only one?
The teaching states: A woman accepted Nazirite status, became ritually impure, and designated an animal as an offering. After she became impure, her husband annulled her Nazirite status. She brings the bird sin offering, but she does not bring the bird burnt offering or the other offerings. From the fact that she brings the bird sin offering, we know that she became ritually impure, because that offering is brought in the case of impurity associated with Nazirite status.
The Ran explains that although she designated the offerings, she does not bring the animal offerings. She brings only the bird sin offering. The question is that if she did not become ritually impure, and her husband merely annulled the remaining fifteen days, one could understand why she would have to bring the three offerings associated with completing the Nazirite period. But now that she became ritually impure, and the husband annulled the Nazirite status, perhaps she should bring the three offerings associated with that impurity. Why does she bring only one?
According to the way I initially explained it, the question is as follows: If she had not become impure, she would have to bring three offerings after counting fifteen days, because the annulment does not retroactively erase those fifteen days. Therefore, even though she became impure, perhaps she should also bring three offerings for the impurity. If the offering is being brought for a partial Nazirite status, there should be three offerings, whether we are speaking about the non-impurity side or the impurity side.
The Ran points out that she cannot bring the offerings immediately upon becoming impure. Ordinarily, when a Nazirite becomes impure, she must first become pure. She cannot bring the offerings while she is still impure. After she becomes pure, she brings the offerings and then continues the Nazirite process. Here, however, she will not continue the process because her husband annulled it. It is therefore truly a partial Nazirite status, and yet the teaching says that she brings one of the three offerings.
The Gemara answers that there is no such thing as an offering for partial Nazirite status. The reason she brings the bird sin offering is that a sin offering may be brought in a case of uncertainty. A sin offering is more lenient in this respect than the other offerings.
For example, when a woman gives birth, she ordinarily brings a sin offering. If she is uncertain whether she gave birth to a child or whether what emerged was merely an air sac, she nevertheless brings a sin offering because of the uncertainty. She may bring that offering even though the circumstances are uncertain. This shows that a sin offering is treated more leniently in this regard. Therefore, even here, although there is no partial Nazirite status and no offering for partial Nazirite status, she brings the bird sin offering because it can be brought in a case of uncertainty.
The Ran explains that there is no such thing as partial Nazirite status and no offering for partial Nazirite status. Nevertheless, since a sin offering may be brought in a case of uncertainty, she brings the bird sin offering. We are not as strict regarding that offering.
The way I explained the Gemara’s question was one interpretation of the Ran. I explained that if the offering exists, she should have to bring all three offerings. If she did not become impure, she would bring three offerings after the fifteen days. Therefore, if becoming impure creates a separate obligation, she should also bring three offerings on the impurity side. The Ran’s explanation is different. He says that if she had not become impure, she would have brought three offerings after the fifteen days. Once she became impure and her husband annulled the Nazirite status, however, the only reason she brings the bird sin offering is because a sin offering may be brought in a case of uncertainty.
Another point is that she cannot bring the offerings while she is still impure. Ordinarily, she would first become pure, bring the offerings, and then resume her Nazirite status. Here, there is no resumption because the husband annulled the vow. Therefore, we are dealing with partial Nazirite status, which does not exist. The bird sin offering is brought only because it is permitted in a case of uncertainty.
The Gemara then raises another challenge: A woman accepts Nazirite status, becomes ritually impure, and afterward her husband annuls the vow. She brings the bird sin offering but does not bring the bird burnt offering. If you say that the husband annuls only the portion that causes anguish and does not annul the portion that does not cause anguish, perhaps he annulled the wine prohibition because abstaining from wine causes anguish, but he did not annul the impurity prohibition. Becoming impure through contact with the dead does not cause anguish in the same way. It could therefore be that the impurity aspect remains in force. She should then still have Nazirite status with respect to impurity and should have to bring all the offerings associated with it.
In other words, the woman had Nazirite status, became impure, and her husband annulled the vow. The teaching says that she brings one offering out of the three. Why bring only one? Perhaps the husband annulled only the aspect involving wine, while the impurity aspect remains. If so, perhaps she still has a full-fledged Nazirite status with respect to impurity and should bring all the offerings.
Now I know what you might answer: There is no such thing as partial Nazirite status. We already dealt with that. But the Gemara could have given that answer. Instead, it gives another answer, and from that answer we derive an additional halachic point.
The Gemara’s assumption in the question was that the impurity aspect of Nazirite status does not cause anguish. The woman is declaring that she will not become impure through contact with the dead, and that seemingly is not a source of anguish. On the contrary, avoiding such impurity would appear to be beneficial.
The Gemara answers that refraining from becoming impure through contact with the dead also causes anguish. When a person goes to bury someone who has died, the living person must take the situation to heart. The person should recognize that one day others will eulogize him, cry for him, and bury him, just as he is now eulogizing, crying for, and burying someone else. If a woman accepts upon herself that she will not become impure through contact with the dead, she cannot participate in burying the dead or in the associated expressions of grief. That itself is a source of anguish.
Therefore, the husband has authority to annul the entire vow. This also explains why there is no difficulty from the fact that she brings only the bird sin offering: that offering is lenient and may be brought in a case of uncertainty.
What is the practical difference of this answer? If a woman makes a vow saying, “It is forbidden to me to go to a house of mourning,” her husband can annul that vow. Since she has accepted upon herself not to participate in a house of mourning, that causes anguish. It is therefore a vow that the husband may annul. This is different from the husband’s own status, because the husband is not the one who accepted the prohibition.
The Ran initially offers another possible answer. Perhaps the Gemara could not have answered simply that the impurity aspect of Nazirite status is a separate portion because there cannot be Nazirite status without the impurity component. But the Ran rejects that reasoning. We have already seen a form of Nazirite status that does not include the impurity prohibition: the case of a Nazirite like Samson. Samson was prohibited from wine but was permitted to become impure through contact with the dead. Since Nazirite status can exist without the impurity prohibition, one might argue that the impurity aspect can also exist independently.
The Ran therefore explains that the Gemara could not simply say that the impurity aspect cannot be separated from Nazirite status. Since the Nazirite status of Samson demonstrates that wine and impurity are not necessarily dependent upon each other, the Gemara instead explains that impurity itself causes anguish. That is why the husband can annul the entire vow.
In short, the Gemara could have answered that Nazirite status cannot be divided, but it gives this additional answer because it wants to correct the original premise of the question. The question assumed that avoiding impurity through contact with the dead does not cause anguish. The Gemara rejects that premise and teaches that it does cause anguish.
The Gemara then turns to another case. A woman says, “It is forbidden to me to benefit from people.” Her husband cannot annul this vow. At first glance, the reason might be that this is not a matter between husband and wife, or that it does not cause anguish. Let us examine the case.
The wording is: “It is forbidden to me to benefit from people.” This includes all benefits that people might provide. Even though we learned yesterday that Shmuel issued a very limited ruling—that even if a woman forbids one particular person to herself, the husband cannot annul the vow—the ruling is following the position of the Sages.
According to that approach, the category of benefits between husband and wife is treated differently from the category of benefits from other people. There is also a distinction between a prohibition that applies only while the marriage exists and one that remains after the marriage ends. If the vow concerns something between husband and wife, it remains prohibited forever, even if she is divorced and marries someone else. If it concerns something that applies only because of the present marriage, the prohibition ends when the marriage ends, and it can return if she marries the same person again.
Now the Mishnah says that although she may not benefit from people, she may still benefit from the gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and corners of the field. These are the portions that the poor are entitled to take.
The novelty of the Mishnah is that even though she said, “I will not benefit from people,” she may take these gifts from the field. Why? Because the people are not giving her anything. The verse says that the owner must leave these portions in the field. He does not have the right to decide which poor person will receive them. He must leave them there, and whoever arrives first may take them.
If the owner had the right to choose which person would receive the produce, then the recipient would be receiving a benefit from him. But here the owner is not giving the item to her. He is merely leaving it in the field, and she is taking it. Therefore, it is not considered that she received a benefit from the people.
The Mishnah then discusses another vow: “It is forbidden to me to benefit from the priests and the Levites.” The priests and Levites may nevertheless take the heave offering against her will. This means that although she vowed that the priests and Levites should not benefit from her, they may come and take the heave offering that belongs to them.
However, if she specifically says, “These particular priests and these particular Levites may not benefit from me,” then other priests and Levites may take the heave offering, but those whom she specifically named may not.
We must wait for the Gemara to explain this final case, because the Mishnah seems contradictory. In the first case, when she vows that she will not benefit from priests and Levites in general, the priests may come and take the heave offering. But taking the heave offering involves a benefit known as the benefit of designation. A person has the right to decide which priest will receive the heave offering. Thus, when she chooses a particular priest, that priest benefits from her choice. Why, then, may the priests take the offering if she vowed not to benefit them?
It seems that the first part of the Mishnah must hold that this benefit of designation is not considered a benefit. The heave offering already belongs to the priestly group. The fact that it reaches one particular priest rather than another does not mean that she gave him something of her own.
But then the final clause becomes difficult. The final clause says that if she specifically prohibits these priests and these Levites, other priests and Levites may take the heave offering, but the named priests may not. If the benefit of designation is not considered a benefit, why should the named priests be prohibited? Every priest should be able to take it. Thus, the Mishnah appears to explain the benefit of designation one way in the first clause and another way in the final clause. We will have to wait for the Gemara to reconcile the final clause, but first we clarify the first clause.
The first clause says that a woman declares, “I will not benefit from people.” She does not say that she will not benefit from her husband. The Mishnah says that her husband cannot annul the vow. This seems to imply that the vow does not cause anguish. Why does it not cause anguish? Perhaps because she can still obtain food from the gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and corners of the field.
That cannot be the explanation. If that were the reason, the Mishnah should have said that the husband cannot annul the vow because she is able to benefit from these gifts. But the Mishnah does not use that language. Moreover, we learned earlier that if a woman vows not to benefit from a particular store, and the husband is the only person who can obtain food for her from that store, the husband can annul the vow. The fact that she could obtain gleanings would not remove the anguish in that case.
Thus, the reason the husband cannot annul the vow is not that she can obtain food from the gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and corners of the field. The reason is that her husband is not included among “people.” Since he is not included in the vow, he can continue to support her. She is not deprived of support from him, and therefore the vow does not cause anguish.
The Ran explains that the phrase allowing her to benefit from the gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and corners of the field is not the conclusion of the first clause. It is not explaining why the husband cannot annul the vow. Rather, it is an additional ruling: even though she prohibited herself from benefiting from people, she may still take these gifts from the field because they are not considered something given to her by the people.
We are nevertheless left with the difficulty in the final clause. The first clause seems to imply that the husband is not included among people, and therefore he can continue to support her. But the Mishnah then says that she may benefit from the gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and corners of the field. If her husband is supporting her, why does she need to take these gifts? Conversely, if her husband is included among people and cannot support her, then the husband should be able to annul the vow because it causes her anguish. Is the husband included among people or not?
That is the precise formulation of the question. The Mishnah appears to have contradictory implications. From the first clause, it seems that the husband is not included among people. That would explain why the husband cannot annul the vow: he can still support her, so there is no anguish. But from the clause allowing her to take the gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and corners of the field, it seems that she cannot rely on her husband and must obtain food from the public. That would suggest that the husband is included among people.
Ulla answers that the husband is not included among people, as we originally explained. That is why the vow does not cause anguish: even though she cannot benefit from other people, her husband can support her. The statement that she may take the gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and corners of the field gives an additional reason. Even if the husband is poor and unable to support her, the vow still does not cause sufficient anguish to permit annulment because she can take these gifts from the field.
Thus, according to Ulla, the Mishnah is not contradictory. The woman says that she will not benefit from people, but her husband is not included in that category and may therefore support her. Consequently, the vow does not cause anguish and the husband cannot annul it. Even if the husband is himself poor and cannot support her, she can still take the gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and corners of the field. Since those gifts are not considered something given to her by another person, she still has a source of food, and the vow does not reach the level of anguish that would permit annulment.