The Eddie B Sit edition presents an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, specifically focusing on Nedarim, Daf Peh Dalet. This daf is being studied le'iluy nishmat Mori Zkeni Rabbi Yosef ben Sarah and Rabbi Avraham ben Esther. May their souls be bound in the bond of life. Additionally, today's learning is dedicated l'refuah shleima for Sarah bat Rachel and Sarah Ruchama bat Rachel, as well as for Rachel bat Shulamit and Shem ben Dina. El na refa na lahem, El na refa na l'refuat hanefesh u'l'refuat haguf, ke'amur, v'chen yehi ratzon, v'nomar, Amen. Today’s study also commemorates the Yahrzeit of Victoria bat Zarifa. May their souls find rest in Gan Eden.
We begin today's daf on Peh Gimmel Amud Bet. To recap the sugia we are involved in, the Mishna states that a woman comes and declares, "Konam ani she'ene l'beriyot," meaning she forbids herself from deriving any benefit from others. The Gemara discusses why her husband cannot be mefer, or nullify, such a neder. The question arises: what is the pshat, or simple understanding, of this ruling? Following this, the Mishna indicates that she is muteret, or permitted, to benefit from leket, shikcha, and peah, which are entitlements for the poor. The Gemara begins to analyze this by suggesting that the reason her husband cannot nullify her neder is that it does not constitute inui nefesh, or suffering, since he can provide her with food. This implies that the husband is not included in the category of beriyot, or people, from whom she forbids herself to derive benefit.
As the discussion progresses, the Gemara raises a question based on the seifa, or latter part, of the Mishna, which states that she can benefit from leket, shikcha, and peah. This leads to a contradiction: if she can eat from these sources, is her husband included in the category of beriyot or not? The Gemara initially suggests that the husband is not included, thus allowing him to provide her with sustenance, which negates the claim of inui nefesh. However, the Gemara also presents the view of Ulla, who asserts that the husband is indeed not included in the beriyot, allowing him to support her financially.
Furthermore, the Gemara continues to explore the implications of this ruling. Even if the husband is poor and cannot support her, she still has access to leket, shikcha, and peah, indicating that she is not suffering. Thus, the husband cannot nullify her neder. Rava then counters Ulla's position, arguing that the husband is included in the beriyot. If this is the case, the question arises: why can't he nullify the neder? The Gemara explains that since she is eligible to receive leket, shikcha, and peah, it is not considered inui nefesh, as she can obtain sustenance from other sources.
The Ran elaborates on Rava's position, emphasizing that even though the Mishna does not explicitly state the reason for the husband's inability to nullify the neder, it can be inferred that the availability of leket, shikcha, and peah is a significant factor. The Gemara then raises a question regarding a previous case where a woman forbade herself from deriving benefit from the fruits of a specific store, which was the only place her husband could obtain credit. In that instance, the husband was permitted to nullify her neder. The Gemara challenges this by suggesting that if she is eligible for leket, shikcha, and peah, he should not have been able to nullify her neder either.
Ultimately, the Gemara reconciles these differing opinions by stating that the husband is generally not included in the category of beriyot when it comes to his wife’s neder. However, in specific circumstances, such as when the woman is divorced, the husband becomes part of the beriyot again. The Gemara concludes that if the woman is married, the husband can provide for her, thus allowing him to nullify her neder. However, if they are divorced, she can only benefit from leket, shikcha, and peah.
Next, the Gemara discusses the status of ma'aser ani, or the poor man's tithe. It questions why the Mishna does not mention that she can benefit from ma'aser ani, despite a Braita stating that she can. The Gemara concludes that this is a machloket, or dispute, between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis. Rabbi Eliezer holds that one does not need to designate the poor man's tithe when purchasing from an am ha'aretz, or an unlearned person, because he does not suspect that they failed to give the ma'aser ani.
The Rabbis, on the other hand, argue that people do not make their belongings hefker, or ownerless, and thus they are considered chashud, or suspect, regarding ma'aser ani. The Gemara clarifies that according to Rabbi Eliezer, the am ha'aretz is not suspected of failing to give ma'aser ani because he could have made his possessions hefker to benefit legally. In contrast, the Rabbis maintain that individuals are hesitant to make their possessions hefker, fearing that others may take them.
Abaye then challenges the understanding of the machloket, asserting that everyone agrees that if there is a doubt regarding ma'aser ani, it is considered tevel, or untithed. However, he questions why Rabbi Eliezer does not require the designation of ma'aser ani when purchasing from an am ha'aretz. The Gemara ultimately resolves this by explaining that the distinction lies in the context of where the ma'aser ani is distributed. If it is in the granary, the poor can take it without any obligation of giving, whereas once it is brought into the house, it requires a formal giving process.
Thus, the Mishna concludes that a woman who forbids herself from deriving benefit from others may still receive leket, shikcha, and peah, but ma'aser ani is prohibited due to the nature of how it is given. The discussion highlights the nuances of halachic reasoning, the importance of context in determining eligibility for benefits, and the distinctions made between different forms of tithes and their implications for individuals under vows.