The Mishnah begins by citing a verse from the portion of vows, which states that "a widow or a divorcee makes a vow, any vow that she makes is binding upon her." The Gemara immediately questions the novelty of this statement. It seems self-evident that if a woman is a widow or a divorcee, she has no husband to annul her vows; therefore, any vow she makes would naturally be binding. What specific case does the verse come to teach us?
The Gemara explains that the verse addresses a nuanced scenario: a woman makes a vow, for instance, "I will be a Nazirite in thirty days." At the time she utters the vow, she is a widow or a divorcee, meaning she has no husband. However, by the time the vow is activated—thirty days later—she is married. The question then arises: how do we determine the validity and annulability of such a vow? Do we consider her status at the time the vow was uttered, or at the time it takes effect?
If we follow her status at the time of utterance, since she was a widow or a divorcee, the vow is binding, and her subsequent husband has no right to annul it. But if we follow her status at the time the vow takes effect, thirty days later, she is married, and her husband would have the right to annul it. The Mishnah's ruling, "the husband cannot annul," teaches us that vows follow the time of utterance. Thus, even if she is married when the vow is activated, because she was unmarried when she made it, the husband has no rights. This is the understanding of the Mishnah: the vow of a widow or divorcee is binding, meaning the husband has no rights, even if she later marries, because we consider her status at the time she made the vow.
The Rambam clarifies this point, explaining that the verse addresses a case where the woman eventually remarries. While she was a widow or divorcee when she made the vow, and the vow is not activated until thirty days later, by which time she is married, we still follow the time the vow was uttered. We have learned many times in tractate Nedarim that a husband has no right to annul vows made by his wife prior to their marriage. This is considered a vow made prior to marriage, and therefore the husband has no rights.
This was the first case. Now, we move to the second case. What if she makes a vow while married, but before it takes effect, she becomes a divorcee or a widow? For example, she says, "I accept upon myself Nazirite status, but it will not take effect until thirty days from now." Within those thirty days, she becomes divorced or widowed. In this scenario, the husband can annul the vow. Why? Because the vow follows the time it was uttered. Since she was married when she made the vow, the husband has the right to annul it, even though by the time it takes effect, she is no longer married. Thus, this principle applies both stringently and leniently. In the first case, where she was unmarried at utterance, the husband cannot annul (stringent for the husband). In the second case, where she was married at utterance, the husband can annul (lenient for the husband).
Case number three presents an interesting scenario: Nadra Bo Bayom – she made a vow on the very day. What does this mean? She got married on a certain day, and on that same day, she made a vow. Then, on that very same day, she got divorced. And then, on that same day, her husband remarried her. So, in one day, she got married, made a vow, got divorced, and then remarried the same man. The Mishnah rules that the husband does not have the right to annul this vow. Why? Because any time she leaves her husband's domain, even for one second, the husband loses his rights over vows made during that period. Since there was a divorce, even temporarily, the husband lost his initial rights. When he remarries her, these vows are considered "previous vows" from before this new marriage, and a husband cannot annul such vows. Even though it was his marriage, once there was a break in the action—a divorce—when she returns to him, the husband loses rights over those vows.
The Rashi elaborates on a similar case not explicitly mentioned in the Mishnah. What if they were merely betrothed (Erusin), got divorced from the betrothal, and then got re-betrothed? The same rule applies: the husband cannot annul. Normally, during betrothal, the father and the betrothed man have joint rights to annul vows. However, once a girl gets married (Nisuin), she permanently leaves her father's domain. So, if she got married, then divorced, and then re-betrothed, the father can no longer annul her vows. Since the father cannot annul, the husband cannot annul alone either. Therefore, whether it was a re-marriage or re-betrothal, the husband cannot annul. These are the three basic cases of our Mishnah, which follows the Tanna who holds that vows are judged based on the time of utterance.
The Gemara then introduces a teaching from a Braita: "A widow or a divorcee says, 'I will be a Nazirite when I get married.'" Rabbi Yishmael says the husband has rights to annul, while Rabbi Akiva says no. Rabbi Yishmael's logic is that the annulment of vows follows the time of the vow's activation. Since the vow is activated at the time of marriage, and she is married then, the husband has rights. Rabbi Akiva, who is the author of our Mishnah, argues that the annulment follows the time of utterance. Since she was unmarried when she made the vow, the husband has no rights. This is a fundamental dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva: does annulment follow the utterance or the activation of the vow?
The Gemara provides a mnemonic to remember the order of subsequent cases. It then presents another case from the Braita: a married woman says, "I will become a Nazirite when I become divorced." Eventually, she gets divorced. Rabbi Yishmael is consistent: since the vow is activated at the time of divorce, and at that point there is no husband, the husband has no right to annul during their marriage. Rabbi Akiva is also consistent: since the vow was uttered during the marriage, the husband has rights to annul, regardless of when it is activated.
Rabbi Yishmael attempts to prove his point from the verse: "A widow or a divorcee makes a vow, her vow is binding upon her." He interprets "vow" to mean that it is binding at the time it takes effect. In the case of a widow or divorcee who says she will be a Nazirite when she remarries, the vow is not truly a "vow" until she gets married. At that point, when the vow becomes binding, the husband would have rights to annul. Rabbi Akiva counters that "binding" refers to the time of utterance. The moment she forbids herself, the vow becomes binding. Therefore, the vow of a widow or divorcee is binding at the time of utterance, and the husband has no right to annul.
The Gemara then asks, "Is it obvious that our Mishnah follows Rabbi Akiva?" Rav Chisda says it is obvious, because our Mishnah states that if a widow or divorcee says she will be a Nazirite in thirty days, the husband cannot annul, even if she is married when the vow takes effect. This aligns with Rabbi Akiva's view that we follow the time of utterance.
However, Abaye challenges this, stating there is a fundamental difference between the case of the Mishnah and the case of the Braita. The Mishnah discusses a vow contingent on a specific time ("in thirty days"), while the Braita discusses a vow contingent on marriage ("when I get married"). Abaye explains that in the Mishnah's case, where the vow is for "thirty days," it is possible that the thirty days could pass without her getting married. Thus, the vow has viability even without marriage, and she retains rights over it. Therefore, even Rabbi Yishmael would agree that the husband has no rights, because she did not make it contingent on marriage. Rabbi Yishmael only holds that we follow the activation of the vow when it is contingent on a marriage or divorce, meaning the utterance and activation must occur in different domains (e.g., single at utterance, married at activation). But in the Mishnah's case, it's possible for both the utterance and activation to be in her own domain (if she doesn't marry within 30 days). In such a case, even Rabbi Yishmael would agree that the husband has no rights. Abaye thus limits Rabbi Yishmael's opinion to cases where the utterance and activation necessarily fall under different jurisdictions.
The Rambam concludes that we follow Rabbi Akiva in all cases. This means we always go after the time of utterance. So, even if she says, "I will be a Nazirite when I get married," since she said it when unmarried, the husband has no rights. Conversely, if she says while married, "I will be a Nazirite when I get divorced," the husband has rights to annul, even though it will only be activated after the divorce. This principle applies whether it is lenient or stringent for the husband.
The Gemara then refers to an earlier Mishnah on a different page, which states, "This is the rule: as long as she did not enter her own domain, even for one second, the father and husband have joint rights to annul the daughter's vows." The Gemara asks what this rule comes to include. It explains a scenario: a betrothed girl's husband sends messengers to bring her for marriage. Normally, once the messengers arrive, she is considered in the husband's jurisdiction. But if her father accompanies her, or sends his own messengers, he is still involved, and they retain joint rights. This is the novelty of that Mishnah.
Returning to our Mishnah, which discussed the case of a woman who married, vowed, divorced, and remarried all on the same day, ruling that the husband cannot annul. The Mishnah makes a general statement that any time she leaves the husband's domain, even temporarily, he loses rights over subsequent vows. The Gemara asks what novelty this general statement comes to teach. It explains a case where the father hands over his betrothed daughter to the husband's messengers (or the father's messengers hand her over to the husband's messengers) for marriage. Once the father has conclusively given her over for marriage, he is out of the picture. The novelty is that even though she has not yet actually married (she is still technically betrothed), once the father is removed, there are no longer joint rights. Since the husband cannot annul alone during betrothal, he cannot annul these vows. Thus, the husband cannot annul vows made after the father's removal, even if she is still betrothed and not yet fully married.
The next Mishnah introduces three basic scenarios where a girl's vows are solely in her own domain, meaning her father has no rights to annul them. These are: 1) A Bogeret, a girl who has matured (reached 12 years and 6 months). A father only has rights over a minor girl. 2) A Yetoma, an actual orphan whose father has died. 3) A Yetoma V'Hayeh Aviha, an "orphan with a living father." This refers to a girl who got married and then divorced. Once a girl gets married, she permanently leaves her father's domain. Even if she divorces and returns to her father's house, he never regains his rights. She is considered like an orphan regarding her father's authority over her vows.
The Mishnah then presents nine cases, which are simply elaborations of these three fundamental scenarios. For example, the first three cases combine the "orphan with a living father" status with whether she was a minor or a mature woman when she made the vow or when the divorce occurred. The next three cases deal with an actual orphan (father died), again varying her age at the time. The final three cases focus on the status of a Bogeret, regardless of her father's status. The Gemara explains that the Mishnah presents these nine cases not to introduce new rules, but to sharpen the students' understanding by illustrating various combinations of these three core principles.
Rabbi Yehudah adds a further point: if a father married off his daughter when she was a minor (Ketana), and she then became a widow or divorcee while still a minor, and then returned to her father's house while still a minor or even a minor girl, her father still loses his rights. One might think that a marriage of a minor does not conclusively remove her from her father's domain, but Rabbi Yehudah teaches that any marriage, even of a minor, permanently removes her from her father's domain regarding vows. Thus, if she makes a vow as a minor girl after such a marriage and divorce, her father has no rights.
The Gemara concludes that this entire Mishnah follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. The Sages, however, would simply state the three core cases. The reason for the nine cases, as quoted by the Rambam from the Yerushalmi, is merely to sharpen the students' analytical skills by presenting various permutations of these principles.
The next Mishnah discusses conditional vows. A woman makes a vow contingent on another factor, which, if it occurs, will affect her husband. A husband can annul vows that affect him (Beno) or cause him distress (Inu'i Nefesh). The Mishnah presents two cases. Case one: "I forbid myself from my father (or your father) if I serve you (my husband)." Case two: "I forbid myself from you (my husband) if I serve my father (or your father)." In both cases, the husband can annul. The Mishnah uses the phrase "Not only this, but even that," indicating that the second case is the greater novelty.
Let's analyze why the husband can annul in both. In the first case, she vows to forbid herself from her father if she serves her husband. The husband can annul because her vow affects him. If she serves him, she becomes forbidden to her father, which is considered an "Inu'i Nefesh" (distress) for the husband, as it limits her interactions. If she refrains from serving him, she fulfills her vow, but this also affects the husband, as she is not serving him. Either way, the husband is affected, giving him the right to annul.
The second case is the greater novelty: "I forbid myself from you (my husband) if I serve my father." At this point, she is not forbidden to her husband. She can simply avoid serving her father and continue to be permitted to her husband. So why can the husband annul? The novelty is that such a vow is inherently impossible to fulfill indefinitely. Eventually, she will inevitably serve her father in some capacity, thereby activating the vow and forbidding herself from her husband. Since it is a vow that will inevitably be broken, the husband has the right to annul it, even before the condition is met. This teaches that even a conditional vow, before its activation, can be annulled if it inevitably leads to a state that affects the husband.
The Mishnah then introduces a dispute regarding these conditional vows. In the first case ("I forbid myself from my father if I serve you"), Ben Hattan says the husband cannot annul, while the Sages say he can. Ben Hattan's logic is that there is no active vow yet; it is merely conditional. The Sages, however, hold that it can be annulled. In the second case, ("I forbid myself from all Jews, including you, if I have marital relations with you once"), Ben Hattan says he cannot annul, while the Sages say he can. This case is also a novelty. If she has relations once, she is forbidden forever. If she refrains, she is denying her husband his marital rights. Either way, the husband is affected. The novelty of the Sages' view is that even in such a case, where the vow has immediate implications, they still permit annulment. The novelty of Ben Hattan's view is that even in such a case, where the vow has immediate implications, he still says it cannot be annulled because it is not yet fully activated. The Gemara concludes that these cases highlight the differing views on whether a conditional vow can be annulled before its condition is met, especially when it inevitably affects the husband.