We begin our study on Petach Amud Bet, five lines from the bottom, with the phrase "Ha'ug Avrah." We are revisiting a fundamental dispute in Nedarim between the Sages and Rabbi Natan concerning a husband's ability to annul a vow before it takes effect. According to Rabbi Natan, a husband cannot annul a vow until it has become active. For instance, if a vow is conditional, it cannot be annulled until the condition is met. The Sages, however, contend that in certain cases, a husband can annul a vow even before it is activated, thereby preventing it from taking effect. This was the subject of our previous discussion, and the Gemara now delves deeper into this issue.
The Gemara presents a case: A man forbade himself from benefiting from the entire world if he were to marry before learning Torah. His intention was to create an incentive for himself to study. He declared, "I will not benefit from the entire world if I marry without first learning Torah." He diligently pursued Torah study, taking his staff and purse, symbolizing his earnest efforts. However, he was unsuccessful in his studies. Consequently, if he were to marry now, the entire world would become forbidden to him.
Rav Huna bar Rav Avuna approached him and, in a clever maneuver, tricked him. He told the man, "Don't worry, if you get married, nothing will happen; your vow will be permissible." Trusting this, the man got married. After the wedding, Rav Huna bar Rav Avuna intentionally soiled the groom's clothes. This act was meant to demonstrate to the newlywed that he now needed the services of other people, specifically a cleaner, to restore his garment. The problem, however, was that the man had just married as an ignoramus, and his vow had therefore taken effect, forbidding him from benefiting from others. What was the wisdom behind the rabbi's actions?
The man then came before Rav Chisda, seeking an annulment of vows. He explained, "I need people's help; my garment is dirty, I've been married for a while, and I need to benefit from others, but I made a vow." Rav Chisda exclaimed, "What a wise man who did such a thing to you by telling you to get married! It must have been Rav Huna bar Rav Avuna who gave you this idea; he is a great man." Rav Chisda understood that Rav Huna bar Rav Avuna holds that just as Rabbi Natan and the Sages dispute whether a husband can annul a vow before it is activated, they also dispute whether a rabbi can annul a vow before it is activated. Therefore, Rav Huna bar Rav Avuna was very clever because before the man got married, the vow was not activated. This means the vow was conditional: "I am forbidden to the whole world until I get married." Before marriage, there was nothing to annul. According to Rabbi Natan, one cannot seek annulment from a rabbi until the vow is active. Just as a husband cannot annul a vow before its activation, a rabbi cannot annul a vow until it is activated. Rav Huna bar Rav Avuna's wisdom lay in getting the man married, thereby activating the vow. Once married, the vow was active. Then, by soiling his clothes, he compelled the man to seek annulment. The wisdom of Rav Huna bar Rav Avuna was that, even though according to the Sages one could annul a vow even before activation, he wanted to be stringent and cover all opinions. Therefore, he had the man marry, told him not to worry, and then brought him to seek annulment from a court of three or a wise person, ensuring all halachic opinions were satisfied. This is one way of understanding the story: Rav Huna bar Rav Avuna put the man in a situation where the annulment would be accepted by all halachic authorities.
The Gemara then learns a verse as follows: "And he shall annul her vow." This implies that annulment can only occur "if there is a building there," meaning if there is a structure or an existing vow. This is how Rabbi Natan understands it. The Sages, however, believe that a husband can annul a vow even if it has not yet taken effect, as it is written, "He annuls the thoughts of the cunning." This suggests that one can annul even a thought, something not yet a full vow, which serves as the source for the Sages' opinion. However, when it comes to approaching a rabbi, everyone agrees that the rabbi can only permit a vow if it has actually taken effect. The verse "He shall not profane his word" implies that the individual himself cannot uproot a vow that has taken effect, but someone else can, provided it has taken effect. Thus, from this verse, everyone learns that a wise person can only permit vows if they have been activated.
The Gemara then brings a proof for the opinion of Papi, who holds that everyone agrees a vow must be active for a rabbi to annul it. A man declares, "Let my property be forbidden to so-and-so, and the rabbi to whom I go for annulment of this vow shall also be forbidden to benefit from me." This creates two vows: one against Mr. A, and another against the rabbi who annuls the first. The text states that he first seeks annulment for the vow against Mr. A, and only then, once that vow is annulled and the rabbi's vow therefore becomes activated, does he seek annulment for the vow against the rabbi. This sequence implies that a rabbi can only annul vows that are active. If one could annul a vow before activation, why the specific order? He could annul the vow against the rabbi first, even if it wasn't yet active. The Gemara responds that "first" and "second" do not necessarily refer to the order in which the vows were made, but simply to the order in which they are annulled. He can annul whichever one he chooses first, and then the second. Therefore, this is not a proof.
The Gemara attempts another proof from a similar case: A man vows, "I will not derive benefit from Mr. A, and I will become a Nazirite when I seek annulment for that vow." Again, there is a sequence: he first seeks annulment for the vow against Mr. A, and only then, when he becomes a Nazirite, does he seek annulment for his Nazirite vow. This again suggests that activation is required for a rabbi to annul. If activation wasn't necessary, he could annul the Nazirite vow first. The Gemara replies that the author of this Baraita is Rabbi Natan, who holds that even for a husband's annulment, activation is required. Therefore, he would also hold that for a rabbi's annulment, activation is required. This does not prove that everyone agrees on this point.
The Gemara then presents a different understanding, reversing Papi's position. According to this view, regarding a husband's annulment, there is a dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Sages. However, regarding a rabbi's annulment, everyone agrees that one can annul a vow even before it is active. This leads to three different interpretations of annulment by a rabbi: (1) it's a dispute, (2) everyone agrees activation is required, or (3) everyone agrees activation is not required. The source for the third view is the verse "He shall not profane his word." "His word" refers to his utterance, not necessarily a fully activated vow. The individual himself cannot uproot his word, but someone else can, even if it's only words and not yet a full vow. This implies that a wise person can annul even before the vow is activated. The Gemara asks, "Does this teach me that even if there is no action, meaning it's only an utterance, one can annul?" Yes, "He shall not profane his word" means he cannot uproot his word, but someone else can. So, a wise person can annul even before the vow is activated.
The Gemara then reintroduces the previous proofs as questions against this new version. "What do you mean, you don't need activation for anyone?" The case of "Let my property be forbidden to so-and-so, and the rabbi to whom I go for annulment of this vow shall also be forbidden to benefit from me." Why must he annul the first vow then the second? If activation isn't needed, he can annul either one first. The Gemara gives the same answer: "first" and "second" refer to the order of annulment, not the order of creation. However, the second proof, "I will not derive benefit from Mr. A, and I will become a Nazirite when I seek annulment for that vow," remains a question. If activation isn't necessary for anyone, why the specific order? He could annul the Nazirite vow first. And one cannot answer that this follows Rabbi Natan, because this opinion states that everyone agrees activation is not required for a rabbi's annulment. The Gemara concludes that this indeed remains an unresolved question.
In summary, regarding a husband's annulment of his wife's vows, everyone agrees it is a dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Sages. Rabbi Natan requires the vow to be active, while the Sages permit annulment even before activation. However, regarding a rabbi's annulment, there are three interpretations: (1) it's a dispute, (2) everyone agrees activation is required, or (3) everyone agrees activation is not required.
Now, let's determine the halacha. On the bottom of Tzadi Amud Rishon, the first white line, it states: "Ulinyan Halacha." We follow the opinion of the Sages, which is obvious. A husband can annul vows even before they are active. This is because we follow the majority opinion against Rabbi Natan. Furthermore, we learned from Rabbi Akiva that if a woman makes a vow while married, saying, "I will accept this prohibition of Nazirite vow when I get divorced," Rabbi Akiva says that the husband has the right to annul it at the time she made the vow, even though it will only be activated after the divorce. This shows that activation is not needed for a husband's annulment.
One might ask: Didn't Rav Chisda praise Rav Huna bar Rav Avuna for activating the vow, suggesting that we should be stringent like Rabbi Natan? The answer is that Rav Chisda praised him for being stringent and covering all bases, but this does not mean the halacha is necessarily that way. It was merely a commendable act of stringency. Therefore, it is clear that when it comes to a husband, he can annul vows even before they are active. This applies to conditional vows, such as those that take effect after a certain period, or upon a divorce, or contingent on some other event that does not immediately activate the vow.
The text clarifies that this applies, for example, if a wife vows, "I will be forbidden to my husband if I derive benefit from my father or your father." In such a case, from the husband's perspective, it is a vow that causes him suffering, and the condition itself is difficult to keep, making it almost inevitable that she will break it. She desires to give benefit to her father or his father. In such inevitable vows that are not yet activated, the husband has the right to annul. However, if the vow is not inevitable, for example, "I will not eat food," and she can easily avoid the condition, then the husband does not need to annul it before it takes effect, because she can simply avoid fulfilling the condition. Annulment is only for cases where the condition is difficult and inevitable, causing suffering to the husband.
What about annulment by a rabbi? We have discussed a husband's annulment, where we follow the Sages. For a rabbi's annulment, the halacha is stringent: everyone agrees the vow must be activated before the rabbi can annul it. However, there is an interesting opinion: Some want to suggest a novel idea. If a woman says, "This item will be forbidden to me after 30 days," it is considered that the vow is already active. How is this possible? Rabbi Natan and the Sages' dispute regarding activation only applies to vows that might never be activated, where the condition might never occur. But a vow that is certain to be activated in a matter of time is considered active immediately. Therefore, if a woman says her vow will take effect in 30 days, it is automatically considered active, and one can go to a rabbi to annul it. This contrasts with a vow like "when I get divorced" (which may never happen) or "if I give benefit to my father" (which she might not do). In such uncertain cases, the dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Sages applies. But where activation is merely a matter of time, everyone agrees it is considered active, and both a rabbi and a husband can annul it.
The Ran, however, prefers the first opinion, which states that whether a vow is active or not depends solely on whether it has actually taken effect, regardless of its type (automatic or not). So, according to the Ran, a husband can annul a vow that is not yet active if it might never become active. But if a vow is certainly going to be active in a matter of time, everyone agrees it can be annulled. The practical difference (Nafka Mina) would be for a rabbi's annulment. While we generally said that for a rabbi's annulment, activation is required, the novel idea is that if a vow is made to take effect in 30 days, it is considered active immediately, and one can go to a rabbi. For example, if a man vows, "I will not eat grapes in 30 days," he can go to a rabbi now. But if he vows, "I will not eat grapes if I visit this house," this is open-ended. If he visits the house, it becomes active, and he can go to a rabbi. But since it's not automatic, it's not considered active until the condition is met, and therefore he cannot go to a rabbi before then. This is the opinion of the Ran.
The Mishnah then discusses three types of women who are divorced but still receive their marriage contract (Ketubah). Initially, the law stated that three women are divorced with their Ketubah. What are these three cases? Case one: A woman says, "I am impure to you." This means she claims to have been with another man. If she is a regular Israelite woman married to an Israelite man and willingly went with another man, she would certainly lose her Ketubah and be divorced. If she was raped (Anusa), she would not have to leave her husband. Therefore, this case must refer to the wife of a Kohen. If a Kohen's wife willingly went with another man, she loses her Ketubah and is divorced. But if she was raped, she is still forbidden to her Kohen husband, even though it was against her will. This is a stringency for a Kohen. In this case, she must be divorced, but she receives her Ketubah. Why? Because she can argue, "It's your misfortune that you are a Kohen. If I were married to an Israelite, I wouldn't lose my Ketubah. It's not my fault you're a Kohen." Therefore, she receives her Ketubah. So, the first case is a Kohen's wife who was raped.
Case two: She says, "Heaven knows what is between me and your children." The Ran explains this refers to a woman claiming her husband is infertile. She says, "Only God knows that you lack the ability to father children." While she is not obligated in the mitzvah of procreation (Piru U'Rivu), which is the husband's obligation, she can claim that she desires a child for support in her old age. Therefore, she has a valid claim for divorce and receives her Ketubah.
Case three: She says, "I am forbidden to all Jews for intimacy." This means she has taken a vow forbidding herself from intimacy with all Jewish men, including her husband. This might be due to pain or discomfort during intimacy. Since she is effectively "raped" each time she is forced into intimacy, the husband cannot compel her. Therefore, she is divorced and receives her Ketubah, as it is not her fault. These were the three initial cases where a woman's claim alone, without proof, was sufficient for divorce with a Ketubah.
However, the rabbis later reversed this. They were concerned that women might abuse this power to pursue other men or break vows. For example, a woman might claim "I am impure to you" to get a divorce and marry someone else, or to get her Ketubah and run off with another man. Or, in the case of the vow, she might go to a place where her vow is unknown, break it, and marry someone else. To prevent such situations, the rabbis decreed that a woman must provide proof for her claims. If she claims "I am impure to you," she must prove it. If she claims "Heaven knows," the husband is instructed to try to reconcile with her. And in the case of the vow forbidding intimacy, the husband is told to annul his part of the vow, leaving her forbidden to other Jews. This was the later rabbinic decree.
The Ran discusses this interesting point. Initially, if a woman claimed "I am impure to you," she was forbidden to her husband and received her Ketubah. But then the rabbis came and said, "No, you must prove it; stay married until you bring proof." The Ran asks: How can the rabbis uproot a law that made her forbidden to her husband and now say she can remain with him? Rabbis generally have the power to make passive decrees, but not to actively permit what was forbidden. The Ran rejects the idea that this is a temporary measure, like a prophet's temporary permission to offer sacrifices outside the Temple. If it's a permanent decree that she must return to her husband, how can they override the original law?
The Ran offers a novel interpretation, though he ultimately rejects it. He suggests that any marriage is made "according to the law of Moses and Israel," meaning the rabbis have power over marriages and can annul them as they see fit. So, if a Kohen's wife was raped and claimed "I am impure to you," the rabbis could say that at the moment she was raped, they temporarily annulled her marriage. Thus, she was not married to the Kohen at that time, and her intimacy with the other man did not make her forbidden to her Kohen husband. Therefore, she could return to him. However, the Ran rejects this because it would only apply if she was raped by a permissible man. If she was raped by a Mamzer or a Chalal, she would become forbidden to her Kohen husband regardless, and the rabbinic annulment of the marriage would not help. Therefore, this explanation is insufficient.
The Ran provides another answer, which he accepts: The original ruling that a woman who says "I am impure to you" must leave her husband was itself a stringency (Chumra) imposed by the rabbis. When they saw that this stringency was being abused, they reverted to the original, more lenient law, which requires proof. Thus, they were not uprooting a biblical law, but rather adjusting a rabbinic stringency. They made it more difficult for her to obtain a divorce without proof, to prevent abuse.
Now, let's consider a simple case: If a woman tells her husband, "I am impure to you," can she eat Terumah? Let's set aside the question of whether she stays married. If she remains married because she needs to bring proof, the question is whether her declaration alone, even without proof, makes her forbidden from eating Terumah. If she actually went with another man, she would be forbidden to her Kohen husband and lose her right to eat Terumah. But since we don't believe her without proof for the purpose of divorce, perhaps we don't believe her for the purpose of Terumah either. Or perhaps her declaration is enough to forbid her from Terumah, even if she remains married.
Rav Sheshat says, "Let her eat." Why? "So that she does not cast aspersion on her children." The concern is not for her existing children, who are known to be Kohanim. Rather, if she stops eating Terumah, people might infer that something happened, and any subsequent children she has with this Kohen would be tainted, as they might not be Kohanim. Therefore, to protect the future status of her children, she should continue eating Terumah. Rava, however, disagrees. He says, "No, she should not eat Terumah." People will not necessarily conclude that her children are tainted. They might simply assume she has no Terumah to eat and is eating regular food (Chullin). Therefore, not eating Terumah would not cast aspersion on her children.
The Gemara then asks: If she becomes a widow, does she still eat Terumah? Normally, a widow of a Kohen can eat Terumah. However, in this case, she would be forbidden from eating Terumah. Why? The reason Rav Sheshat permitted her to eat Terumah was to prevent aspersion on her children. Once she is widowed, she will no longer have children with the Kohen. If people see her not eating Terumah after she becomes a widow, they might assume she did something after her husband's death that made her forbidden to eat Terumah. This would not retroactively affect her children's status. Therefore, the concern for "aspersion on her children" no longer applies, and she would be forbidden from Terumah. A Kohen's widow can generally eat Terumah, even if raped. But if she willingly went with a disqualified man (Pasul), like a Mamzer or Chalal, she loses her right to Terumah.
So, Rav Sheshat's logic was: While married, she should continue eating Terumah to avoid casting aspersion on her children. But once widowed, this concern is gone. If she stops eating Terumah, people will attribute it to something that happened after her widowhood, not to something that would retroactively affect her children's status. Thus, the reason for permitting her to eat Terumah ceases.
We revisit a previous point: Rava asked, "Does a Kohen's wife who was raped receive her Ketubah or not?" We answered this question from our Mishnah. The Mishnah states that a woman who tells her husband, "I am impure to you," receives her Ketubah. If this were a regular Israelite woman, if she willingly went with another man, she would not receive her Ketubah. If she was raped, she would not have to be divorced. Therefore, the Mishnah must be referring to a Kohen's wife who was raped. In this case, she must be divorced, but she receives her Ketubah. This is the only way to understand the Mishnah's ruling that she receives her Ketubah. Thus, a Kohen's wife who was raped receives her Ketubah.